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Chapter 1
Introduction
Le changement structurel est un processus ne´cessaire qui ame´liore conside´ra-
blement les conditions de vie dans nos socie´te´s. Il peut de´couler par exemple de
l’introduction de nouvelles avance´es technologiques qui permettent d’augmenter
a` long terme la productivite´ agre´ge´e dans nos e´conomies. En retour, la hausse de
la productivite´ a un impact sur notre consommation de tous les jours. Elle nous
permet notamment de vivre dans un plus grand confort. Les individus peuvent
alors s’e´panouir dans leur ensemble. Il est e´vident que le changement structurel
peut prendre d’autres formes que celle du changement technologique, mais il est
souvent issu d’une transformation des forces qui influencent les marche´s et en
ge´ne´ral aboutit a` long terme a` une ame´lioration du bien-eˆtre global.
Mais le changement structurel est aussi un processus douloureux. Il peut
durer plusieurs de´cennies et, durant cette pe´riode, nous sommes beaucoup a`
devoir en supporter les couˆts. Comme nous allons l’illustrer dans ce chapitre
introductif, le changement structurel a pour conse´quence une modification du
rapport aux facteurs de production, ce qui alors me`ne a` modifier l’ensemble
des prix relatifs qui caracte´risent une e´conomie. En particulier, la modifica-
tion des prix est due a` une transformation des demandes relatives de facteurs.
Ces derniers se re´ve`lent alors inutiles a` l’exe´cution de certaines taˆches ou sont
fortement demande´s dans d’autres points de l’e´conomie.
Le changement structurel entraˆıne alors souvent un processus de re´allocation.
Des pans entiers de travailleurs doivent par conse´quent se re´allouer a` d’autres
taˆches. Les lois du marche´ les incitent ainsi a` devoir s’adapter a` un nouveau
contexte, mais elles le font pour un futur meilleur.
Cette the`se s’inte´resse a` cette proble´matique. Elle suppose que tout pro-
cessus de changement structurel implique un mouvement de re´allocation des
facteurs de production, notamment des travailleurs puisqu’il s’agit d’une the`se
en e´conomie du travail, mais qu’un tel processus engendre souvent des couˆts
non ne´gligeables. Elle se veut surtout positive, mais la nature des questions
qu’elle pose me`ne naturellement a` un de´bat normatif. Par exemple, elle cherche
des re´ponses aux interrogations suivantes: comment s’ajuste une e´conomie au
changement structurel? Quelle est la nature des couˆts associe´s au changement?
Ces couˆts peuvent-ils en exce´der les gains? Le processus de re´allocation vaut-
il vraiment la peine? Les gains issus d’un tel processus sont-ils distribue´s de
manie`re e´gale?
Ce chapitre introductif est divise´ en deux parties. Nous allons tout d’abord
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de´velopper la proble´matique que nous venons de de´crire plus haut. Puis, nous
de´crirons l’ensemble des contributions de la the`se a` cette litte´rature et en quoi
elles s’inse`rent dans un tel contexte.
1.1 Elaboration d’une proble´matique
1.1.1 Le changement structurel
Qu’entend-on par changement structurel ? En statistique, le changement
structurel correspond a` une modification des parame`tres d’une structure ge´ne´rant
une se´rie temporelle. De la meˆme manie`re, en e´conomie, on parle de changement
structurel lorsque les parame`tres de´finissant une e´conomie se modifient.
Nous conside´rons que deux groupes de parame`tres forment la base de la
structure d’une e´conomie. D’une part, une e´conomie subit un changement
structurel quand la technologie qui est a` sa disposition e´volue. D’autre part, le
changement structurel intervient lorsque les pre´fe´rences des me´nages en matie`re
de consommation se transforment. Ces deux classes de parame`tres correspon-
dent naturellement aux deux branches traditionnelles de la the´orie de l’e´quilibre
ge´ne´rale, telles que sont l’offre et la demande.
De meˆme, nous voyons comme inclus dans ces deux groupes l’ensemble des
frictions qui alte`rent l’adoption d’une technologie particulie`re ou l’acce`s a` la con-
sommation d’un bien spe´cifique. Par exemple, une plus grande transparence du
marche´ du cre´dit favorisant l’adoption de nouvelles technologies correspondrait
a` un changement structurel.
L’ide´e de changement structurel va cependant au dela` d’une simple modifica-
tion de parame`tres. Un tel processus doit e´galement eˆtre important d’un point
de vue quantitatif. Pour revenir a` notre pre´ce´dente analogie, en statistique,
nous dirions qu’il doit eˆtre significatif. En e´conomie, il s’agit d’un bouleverse-
ment pour l’ensemble de la socie´te´. Il affecte une majorite´ de la population et,
dans certains cas, il n’est meˆme pas anticipe´.
Le changement structurel peut eˆtre le re´sultat d’une se´rie de facteurs. Par
exemple, il peut eˆtre l’issue d’investissement en recherche et de´veloppement.
Certaines firmes, a` la recherche de profits, investissent financie`rement pour
la de´couverte de nouvelles technologies leur permettant d’augmenter leur pro-
ductivite´ ou d’acque´rir des revenues supple´mentaires en revendant des droits
a` d’autres entreprises graˆce a` l’obtention de brevets. La technologie qui se
re´ve`le supe´rieure est alors progressivement adopte´e par l’ensemble des firmes.
L’informatique en est l’exemple le plus marquant. De la meˆme manie`re, la
recherche permet la cre´ation de nouveaux biens de consommations et la pub-
licite´ la promotion d’autres biens.
Le changement structurel peut aussi de´couler de l’e´volution des mentalite´s.
Par exemple, la morale peut amener une socie´te´ a` interdire certains moyens
de production et a` en favoriser d’autres. C’est le cas du travail des enfants
par exemple. Ou encore, la pression politique de certains groupes peut ge´ne´rer
des effets similaires; l’interdiction ou l’utilisation des organismes ge´ne´tiquement
modifie´s pourrait correspondre a` un tel cas.
On peut aussi argumenter que l’e´volution des mentalite´s de´coule en fait
du changement structurel. Par exemple, dans le cas du travail des enfants,
Doepke et Zilibotti (2005) sugge`rent que son abolition est la conse´quence d’un
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changement technologique favorisant la main d’oeuvre qualifie´e. Ils conside`rent
un mode`le ou` des parents peuvent choisir la taille de leur famille et de´cident
soit d’e´duquer ou de faire travailler leur enfants. Une croissance des ine´galite´s
salariales les ame`ne alors a` e´lever un nombre restreint d’enfants et a` supporter
politiquement des lois qui bannissent le travail des enfants. Dessi et Pallage
(2001, 2005) conside`rent e´galement cette possibilite´. D’une manie`re similaire,
un autre pan de cette lite´rature sugge`re que les pressions provenant de la mon-
dialisation ont ainsi re´duit le travail des enfants dans certains pays. Les travaux
de Edmonds et Pavcnik (2001, 2005a, 2005b) et Pallage et Zimmermann (2007)
ont illustre´ ce phe´nome`ne.
Le changement structurel a donc des conse´quences importantes sur l’ensemble
de la socie´te´. Il peut meˆme aller jusqu’a` modifier notre manie`re de penser.
Comme nous allons l’illustrer ci-dessous, la litte´rature en e´conomie a pre´sente´
de nombreux exemples de changement structurel, motivant la plupart des de´bats
dans ce domaine.
La technologie
Il va de soi que l’apparition d’une technologie n’est pas une raison suffisante
pour qu’un ensemble d’entreprises soient dispose´es a` l’acque´rir imme´diatement.
D’autres facteurs additionnels peuvent influencer le choix d’un producteur. Par
exemple, l’abondance des facteurs de production ne´cessaires a` l’utilisation d’une
technologie particulie`re peut influencer le couˆt de son utilisation. Dans un tel
cas, les entreprises pre´fe`rent attendre l’expansion de la masse de ces facteurs
avant de s’inte´resser a` une telle technologie. On observe alors un phe´nome`ne
dit de diffusion.
Dans ce contexte, le mode`le de Chari et Hopenhayn (1991) conside`re une
e´conomie ou` a` chaque pe´riode une nouvelle technologie, plus performante, ap-
paraˆıt. Le capital humain dans lequel investissent les travailleurs est e´galement
spe´cifique a` chaque ge´ne´ration. Dans un tel cas, les technologies les plus anci-
ennes survivent due a` la productivite´ marginale de´croissante au sein de chaque
ge´ne´ration, menant au phe´nome`ne de diffusion. Une telle approche est aussi
conside´re´e dans les travaux de Williamson (1990), Matsuyama (1992) et Roger-
son (2005).
Le phe´nome`ne de diffusion peut aussi eˆtre la conse´quence d’autres facteurs
comme l’incertitude concernant l’efficacite´ encore inconnue d’une technologie
particulie`re. Les travaux de Rosenberg (1976), Jensen (1983) et Balcer et Lipp-
man (1984) ont illustre´ la pertinence d’un tel argument. Il peut aussi eˆtre
la cause d’externalite´ comme les effets d’apprentissage. Certaines entreprises
pre´fe`rent alors observer d’abord celles qui ont de´ja` acquis les nouvelles technolo-
gies avant de faire de meˆme afin de minimiser les couˆts d’adaptation. Les travaux
de Jovanovic et Lach (1989) et Jovanovic et MacDonald (1994) pre´sentent une
telle ide´e. D’autres comportements strate´giques expliquant les effets de diffusion
sont e´galement explore´s dans Kamien et Schwartz (1972), Reinganum (1981) et
Spence (1984). En situation de concurrence imparfaite sur le marche´ des biens
par exemple, une technologie particulie`re peut ne pas s’adopter imme´diatement
afin de ne pas en subir le couˆt d’imple´mentation, menant a` l’e´mergence d’un jeu
entre oligopoleurs concernant la de´cision d’adopter ou non la nouvelle technolo-
gie. Enfin, un tel effet peut se voir exacerbe´ par un marche´ du cre´dit imparfait.
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Une fois adopte´e par l’ensemble des entreprises d’une e´conomie, la technolo-
gie peut modifier le rapport aux facteurs de production de plusieurs manie`res.
Tout d’abord, l’avantage comparatif de certains facteurs de production peut
eˆtre affecte´. Un exemple tre`s re´pandu dans la litte´rature est le changement
technologique favorisant la main d’oeuvre qualifie´e. Ce changement a e´te´ e´tudie´
par un grand nombre d’e´conomistes et a e´te´ conside´re´ comme l’une des ex-
plications principales de la croissance des ine´galite´s salariales dans la plupart
des e´conomies de´veloppe´es. Cet argument a notamment e´te´ analyse´ par Bound
et Johnson (1992), Katz et Murphy (1992), Levy et Murnane (1992), Krueger
(1993) et Autor et al. (1998) parmi d’autres. Il suppose que, suite aux avance´es
technologiques au cours de ce demi-sie`cle passe´, la productivite´ des travailleurs
qualifie´s a grandement augmente´ par rapport a` celle des travailleurs non qual-
ifie´s. Ceci est principalement duˆ a` l’introduction de l’informatique dans la ma-
jorite´ des emplois. Cela implique que la demande de travailleurs qualifie´s est
devenue bien plus importante que la demande de travailleurs non qualifie´s, expli-
quant la hausse du salaire relatif et donc la croissance des ine´galite´s. En outre,
Bound et Johnson (1992) argumente que ce phe´nome`ne pourrait expliquer la
hausse du salaire relatif des femmes par rapport a` celui des hommes.
De la meˆme manie`re que l’avantage comparatif de certains facteurs de pro-
duction peut eˆtre modifie´, la productivite´ de l’ensemble d’un secteur par rap-
port a` un autre peut e´galement se voir affecte´e par le changement technologique.
Un exemple typique est l’importance croissante qu’a connu le secteur des ser-
vices par rapport au secteur manufacturier au cours de la deuxie`me moitie´ du
vingtie`me sie`cle. Ce changement a notamment implique´ une re´allocation pro-
gressive des ressources d’un secteur a` l’autre. Certains mode`les ont eu pour but
de reproduire cette re´allocation dans un contexte ou` la croissance technologique
est ine´gale d’un secteur a` l’autre. C’est le cas des travaux de Baumol (1967)
et Ngai et Pissarides (2007). Un telle manie`re de voir le changement structurel
peut e´galement expliquer la croissance des ine´galite´s si on suppose que le secteur
des services utilise de fac¸on intensive de la main d’oeuvre qualifie´e alors que le
secteur manufacturier utilise principalement de la main d’oeuvre non qualifie´e.
Le changement technologique peut en outre modifier les relations de substitu-
abilite´ ou comple´mentarite´ entre facteurs. Ainsi certains facteurs de production
peuvent se voir soudainement valorise´s, alors que d’autres de´laisse´s, simplement
parce que la nature de leur lien avec un troisie`me facteur change. Le second
chapitre du livre de Hamermesh (1996) de´crit en de´tails ce me´canisme. La
premie`re loi de Marshall (1920), notamment, permet d’e´valuer la demande d’un
facteur en fonction de sa relation de comple´mentarite´ ou de substituabilite´ avec
un autre facteur. Par exemple, si deux facteurs sont comple´mentaires alors une
hausse de la demande de l’un a un impact positif sur la demande de l’autre, et
inversement s’ils sont substituables.
En fait, certains ont vu la hausse de la demande de travailleurs qualifie´s
comme le passage d’une relation de substituabilite´ a` une relation de comple´men-
tarite´ avec le capital physique. Avant, le capital physique, qui e´tait princi-
palement constitue´ de machines destine´s au secteur de l’industrie, pouvait se
conside´rer comme un facteur comple´mentaire a` la main d’oeuvre non qualifie´e
et un substitut de la main d’oeuvre qualifie´e. Puis, suite a` l’introduction de
l’informatique, le capital physique, alors principalement constitue´ d’ordinateurs,
est devenu un facteur comple´menatire a` la main d’oeuvre qualifie´e et un substi-
tut de la main d’oeuvre non qualifie´e, expliquant la croissance du salaire relatif
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du premier des deux facteurs par rapport au second au cours de ces dernie`res
anne´es.
De la meˆme manie`re, les liens de comple´mentarite´ et de subsitituabilite´ per-
mettent d’expliquer le phe´nome`ne dit de polarisation de la distribution des
salaires qui est actuellement observe´. Ce dernier se re´fe`re au fait que la de-
mande de travail concernant les taˆches hautement qualifie´es n’est pas la seule a`
avoir augmente´ au cours des dernie`res de´cennies, mais que la demande de travail
pour les taˆches les moins qualifie´es s’est e´galement accentue´e. Pour ce qui est des
taˆches interme´diaires, la demande, elle, a diminue´. La litte´rature en e´conomie
s’est inte´resse´ a` ce phe´nome`ne de polarisation parce que l’explication de la hausse
des ine´galite´s salariales par le changement technologique favorisant la main
d’oeuvre qualifie´e avait rec¸u quelques critiques. Notamment, dans un article de
Card et Dinardo (2002), les auteurs avaient remarque´ que la hausse des ine´galite´s
salariales s’e´tait stabilise´e aux Etats-Unis durant les anne´es 90. Sachant que les
anne´es 90 ont e´galement connu de fortes avance´es technologiques et que ces
dernie`res ont rapidement e´te´ incorpore´es par les entreprises, les ine´galite´s au-
raient du s’aggraver a` ce moment la`. Une telle incohe´rence a e´galement e´te´
mise en avant par Lemieux (2006). Autor et al. (2006) ont donc offert une
expliquation de la stabilisation des ine´galite´s en se basant sur le phe´nome`ne de
polarisation. Ils conside`rent que l’utilisation des ordinateurs est comple´mentaire
aux taˆches qui sortent de la routine, alors l’informatique est un substitut a` celles
qui rele`vent de la routine. L’introduction de l’informatique a donc favorise´ les
travailleurs les plus qualifie´s puisqu’ils sont les plus aptes a` l’usage d’ordinateurs,
mais e´galement les moins qualifie´s car ces derniers s’occupent essentiellement
de travaux sortant de la routine. De meˆme, les travailleurs aux compe´tences
interme´diaires se sont vus de´favorise´s parce que leur compe´tences sont destine´es
a` des taˆches dˆıtes de routine. Le phe´nome`ne de polarisation explique donc
pourquoi le salaire relatif des travailleurs les moins qualifie´s par rapport aux
travailleurs dont les compe´tences sont interme´diaires a subi une augmentation
et, de la meˆme manie`re, pourquoi les ine´galite´s salariales se sont stabilise´ pen-
dant les anne´es 90.
Enfin, le changement technologique peut e´galement se mate´rialiser via une
modification de l’obsolescence du capital physique. Par exemple, Cummins
and Violante (2002) ont montre´ que la croissance de l’indice de qualite´ des
e´quipements et des softwares est passe´e d’un taux de 4% juste apre`s la deuxie`me
guerre mondiale a` un taux de 6% dans les anne´es 90. Un tel changement a un ef-
fet sur l’obsolescence technologique si le progre`s technique n’est incorpore´ qu’aux
nouveaux e´quipements. Il s’ave`re que les travaux de Greenwood et al. (1997) et
Hulten (1992) ont en effet montre´ que depuis la fin de la deuxie`me guerre mondi-
ale, l’e´conomie ame´ricaine a connu un changement dans la nature de son progre`s
technique. Ce dernier avait tendance a` affecter toutes sortes d’e´quipement a` la
fin de la guerre (il e´tait dit neutre), alors qu’il ne s’incorporait plutoˆt qu’aux
nouveaux e´quipements dans les anne´es 90 (il e´tait dit spe´cifique aux investisse-
ments). Selon Cummins et Violante (2002), ceci a eu pour conse´quence un
creusement de l’e´cart technologique, c’est-a`-dire que la productivite´ des nou-
velles machines a augmente´ par rapport a` la productivite´ moyenne.
Pour revenir a` notre exemple sur les ine´galite´s salariales, l’obsolescence tech-
nologique a e´galement e´te´ avance´e comme un facteur permettant d’expliquer ce
phe´nome`ne. L’ide´e est que si le progre`s technique est spe´cifique aux nouveaux
e´quipements et que capital et travail qualifie´ sont comple´mentaires, alors une
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augmentation de l’e´cart technologique implique une augmentation des e´carts
salariaux. Un tel me´canisme a e´te´ mis en avant notamment par Krussel et
al. (2000), Jovanovic (1998) et Violante (2002) et il a l’avantage qu’en plus
d’expliquer la croissance des ine´galite´s entre main d’oeuvre qualifie´e et non
qualifie´e, il permet aussi de comprendre pourquoi les ine´galite´s ont aussi pu
s’accroˆıtre au sein de chaque groupe de qualification. Cette dernie`re observa-
tion a e´te´ en effet mise en valeur par certains e´conomistes tels que Juhn et al.
(1993) et a e´te´ de´nomme´e ine´galite´ re´siduelle ou intra-groupe1.
Pour re´sumer, le changement technologique peut prendre plusieurs formes.
Les exemples que nous avons e´nume´re´s sont notamment (i) une modification de
l’avantage comparatif de certains facteurs, (ii) une transformation des liens de
comple´mentarite´ ou de substituabilite´ entre facteurs et enfin (iii) une acce´le´ration
de l’obsolescence technologique. Comme nous l’avons pre´cise´ ces diffe´rentes
formes de changement technologique peuvent bien entendu quelques fois de´signe´
un meˆme me´canisme. Par exemple, l’augmentation de la productivite´ relative de
la main d’oeuvre qualifie´e qui a e´te´ observe´e au cours des dernie`res anne´es peut
en fait s’interpre´ter comme un changement dans la nature de la relation entre
capital physique et main d’oeuvre qualifie´e; en particulier, il peut se comprendre
comme le passage d’un lien de substituabilite´ a` une relation de comple´mentarite´.
Cependant, le changement structurel peut prendre d’autres formes que le
changement technologique. Comme nous allons le de´crire ci-dessous, il peut
e´galement se manifester par une modification de la composition de la demande.
La composition de la demande
Le changement structurel peut avoir un impact sur l’e´conomie au travers
d’un autre canal. Celui-ci concerne le comportement de la demande et suppose
que les pre´fe´rences des me´nages peuvent se modifier de fac¸on permanente. De
la meˆme manie`re que pour la technologie, la composition de la demande peut
modifier le rapport aux facteurs de production dans le long terme. Par exemple,
concernant le changement structurel qui me`ne au de´clin de certains secteurs et
a` l’expansion d’autres, nous avons vu pre´ce´demment que ce dernier pouvait se
mode´liser a` l’aide de taux de croissance de la productivite´ totale des facteurs qui
diffe`rent d’un secteur a` l’autre. Mais, le changement sectoriel peut tre`s bien eˆtre
aussi la conse´quence d’une e´volution particulie`re de la demande. Par exemple,
les mode`les de Echevarria (1997), Kongsamut et al. (2001) et Gollin et al.
(2002) ont tente´ d’expliquer le processus de changement sectoriel en se basant
sur des pre´fe´rences non homothe´tiques. Des e´lasticite´s-revenu qui diffe`rent d’un
secteur a` l’autre permettent alors d’expliquer pourquoi la part de la production
d’un secteur en particulier dans l’output total peut soudainement croˆıtre a` un
rythme soutenu.
Il est cependant difficile de distinguer empiriquement quel est la composante
majeure du changement structurel, c’est-a`-dire si ce dernier est principale-
ment duˆ a` une modification de sa technologie ou s’il de´coule de l’e´volution des
pre´fe´rences des me´nages. La raison est notamment un proble`me d’identification
bien connu en e´conome´trie. Ceci a d’ailleurs mene´ des e´conomistes comme
Acemoglu (2001) a` conside´rer un mode`le ou` une modification de l’e´lasticite´ de
1Il faut cependant noter que des travaux tels que celui de Lemieux (2006) ont re´cemment
mis en doute un tel fait. Lemieux (2006) argumente que l’ine´galite´ re´siduelle n’est autre qu’un
effet de composition.
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substitution entre deux biens peut s’interpre´ter de manie`re e´quivalente comme
un effet technologique ou une transformation des pre´fe´rences.
Ne´anmoins, les e´conomistes tendent a` voir la technologie comme affectant
l’e´conomie sur le long terme, alors que la demande a plutoˆt un effet a` court
terme. Il est vrai que l’histoire nous a donne´ de nombreux exemples de biens de
consommation qui ont soudainement e´te´ passe´ de mode, provoquant le de´clin de
certaines industries. C’est le cas notamment de certains fe´culents ou industries
textiles, mais on peut difficilement dire que ces derniers ont eu des conse´quences
majeures pour l’ensemble de l’e´conomie dans le long terme.
Il existe cependant un exemple de changement structurel correspondant a`
une modification de la demande que la litte´rature en e´conomie a conside´re´
comme important. Il s’agit de la libe´ralisation du marche´ des biens au niveau
international. Selon cette dernie`re, la suppression des barrie`res au commerce
implique que la demande de biens en provenance d’autres e´conomies peut avoir
un effet significatif sur l’activite´ domestique. Pour revenir a` notre exemple
pre´ce´dent, un tel effet a e´te´ conside´re´ comme une explication possible de l’augmentation
des ine´galite´s salariales au sein des e´conomies de´veloppe´es. Le me´canisme
sous-jacent de´coule de la the´orie traditionnelle du commerce internationale dite
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek qui conside`re l’impact de la libe´ralisation du commerce
dans le cas ou` les e´conomies conside´re´es disposent de la meˆme technologie mais
ne pre´sentent pas la meˆme abondance en termes de ressources disponibles a` la
production. Apre`s libe´ralisation, les e´conomies de´veloppe´es, selon cette the´orie,
se mettent a` exporter des biens qui utilisent intensivement de la main d’oeuvre
qualifie´e et importent depuis les pays en voie de de´veloppement des biens in-
tensifs en main d’oeuvre non qualifie´e. Pour les pays de´veloppe´s, le prix des
exportations augmente donc apre`s la libe´ralisation et celui des importations
baissent, ce qui e´le`ve le salaire de la main d’oeuvre qualifie´e et fait diminuer
celui de la main d’oeuvre non qualifie´e. Ce me´canisme est connu sous le nom
de the´ore`me d’e´galisation des re´mune´rations des facteurs et permet donc, dans
un contexte de mondialisation, d’expliquer la croissance des ine´galite´s propre a`
ces dernie`res de´cennies. Un grand nombre d’e´tudes en e´conomie internationale
s’est attarde´ a` l’e´tude de ce me´canisme, notamment Freeman (1995), Richardson
(1995), Wood (1995), Feenstra (2004), Lawrence et Slaughter (1993) et Bernard
et Jensen (1997).
Toutefois, il faut noter que la meilleure accessibilite´ des biens de consom-
mation au niveau international n’est pas ne´cessairement un e´le´ment a` inclure
seulement dans la composition de la demande en tant que changement struc-
turel. On pourrait e´galement conside´rer qu’elle correspond a` un changement
technologique.
En effet, la litte´rature en e´conomie internationale s’est re´cemment inte´resse´
au comportement individuel des firmes sur la sce`ne internationale. En par-
ticulier, il s’ave`re que seulement un sous-ensemble restreint d’entreprises par-
ticipent au commerce international et ces entreprises se re´ve`lent plus perfor-
mantes que celles qui ne se de´dient qu’au marche´ domestique. La supe´riorite´ de
ces firmes peut s’observer pour tout un ensemble de variables les caracte´risant
tels que la productivite´ totale des facteurs, la taille de la production, l’emploi
total, les salaires paye´s, l’intensite´ capitalistique et la part de la main d’oeuvre
qualifie´e au sein des employe´s (voir notamment Bernard et Jensen (1995), Bernard
et al. (2003), Eaton el al. (2004), ainsi que Bernard et al. (2007) et Tybout
(2002) pour une revue de la litte´rature sur le sujet). De plus, la litte´rature a
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e´galement souligne´ que la causalite´ de la relation allait de la performance a` la
participation au commerce international. Autrement dit, l’entre´e sur le marche´
international est un processus couˆteux2 pour les entreprises et ces dernie`res
de´cident de par elles meˆmes de leur pre´sence ou absence sur un tel marche´; leur
choix est notamment fonction de leur productivite´ (voir notamment les articles
de Bernard et Jensen (1999) et Clerides et al. (1998), parmi d’autres, sur le
sujet). Des caracte´ristiques similaires s’appliquent e´galement aux compagnies
qui de´cident d’aller investir a` l’e´tranger (voir Helpman et al. (2004)).
Ces observations empiriques impliquent que tout choc positif de produc-
tivite´ au niveau agre´ge´ me`ne a` une entre´e plus importante d’entreprises sur le
marche´ international puisque leur productivite´ alors plus e´leve´e leur permet-
trait de supporter les couˆts lie´s a` l’entre´e sur le marche´. D’ou`, si le changement
technologique est associe´ a` une productivite´ plus importante, alors il pourrait
tre`s bien eˆtre a` l’origine de l’arrive´e d’entreprises exte´rieures sur le marche´.
De la meˆme manie`re, on peut voir l’impact de la globalisation sur les salaires,
non pas comme le re´sultat d’un processus d’e´galisation du couˆt des facteurs, mais
comme duˆ a` une croissance du commerce des biens interme´diaires. Autrement
dit, ce phe´nome`ne peut tre`s bien eˆtre la conse´quence de de´localisations d’entrepri-
ses a` l’e´tranger qui, elles, ont en fait a` voir avec une modification de la tech-
nologie3. C’est le cas des articles de Feenstra (1998) et Feenstra et Hanson
(1999) qui fournissent une telle explication de l’augmentation des ine´galite´s.
Notamment, Feenstra et Hanson (1996, 1999) essaient dans leur e´tude de quan-
tifier l’importance du commerce des biens interme´diaires dans l’explication de
ces ine´galite´s par rapport au changement de la technologie. Leurs re´sultats
indiquent que l’usage des ordinateurs expliquent 35% des ine´galite´s aux Etats-
Unis, alors l’outsourcing 15%.
Pour conclure, le changement structurel peut se pre´senter sous diffe´rentes formes
telles que le changement technologique ou l’e´volution des pre´fe´rences des me´nages
en matie`re de consommation. Bien qu’il n’est pas facile de savoir laquelle des
deux branches affecte principalement la structure de l’e´conomie, il est clair que
l’impact sur l’e´conomie est toujours le meˆme. Comme nous l’avons illustre´, l’effet
direct du changement est une modification du rapport aux facteurs de produc-
tion qui notamment a un impact sur leur re´mune´ration. L’exemple qui revient
a` plusieurs reprises dans la litte´rature est la croissance des ine´galite´s salariales
dans les pays de´veloppe´s comme conse´quence directe d’un tel changement. Mais
pourquoi de telles ine´galite´s persistent-elles ? On pourrait en effet penser que,
dans le cas d’un changement technologique favorisant la main d’oeuvre qual-
ifie´e, l’ensemble des travailleurs re´agirait a` un tel phe´nome`ne en investissant
dans le type de capital humain le plus demande´ dans l’e´conomie. Comme nous
allons le pre´senter ci-dessous, il est e´vident qu’un tel investissement se re´ve`le
trop couˆteux pour le travailleur.
2Voir Roberts et Tybout (1997) et Das et al. (2007).
3Voir Baker et Hubbard (2003) et Bartel et al. (2005) qui expliquent en quoi le changement
technologique me`ne au phe´nome`ne d’outsourcing.
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1.1.2 L’ e´cart entre la structure de l’e´conomie et l’allocation
des ressources
L’effet direct du changement structurel sur l’e´conomie se traduit donc par
une transformation du rapport aux facteurs de production, ce qui, entre autre,
affecte aussi le niveau de leur re´mune´ration. On pourrait toutefois penser qu’une
variation du prix d’un facteur en particulier implique une croissance de l’offre
de ce facteur. Par exemple, si le salaire des travailleurs qualifie´s s’accroˆıt, alors
les individus devraient re´agir en investissant dans ce type de capital humain.
L’offre de main d’oeuvre qualifie´e augmenterait donc, ce qui ferait revenir les
salaires a` leur niveau initial.
Cependant, il est indubitable que le couˆt de re´investir en capital humain est
trop e´leve´, ce qui empeˆche les travailleurs de se re´allouer d’une taˆche a` l’autre.
Le changement implique par conse´quent un e´cart entre la structure de l’e´conomie
et l’allocation des ressources, ce qui se doit notamment a` une mobilite´ limite´e
des facteurs de production. Certes le proble`me d’immobilite´ peut se re´sorber a`
long terme lorsque de nouvelles ge´ne´rations de travailleurs arrivent sur le marche´
du travail, mais ce proble`me est manifeste a` court terme et peut meˆme durer
pour un bon nombre d’anne´es. La persistance des ine´galite´s salariales au cours
de ces dernie`res de´cennies en te´moigne largement.
Une autre raison, comple´mentaire a` la premie`re, qui favorise l’apparition
d’un e´cart entre l’allocation des ressources et la structure de l’e´conomie est
l’incertitude lie´e a` l’investissement dans de nouvelles technologies. D’une part,
lorsqu’une nouvelle technologie est introduite, on ne sait pas ex ante si elle se
re´ve`lera productive ou non. D’autre part, on ne connait sa nature que lorsque
qu’elle est effectivement introduite. L’absence d’information et l’aversion au
risque implique souvent que le changement structurel n’est pas anticipe´ par le
comportement des agents.
Nous allons de`s a` pre´sent pre´senter une se´rie d’exemples illustrant sous quelle
forme l’e´cart peut prendre forme. Ils sont tous la conse´quence des facteurs que
nous avons de´crits ci-dessus.
La distribution du capital humain
L’e´cart peut se mate´rialiser de plusieurs manie`res. Une premie`re, que nous
avons de´ja` e´voque´e, concerne la distribution sectorielle ou occupationnelle du
capital humain. En effet, la recherche en e´conomie a montre´ que la composante
sectorielle est un aspect important du capital humain. Par exemple, Neal (1995)
illustre que, suite a` un licenciement, les pertes salariales apre`s re´embauche sont
plus marque´es lorsque le travailleur change d’industrie. De meˆme, Parent (2000)
montre que pour ce qui est de l’e´valuation des salaires individuels, ce qui im-
porte n’est pas l’expe´rience au sein d’une entreprise particulie`re, mais en fait
l’expe´rience au sein de l’industrie de re´fe´rence.
Toutefois, Kambourov et Manovskii (2007) ont critique´ cet aspect et argu-
mentent que la composante occupationnelle est un e´le´ment bien plus impor-
tant. Dans leur travail, ils estiment des e´quations de salaire et montrent que
l’expe´rience au sein d’une industrie perd beaucoup de sa significativite´ lorsque
l’expe´rience au sein de l’occupation en question est introduite dans l’e´quation.
Cette dernie`re s’ave`re eˆtre un facteur quantitativement bien plus important.
En bref, qu’il s’agisse de secteurs ou d’occupations, les travaux empiriques
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sur le capital humain ont montre´ que la spe´cificite´ est un e´le´ment important
dans l’explication du niveau des salaires individuels.
Cette spe´cificite´ a pour conse´quence une mobilite´ re´duite des travailleurs
que ce soit d’une industrie a` l’autre ou d’une occupation a` l’autre. Elle im-
plique e´galement que tout changement dans la structure de la production d’une
e´conomie se traduit par des licenciements qui, a` leur tour, me`nent soit a` d’impor-
tantes pertes salariales soit a` des difficulte´s de re´embauche. Dans un tel con-
texte, le bien-eˆtre d’une partie de la population des travailleurs subirait des
conse´quences ne´gatives. C’est le cas notamment de l’effet du commerce inter-
national qui a e´te´ e´tudie´ par Kletzer (2001) dans son livre4. Elle montre que les
travailleurs des secteurs importateurs pre´sentent des caracte´ristiques simailires
a` la plupart des travailleurs du secteur manufacturier, c’est-a`-dire qu’ils sont
pour la plupart plus aˆge´s, moins e´duque´s, disposent d’une expe´rience plus longue
au sein de leur emploi et appartiennent souvent a` un groupe minoritaire. En
d’autres termes, il s’agit de travailleurs qui sont sujet a` un plus grand risque
puisqu’ils pre´sentent une spe´cificite´ plus marque´e de leur capital humain et leur
e´ducation ne leur permettrait pas de retrouver un emploi qualifie´. Kletzer (2001)
illustre en effet que ces travailleurs subissent d’importantes pertes salariales lors
de la re´embauche et que cette re´embauche est meˆme moins probable que pour
le reste des individus. De plus, ces pertes sont plus importantes pour ce qui est
des employe´s des secteurs les plus importateurs.
D’une manie`re ge´ne´rale, de nombreuses e´tudes ont supporte´ l’ide´e que la
spe´cificite´ du capital humain est un e´le´ment non ne´gligeable. La plupart de ces
travaux se sont notamment attarde´s sur la corre´lation positive entre le salaire
individuel et l’expe´rience au sein d’une entreprise donne´e. Ils comprennent
notamment Hamermesh (1987), Topel (1991), Jacobson et al. (1993), Farber
(1993), Stevens (1997) et Kletzer (1998), entre autres. De plus, certains ont
e´galement illustre´ que l’importance des pertes salariales suite a` un licenciement
e´taient assez persistantes au cours du temps.
Comme nous l’avons illustre´ plus haut, ces e´tudes ont quelques fois mene´
certains e´conomistes e´valuer les conse´quences de certains chocs e´conomiques en
terme de bien-eˆtre tout en prenant en compte un tel aspect. Par exemple, un
pan de la litte´rature en e´conomie s’est inte´resse´ a` l’effet des cycles d’activite´ sur
le bien-eˆtre des agents5. Cette litte´rature suppose que les individus n’aiment pas
subir de larges fluctuations de leur niveau de consommation a` travers le temps
et si certaines frictions les empeˆchent de s’assurer comple`tement contre un tel
risque, alors leur bien-eˆtre peut en eˆtre affecte´. Des e´tudes comme Rogerson et
Schindler (2002) et Krebs (2007) ont en effet montre´ que la spe´cificite´ du capital
humain pouvait aggraver ce phe´nome`ne.
De la meˆme manie`re, le proble`me de la spe´cificite´ du capital humain peut
se voir exacerber par la spe´cificite´ du progre`s technique. Comme nous l’avons
expliquer pre´ce´demment certains travaux ont montre´ que le progre`s technique
est passe´ d’une nature neutre a` un e´tat ou` il est spe´cifique aux nouveaux in-
vestissements6. Dans ce contexte, Violante (2002) conside`re un mode`le ou`,
d’une part, l’investissement en capital physique est spe´cifique aux nouvelles
ge´ne´rations et, d’autre part, capacite´des travailleurs a` s’adapter a` un nouvel
environnement n’est pas parfaite. En l’occurrence cette capacite´ de´pend de la
4Voir e´galement Wasmer et von Weizsa¨cker (2007) pour un point de vue re´cent sur le sujet.
5Voir notamment Lucas (1987).
6Voir par exemple Greenwood et al. (1997).
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“distance technologique” qui se´pare le nouvel emploi d’un travailleur de son
emploi pre´ce´dent. En d’autres termes, il est difficile pour un travailleur util-
isant une technologie age´e de soudainement faire usage des technologies les plus
avance´es. L’incapacite´ implique donc une mobilite´ limite´e des emplois dont le
capital physique est obsole`te a` ceux qui disposent d’une technologie plus re´cente.
Le mode`le de Violante (2002) permet ainsi d’expliquer la croissance re´cente des
ine´galite´s salariales re´siduelles.
Des travaux plus re´cents, comme Vandenbussche et al. (2006), ont effec-
tivement montre´ qu’un haut niveau d’e´ducation e´tait requis pour inciter a` la
recherche et de´veloppement. D’autre part, Bartel et Sicherman (1993, 1998)
ont montre´ que la de´pre´ciation du capital humain e´tait plus importante dans
les industries ou` le changement technologique e´tait le plus rapide. En partic-
ulier, les entreprises dans ces secteurs sont caracte´rise´es par un besoin constant
d’investir dans des formations permettant a` leur employe´s de pouvoir utiliser
les technologies les plus re´centes.
La distribution ge´ographique du travail
Une autre illustration de l’e´cart entre la structure de l’e´conomie et l’allocation
de ses ressources est la distribution ge´ographique du travail. L’ide´e est que, dans
une e´conomie ou` des re´gions sont en de´clin et d’autres en expansion et ou` les
premie`res pre´sentent une croissance des salaires plus forte, la mobilite´ parfaite
du travail devrait se traduire par des mouvements de travailleurs des re´gions
ou` les conditions salariales sont les moins inte´ressantes aux re´gions les plus dy-
namiques.
L’e´tude de Blanchard et Katz (1992) montrent en effet que, pour ce qui est
des Etats-Unis, suite a` un shock re´gional ne´gatif, les entreprises quittent l’Etat
en question, puis le reste de l’ajustement s’effectue principalement a` travers la
migration de travailleurs vers d’autres Etats. La rigidite´ des salaires a` la baisse
ne permet pas un retour des cre´ations d’emplois.
Cependant, il se peut que dans certains cas des frictions entravent les mou-
vements de travailleurs d’une re´gion a` l’autre. Par exemple, dans le cas des
e´conomies europe´ennes, Decressin et Fatas (1995), qui ont re´alise´ une e´tude
qui s’inspire en grande partie de Blanchard et Katz (1992), ont montre´ que,
bien que l’ajustement a` un choc s’effectue principalement par des migrations
d’individus aux Etats-Unis, une grande partie en Europe s’ope`re par une baisse
du taux de participation au marche´ du travail. Cette e´tude montre clairement
que des barrie`res a` la mobilite´ peuvent donc produire un e´cart entre l’allocation
des ressources et ce qu’elle devrait eˆtre d’un point de vue optimal. D’autres
travaux comme McCormick (1997) et Wasmer et al. (2005) sugge`rent que les
couˆts associe´s a` la migration sont plus e´leve´s pour ce qui est de la main d’oeuvre
non qualifie´e.
De manie`re ge´ne´rale, les barrie`res a` la mobilite´ impliquent que l’ajustement
aux chocs e´conomiques doit s’effectuer d’autres manie`res que par les migrations.
Une possibilite´ est une hausse du choˆmage. Une contribution importante a` la
litte´rature de Oswald (1996) montre que la corre´lation entre le pourcentage
de proprie´taires dans une e´conomie et son taux de choˆmage est tre`s e´leve´e.
Une autre e´tude de Mincer (1978) montre que l’attachement au marche´ du
travail des femmes joue e´galement un roˆle important, l’ide´e e´tant que la mobilite´
ge´ographique et la participation de la femme au marche´ du travail sont corre´le´es
21
positivement.
La litte´rature sur le sujet a e´galement souligne´ que d’autres facteurs pou-
vaient influencer les migrations inter-re´gionales et que la causalite´ inverse entre
mobilite´ et choˆmage pouvait eˆtre possible. Par exemple, Bentolila (1997), pour
ce qui est de l’Espagne, et Pissarides et Wadsworth (1989), pour le Royaume-
Uni, ont illustre´ que, d’une part, des diffe´rences inter-re´gionales en terme de
choˆmage avaient tendance a` inciter aux mouvements migratoires, mais que,
d’autre part, un taux de choˆmage national e´leve´ de´courageait les mouvements
de travailleurs. En effet, l’ide´e est qu’un choˆmeur n’est pas force´ment preˆt a`
payer le couˆt de migrer vers les re´gions les plus dynamiques si de toute fac¸on il
est fort probable qu’il reste choˆmeur.
La protection des entreprises les moins productives
Plus re´cemment la litte´rature en e´conomie a souligne´ qu’une allocation pau-
vre des ressources peut mener a` un niveau de productivite´ agre´ge´e sous-optimal.
Ce pan de la litte´rature suppose que certaines frictions, souvent pre´sentes sur le
marche´ des biens, prote`gent les entreprises les moins efficaces. De telles frictions
peuvent d’une certaine manie`re interagir avec le changement structurel, menant
a` une situation sous optimale. Le fait de maintenir ces entreprises en vie plutoˆt
que de les inciter a` faire faillite fait que le niveau moyen de productivite´ dans
l’e´conomie est plus faible que ce qu’il ne devrait eˆtre. De plus, le fait que ces
firmes s’accaparent une partie des ressources empeˆchent d’autres entreprises,
potentiellement plus productives, de s’inse´rer sur le marche´ des biens et ainsi
de contribuer a` la croissance de la productivite´.
Des e´tudes empiriques ont en effet montre´ que la suppression de ces frictions
menait effectivement a` une re´allocation des ressources ame´liorant la productivite´
agre´ge´e. Par exemple, Olley et Pakes (1996) ont montre´ que les de´re´gulations
dans le secteur des te´le´communications aux Etats-Unis ont provoque´ la sortie
des firmes les moins productives et a` une re´allocation des ressources vers les
plus productives, ce qui a permis une croissance de la productivite´ dans ce
secteur. Pavcnik (2002) a e´galement illustre´ que la suppression des barrie`res au
commerce international au Chili avait produit des effets similaires.
Ces travaux empiriques ont motive´ un bon nombre de mode`les the´oriques
dont le but est de mettre en relation la re´allocation des facteurs de production
d’un e´tablissement a` l’autre et le niveau moyen de la productivite´. En commerce
international, deux contributions importantes a` la litte´rature dans ce domaine
sont Melitz (2003) et Bernard et al. (2003). Ils conside`rent l’impact de la
libe´ralisation du commerce sur la re´allocation et le processus d’entre´e et de
sortie de firmes.
D’autres mode`les ont sugge´re´ aussi que la libe´ralisation du marche´ des biens
n’est pas une condition suffisante a` la re´allocation des facteurs et a` la croissance
de la productivite´. D’autres frictions, qui doivent e´galement eˆtre supprime´es,
peuvent empeˆcher ces re´allocations et rendre la libe´ralisation ineffective. Par
exemple, Bergoeing et al. (2004) montrent que certaines politiques e´conomiques
comme les subsides aux entreprises peuvent ralentir le processus de re´allocation.
Ou encore, l’exercice de calibration de Restuccia et Rogerson (2007) montre
que les distorsions de prix sont un frein aux re´allocations, a` la croissance de la
productivite´ et ainsi qu’a` l’accumulation de capital physique.
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Le mismatch
En e´conomie du travail, lorsque les ressources ne sont pas alloue´es aux taˆches
pour lesquelles elles seraient les plus productives, on parle en ge´ne´ral de mis-
match. Le terme match provient de l’anglais et signifie “appariement”, mis-
match se re´fe´rant donc a` un appariement entre producteur et travailleur qui ne
s’effectue pas correctement. Les diffe´rents exemples que nous avons pre´sente´s
ci-dessus sont par conse´quent des cas particuliers de mismatch.
Lemismatch est souvent l’une des raisons avance´es comme facteur de choˆmage
en e´conomie. Initialement, on pensait surtout le mismatch de la manie`re suiv-
ante. Supposons qu’une e´conomie est compose´e d’un certain nombre de marche´s
du travail distincts. Ces diffe´rents marche´s se diffe´rencient par exemple selon
leur re´gion, leur industrie ou encore le type de main d’oeuvre qu’ils impliquent,
mais ils peuvent e´galement concerner d’autres caracte´ristiques du travailleur
telles que le gendre, l’ethnie ou encore l’age. Layard et al. (1991) conside`rent
donc qu’une e´conomie est caracte´rise´e par un proble`me de mismatch lorsque
des de´se´quilibres entre offre et demande persistent sur l’un de ces marche´s. Ce
proble`me a entre autre des conse´quences sur le taux de choˆmage d’une e´conomie.
D’une certaine manie`re, on pourrait conside´rer qu’il s’agit encore une fois d’un
proble`me lie´ a` la mobilite´. En effet, on pourrait par exemple faire diminuer le
taux de choˆmage en diminuant l’offre de travail des marche´s en exce´dent pour
la re´allouer aux marche´s ou` la demande est importante. Malheureusement, la
pre´sence de barrie`res a` la mobilite´ comme la spe´cificite´ du capital humain ou
les couˆts lie´s a` un de´me´nagement limitent une telle re´allocation, ce qui me`ne a`
la persistance des de´se´quilibres et maintient le taux de choˆmage a` des niveaux
e´leve´s.
Les premiers travaux a` conside´rer un tel aspect du marche´ du travail ont
notamment e´te´ re´alise´es dans le contexte de la courbe de Phillips, c’est-a`-dire a`
l’e´poque durant laquelle les e´conomistes ont longuement essaye´ de comprendre
la corre´lation ne´gative entre taux d’inflation et taux de choˆmage (ou encore
variation du taux de choˆmage), ainsi que d’autres variables. Ceci concerne par
exemple les articles de Lipsey (1960) et Archibald (1969). Ces travaux ont mis
en e´vidence que le taux de dispersion du choˆmage entre diffe´rents marche´s e´tait
corre´le´ positivement avec le niveau du choˆmage. Cette observation des donne´es
nous renvoie donc encore une fois aux proble`mes de mobilite´ des travailleurs.
En effet, une dispersion e´leve´e des taux de choˆmage pourrait se voir re´duite en
re´allouant les travailleurs depuis les marche´s ou` le taux de choˆmage est le plus
important vers ceux ou` il est le plus faible, ce qui permettrait aux diffe´rents
taux de converger et ainsi re´duire le taux agre´ge´ de l’e´conomie. Ces diffe´rents
travaux ont par ailleurs sugge´re´ des politiques e´conomiques de demande de type
keyne´sien ou` des programmes de relance du marche´ du travail seraient applique´s
en particulier aux marche´s ou` le taux de choˆmage s’ave`re le plus e´leve´. Les
travaux de Bailey et Tobin (1977) et Johnson et Blakemore (1979) sugge`rent
notamment cette possibilite´.
L’ensemble des travaux ci-dessus ont meˆme a` un moment de l’histoire du
de´veloppement de la science e´conomique bouleverser la manie`re de voir le proble`me
du choˆmage. Un article important de Lilien (1982) a par exemple sugge´re´ que
le de´terminant majeur de la variation cyclique du taux de choˆmage e´tait le
changement cyclique de la structure sectorielle de la demande de travail, ainsi
que la re´allocation de travailleurs que ce changement implique. Lilien (1982)
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suppose en particulier que puisque les marche´s du travail sont dote´s de frictions,
la re´allocation entre marche´s est donc lente, ce qui implique donc une hausse
du choˆmage pendant la pe´riode de transition.
Les travaux de Abraham et Katz (1986) et Blanchard et Diamond (1989)
ont cependant limite´ l’importance de cet argument en pre´sentant certains faits
empiriques justifiant la pre´dominance des chocs agre´ge´s, c’est-a`-dire des chocs
qui affectent la demande de travail dans l’ensemble de l’e´conomie et non pas pour
certains secteurs en particulier. Par exemple, les donne´es empiriques sugge`rent
que le stock agre´ge´ de vacances d’emploi non pourvues est ne´gativement corre´le´
avec le taux de choˆmage agre´ge´, ce qui tend a` favoriser cette dernie`re explication
puisque un choc de re´allocation impliquerait en fait une corre´lation positive (les
vacances a` pourvoir caracte´riseraient le secteur en expansion, alors le choˆmage
correspondrait aux travailleurs du secteur en de´clin).
Enfin, l’e´tude empirique de Davis et Haltiwanger (1999b) a mitige´ l’importance
des deux arguments en montrant que certains chocs me`nent a` une corre´lation
positive des taux de cre´ation et destruction d’emploi (ce qui correspond a` un
choc de re´allocation) et d’autres a` une corre´lation ne´gative (chocs agre´ge´s).
Plus re´cemment, Shimer (2006) a calibre´ un mode`le demismatch a` l’e´conomie
ame´ricaine. En particulier, il a de´compose´ l’e´conomie en plus de deux cent
marche´s. Dans son mode`le, les vacances et les travailleurs sont attribue´s de
manie`re ale´atoire a` un secteur. Le choˆmage apparaˆıt donc lorsque un marche´
est caracte´rise´ par plus de travailleurs que de vacances d’emplois a` pourvoir.
Shimer (2006) montre alors qu’un mode`le ou` l’unique friction qui le caracte´rise
est le mismatch peut re´pliquer la plupart des faits stylise´s concernant le marche´
du travail tout aussi bien qu’un mode`le qui conside`re des chocs agre´ge´s.
1.1.3 La re´action de l’e´conomie au changement: re´allocation
et politiques e´conomiques
Le changement structurel implique donc que l’allocation actuelle des ressources
est obsole`te. Des re´allocations sont alors ne´cessaires afin de re´pondre a` un tel
phe´nome`ne. En plac¸ant les facteurs la` ou` ils sont les plus productifs, on parvient
a` ame´liorer le bien-eˆtre de l’e´conomie dans son ensemble, voire a` diminuer les
ine´galite´s.
Cet e´cart pourrait tre`s bien se re´sorber via d’autres me´canismes. Par ex-
emple, lorsque la distribution du capital humain ne correspond pas a` la struc-
ture demande´e, l’investissement en capital humain pourrait eˆtre une solution au
proble`me. Mais cette possibilite´ s’ave`re tre`s couteuse. On pourrait alors penser
que les gains associe´s a` cet investissement n’en exce´deraient pas les couˆts. De
plus, rien ne nous dit qu’une fois l’investissement paye´ un autre choc ne boule-
verserait pas l’e´conomie, nous ramenant a` la situation initiale.
Pour ce qui est de l’exemple du capital humain, l’ajustement s’effectuera
donc via la de´mographie. On peut alors anticipait qu’un tel ajustement prendra
un temps incroyable. Par exemple, dans un exercice de calibration de Lamo et
al. (2006), les auteurs montrent que, dans le contexte de l’Estonie et la Pologne
qui viennent connaˆıtre un changement structurel puisqu’il s’agit d’e´conomies en
transition, la convergence vers le nouvel e´quilibre de long terme peut prendre
dans certains cas un demi-sie`cle, c’est-a`-dire le temps requis si on veut remplacer
l’ensemble de la force de travail par ce que l’e´conomie exige. Une se´rie d’articles
sur ce the`me comme ceux de Williamson (1990), Matsuyama (1992) et Rogerson
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(2005) ont e´galement montre´ dans des mode`les a` ge´ne´rations imbrique´es que la
de´mographie pouvait expliquer le niveau du taux d’emploi dans une e´conomie
lorsqu’on conside`re des chocs permanents sectoriels.
Si les re´allocations s’ave`rent trop couˆteuses, il existe ne´anmoins d’autres
moyens destine´s a` limiter un tel couˆt. C’est le cas de certaines politiques
e´conomiques. Ces dernie`res peuvent soit influencer la structure de l’e´conomie
d’une manie`re artificielle, soit modifier la disponibilite´ des ressources, de manie`re
a` ce que offre et demande sur le marche´ des facteurs se rapprochent. Comme
nous allons le de´crire plus bas, ces politiques peuvent permettre un accroisse-
ment de l’efficience dans certains cas en corrigeant les erreurs des marche´s la` ou`
ils sont caracte´rise´s par des imperfections. Mais elles peuvent e´galement eˆtre
le re´sultat de pressions politiques qui me`nent a` favoriser les inte´reˆts de certains
groupes au de´triment de l’inte´reˆt ge´ne´ral.
Une premie`re se´rie de facteurs sont les institutions du marche´ du travail.
La protection de l’emploi, par exemple, a incontestablement un impact sur les
re´allocations. En prote´geant la situation des travailleurs employe´s, elle certes
re´duit les licenciements, mais elle implique aussi que ces derniers ne pourront
jamais eˆtre re´alloue´s vers les taˆches pour lesquelles ils seraient plus efficaces.
Une grande partie de la litte´rature en e´conomie du travail s’est inte´resse´ au fait
que la protection de l’emploi re´duit les re´allocations au sein d’une e´conomie. Ces
travaux englobent par exemple Bertola (1990, 1999), Bentolila et Bertola (1990),
Hopenhayn et Rogerson (1993), Garibaldi (1998), Gomez-Saldavor et al. (2004)
et Ljungqvist (2002). Ils ont e´galement montre´ que l’effet d’une telle politique
sur le niveau de l’emploi est ambigu car bien qu’elle re´duise les destructions
d’emplois, elle re´duit e´galement les cre´ations car les entreprises anticipent avoir
a` payer des taxes de licenciement si elles ne prennent pas la bonne de´cision a`
l’embauche.
La litte´rature en e´conomie du travail a donc montre´ montrer d’une telle insti-
tution avait tendance a` diviser le monde des travailleurs en deux sous-ensembles.
Le premier comprend les insiders, c’est-a`-dire ceux qui ont un emploi et, puisque
ce dernier est prote´ge´, ces travailleurs peuvent be´ne´ficier de cette situation pour
une longue dure´e. Le second groupe est celui des outsiders. Ces derniers sont
d’une certaine manie`re exclus du marche´ car puisque la protection de l’emploi
re´duit e´galement les cre´ations il est peut probable qu’ils soient embauche´s et
cette situation peut tre`s bien persister au cours du temps. Certains e´conomistes
voient donc cette institution du marche´ du travail comme le re´sultat de pressions
politiques favorisant certains groupes au de´triment d’autres. Un tel argument
est notamment re´sume´ dans Saint-Paul (1995, 2000, 2002).
Plus re´cemment, Wasmer (2006) a montre´ que la protection de l’emploi a
tendance a` favoriser l’investissement en capital humain spe´cifique, c’est-a`-dire de
capital humain qui permet d’augmenter la productivite´ au sein d’une entreprise
mais qui n’a pas d’effet sur la productivite´ des autres firmes. Un tel phe´nome`ne
vient alors renforcer les barrie`res a` la re´allocation puisque les travailleurs n’ont
ainsi pas d’incitants a` aller exercer leur me´tier ailleurs.
Une autre institution du marche´ du travail qui a des effets sur les re´allocations
est l’assurance choˆmage. Elle a par exemple e´te´ e´tudie´ par Ljungvist et Sargent
(1998, 2002), Acemoglu (2001), Acemoglu et Shimer (1999, 2000), Fredriksson
et Holmlund (2001), Hopenhayn et Nicolini (1997), Pavoni (2006), Pavoni et
Violante (2007). L’assurance choˆmage est une politique efficace si le marche´
du travail est caracte´rise´ par de l’incertitude et que les travailleurs sont averses
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au risque. Dans un tel cas, les agents ont tendance a` accepter des emplois de
mauvaise qualite´ dont la productivite´ totale des facteurs est en ge´ne´ral moins
e´leve´e. La production agre´ge´e se re´ve`le alors moins importante que ce qu’elle
devrait eˆtre a` son niveau optimal. L’assurance choˆmage permet alors de pallier
une telle de´ficience en offrant la possibilite´ aux travailleurs d prendre leur temps
dans leur recherche d’emploi.
Cependant si cette dernie`re s’ave`re trop ge´ne´reuse, alors les travailleurs devi-
ennent donc beaucoup trop exigeants dans leur recherche. Dans un contexte de
mobilite´ ge´ographique, il est peu probable que ces derniers de´cident d’aller vivre
vers une autre re´gion si l’assurance choˆmage leur offre la possibilite´ de rester
dans leur ville natale. Des articles comme ceux de Hassler et al. (2003, 2005)
et Pallage et Zimmermann (2001) ont alors construit des mode`les ou` les agents
peuvent voter pour des politiques e´conomiques comme l’assurance choˆmage et
de´cider d’aller vivre ou non dans une re´gion alternative. Ces types de mode`les
pre´sentent alors souvent deux e´quilibres, l’un est caracte´rise´ par une faible mo-
bilite´ et une assurance choˆmage ge´ne´reuse et l’autre est celui d’une e´conomie
dynamique ou` l’assurance est plus faible.
D’autres politiques e´conomiques peuvent affecter les re´allocations comme
les politiques de concurrence ou encore les barrie`res au commerce international.
Nous avons de´ja` fait re´fe´rence pre´ce´demment a` ces dernie`res. Comme nous
l’avons de´ja` remarque´, ces politiques ont tendance a` prote´ger les entreprises
les moins productives. En re´duisant les barrie`res a` l’entre´e ou en favorisant la
concurrence, on pourrait alors mener ces dernie`res a` la faillite et ainsi re´allouer
les facteurs vers les firmes qui disposent d’une productivite´ totale des facteurs
plus importante.
Il existe e´galement des politiques comme l’immigration qui permettent de
modifier la disponibilte´ des ressources dans une e´conomie. Pour corriger les
proble`mes de l’augmentation des ine´galite´s salariales, Borjas (1999, 2003) pro-
pose par exemple de favoriser l’immigration de la main d’oeuvre qualifie´e, ce
qui permettrait aux salaires de revenir a` leur niveau initial.
Enfin, les politiques du logement, en prote´geant les locataires, sont un frein
a` la mobilite´ ge´ographique. Meˆme si ces locataires voudraient quelques fois
aller travailler dans une autre zone ge´ographique de l’e´conomie, la le´gislation
en terme de logement incitent les proprie´taires a` exiger toute une se´rie de doc-
uments qui va alors limiter les incitants a` aller vivre ailleurs.
Le changement structurel modifie donc le rapport aux facteurs de production
et va par la` exiger une re´allocation des ressources. Malheureusement, un tel
processus peut se re´ve´ler tre`s couteux. Les diffe´rents chapitres de cette the`se
vont donc s’appuyer sur une telle proble´matique. Dans de nombreuses situations
telles que la re´allocation intra-sectorielle entre firmes qu’exige l’ouverture aux
e´changes ou` les travailleurs doivent alors se re´allouer des entreprises les moins
productives a` celles qui sont plus performantes, ou encore dans un contexte de
mobilite´ ge´ographique requis par la divergence entre re´gions, ou meˆme dans celui
de la mobilite´ inter-sectorielle ou occupationnelle qui peut se voir limite´e par la
nature du capital humain, nous allons tenter de de´terminer par exemple si le
couˆt de ces re´allocation peut en exce´der les gains et de voir comment l’e´conomie
s’ajuste dans ces cas particuliers.
26
1.2 Les contributions de la the`se
1.2.1 La libe´ralisation du commerce me`ne-t-elle a` des pertes
d’emploi?
L’un des faits les moins conteste´s en e´conomie internationale est que le
commerce implique des gains a` l’e´change. Les gains issus du commerce peu-
vent provenir de diffe´rentes sources. En commerc¸ant, les e´conomies peuvent
be´ne´ficier de leur diversite´ respective. La spe´cialisation internationale me`ne
a` des gains en termes d’efficience et la concentration de la production dans
un meˆme endroit permet la re´alisation d’e´conomies d’e´chelle. L’inte´gration
e´conomique peut meˆme mener a` une augmentation du taux de croissance mon-
diale de la production en favorisant les flux d’ide´es au sein des secteurs spe´cialise´s
en recherche et de´veloppement, comme l’affirment Rivera-Batiz et Romer (1991).
La litte´rature re´cente sur l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ de firmes en commerce interna-
tional a identifie´ un autre me´canisme menant a` des gains en termes de bien-eˆtre
lorsqu’une e´conomie est plus expose´e au commerce. Il semblerait que la pre´sence
de couˆts d’entre´e sur les marche´s internationaux me`nerait les entreprises les plus
productives, qui sont e´galement les plus grandes, a` eˆtre les seules a` pouvoir par-
ticiper au commerce international. Les travaux ayant analyse´ un tel aspect sont
notamment Bernard et Jensen (1995 and 1999), Aw et al. (2000), Clerides et
al. (1998), Eaton et al. (2004), Head et Ries (1999), Levinsohn (1999), Pavc-
nik (2002), and Roberts et Tybout (1997). Tybout (2002) et Bernard et al.
(2007) fournissent e´galement une revue de la litte´rature. A cause des couˆts
d’entre´e sur le marche´ des exports, l’ouverture au commerce a alors des effets
sur les re´allocations d’emplois au sein d’un meˆme secteur. Lorsque le commerce
se libe´ralise, les grandes entreprises qui exportent ont alors besoin de plus de
travailleurs pour produire puisque de nouveaux marche´s leur permettent de
re´aliser de nouveaux investissements. Cette hausse de la demande de travail des
grandes entreprises ge´ne`re une re´allocation de travailleurs des entreprises les
moins productives vers celles dont la productivite´ est plus e´leve´e. Les grandes
entreprises deviennent encore plus grandes et, puisqu’elles sont plus productives
que les entreprises les plus petites, la productivite´ agre´ge´e augmente. En outre,
comme elles sont e´galement capables de fixer des prix moins e´leve´s, les petites
entreprises sont donc mener a` la faillite, ce qui de nouveau me`ne a` une hausse
de la productivite´ agre´ge´e.
Un mode`le permettant d’expliquer les re´allocations d’emplois des petites vers
les grandes entreprises est celui de Melitz (2003). Dans son mode`le, les firmes
sont he´te´roge`nes a` cause de l’incertitude inhe´rente a` l’investissement d’entre´e sur
le marche´. Puis, a` cause de l’existence de couˆts non recouvrables sur le marche´
des exportations, seulement les entreprises les plus productives exportent et la
libe´ralisation du commerce me`ne a` une hausse de la productivite´ agre´ge´e, une
croissance de la taille des entreprises, mais un nombre restreint d’entreprises.
Les entreprises les plus petites sont exclues du marche´ car les plus grandes font
pression a` la hausse sur les salaires re´els.
Cependant, ces conclusions sont tire´es a` partir d’un contexte de plein-emploi.
La question suivante survient donc naturellement lorsqu’on s’inte´resse a` un
monde caracte´rise´ par des frictions sur le marche´ du travail: quelles peuvent
eˆtre les conse´quences pour le niveau de l’emploi de cette re´allocation? En ef-
fet, le niveau moyen d’emploi par firme augmente, mais puisque le nombre
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d’entreprises diminue, on pourrait envisager que le deuxie`me effet domine, ce
qui causerait des pertes d’emplois.
Il s’ave`re que, bien que beaucoup d’e´conomistes anticiperaient que la libe´rali-
sation du commerce me`nerait a` une diminution des prix7, certaines e´tudes ont
montre´ que la libe´ralisation ne ge´ne`re pas d’effet d’e´chelle significatif comme
Krugman (1979) l’aurait pre´vu. Par “effet d’e´chelle”, on se re´fe`re au fait que
la libe´ralisation du commerce me`ne les exportateurs a` acce´der a` un marche´
plus large, ce qui leur permet de re´duire le couˆt moyen de production et ainsi
de diminuer leur prix. Cela intervient notamment lorsque la concurrence de-
vient plus forte. Cependant, lorsque la concurrence n’est pas affecte´e par la
libe´ralisation du commerce, il est possible qu’aucun effet d’e´chelle n’apparaisse.
C’est typiquement le cas quand les pre´fe´rences sont de type CES car, sous cette
spe´cification, les marges fixe´es par les entreprises ne de´pendent alors pas du nom-
bre de firmes pre´sentes sur un marche´. L’absence d’effet d’e´chelle a e´te´ illustre´e
dans le contexte de l’e´conomie canadienne par Head and Ries (1999, 2002) et
Trefler (2004), dans celle de l’e´conomie mexicaine (Tybout et Westbrook 1995)
et le Chilli (Tybout et al. 1991). En fait, il semblerait que le commerce ge´ne`re
d’importants effets de “se´lection”. Ces effets impliquent que la production est
biaise´e vers un sous-ensemble de firmes. Selon Feenstra (2004), la taille de l’effet
de se´lection pourrait meˆme eˆtre un facteur de choˆmage.
Le premier chapitre de cette the`se essaie de re´pondre a` cette question. Nous
construisons un mode`le a` firmes he´te´roge`nes essentiellement similaire a` celui
de Melitz (2003) en supposant que le marche´ du travail est caracte´rise´ pas des
frictions a` la Pissarides (2000). Le but est de comprendre en quoi l’emploi est
affecte´ par la libe´ralisation du commerce. Dans le mode`le, l’usage de pre´fe´rences
CES permet d’e´liminer tout effet d’e´chelle et de se concentrer sur l’influence
de l’effet de se´lection. Puis, nous re´alisons des statiques comparatives sur le
niveau de l’emploi et montrons qu’une ouverture plus importante au commerce
est associe´e a` un niveau moins e´leve´ d’emploi a` l’e´quilibre. Cela sugge`re que
le processus de re´allocation est caracte´rise´ par des destructions d’emploi dues
aux sorties de petites entreprises exce´dant les cre´ations d’emplois des grandes
entreprises.
Il y a deux raisons a` la diminution de l’emploi. Tout d’abord, l’absence
d’effet d’e´chelle dans l’e´conomie est un obstacle a` l’entre´e de firmes. Puis,
la concurrence monopolistique implique que le revenu marginal de´croit avec la
taille de la firme, ce qui veut dire que les incitants a` l’embauche de nouveaux tra-
vailleurs sont plus faibles pour les firmes les plus grandes. Ceci est d’une certaine
manie`re en ligne avec la litte´rature empirique sur les flux d’emplois bruts qui a
montre´ que les grandes entreprises pre´sentent des taux de cre´ations plus faibles
(voir Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004) et Davis et Haltiwanger (1999a)). Apre`s
la libe´ralisation du commerce, les grandes entreprises n’augmentent pas leur
niveau d’emploi de manie`re a` compenser les pertes dans le reste de l’e´conomie
car en limitant un peu leur embauches elles peuvent extraire des profits plus
e´leve´s. Par conse´quent, la libe´ralisation du commerce augmente la productivite´
agre´ge´e, mais, a` cause de la pre´sence de frictions a` la fois sur les marche´s du
7Par exemple, Cox et Harris (1985) ont estime´ que les gains provenant de la suppression
des taxes a` l’importation dans le cas de l’e´conomie canadienne a` partir d’un mode`le d’e´quilibre
ge´ne´ral. Leur re´sultats ont sugge´re´ une augmentation du PNB de 8 a` 10%. La raison principale
est que la libe´ralisation au Canada permettrait l’acce`s a` un marche´ plus large (les Etats-Unis),
ce qui favoriserait la re´alisation d’e´conomie d’e´chelle et ainsi la baisse des prix.
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travail et sur celui des biens, l’emploi chute.
Le me´canisme est en fait similaire a` l’introduction de barrie`res a` l’entre´e sur
le marche´ des biens. Dans Blanchard et Giavazzi (2003), les auteurs expliquent
le niveau e´leve´ du choˆmage en Europe graˆce a` la pre´sence de barrie`res a` l’entre´e
sur le marche´ des biens. Dans notre mode`le, la libe´ralisation du commerce a un
effet similaire: parce que les gains du commerce sont biaise´s vers les entreprises
les plus grandes, une plus grande ouverture au commerce gonfle les barrie`res a`
l’entre´e, ce qui pe´nalise les petites entreprises.
Dans ce chapitre, nous analysons e´galement d’un point de vue empirique
l’e´volution des flux d’emplois bruts en association avec celle de deux taux
d’ouverture (un pour les importations et l’autre pour les exportations). L’e´tude
concerne 418 secteurs de l’e´conomie ame´ricaine sur la pe´riode 1974-1988. Con-
trairement a` d’autres e´tudes, nous trouvons qu’une plus grande ouverture au
commerce ge´ne`re plus de destructions que de cre´ations d’emplois que ce soit pour
une hausse du taux d’importations comme pour celui du taux d’exportations.
L’estimation prend en compte l’effet de divers chocs agre´ge´s et introduit des ef-
fets fixes pour chaque secteur. De plus, l’utilisation de la Me´thode des Moments
Ge´ne´ralise´s permet de tenir compte des proble`mes d’endoge´ne´ite´.
Comme beaucoup de travaux empiriques ont montre´, une augmentation des
importations me`ne a` une diminution de l’emploi. Nous trouvons dans ce chapitre
qu’une augmentation d’un point du taux d’importation me`ne a` une augmenta-
tion du taux de destruction de 14,7 points et n’a pas d’effet significatif sur
les cre´ations. Un re´sultat inte´ressant de la partie empirique de ce chapitre est
qu’une augmentation de la part des exportations ge´ne`re une augmentation du
taux de cre´ation de 4,5 points et une augmentation du taux de destruction de
6,5 points.
Ce chapitre n’est bien suˆr pas le premier a` analyser l’emploi dans un contexte
international. Un pan important de la litte´rature s’appuie sur une approche a`
plusieurs secteurs. Des travaux empiriques illustrent que les industries les plus
ouvertes au commerce pre´sentent des taux de rotation de la main d’oeuvre plus
e´leve´s. C’est le cas par exemple des travaux de Davis et al. (1996) et Magee et al.
(2005). Dans Cun˜at et Melitz (2006), les auteurs suivent cette ide´e et essaient
de comprendre en quoi la protection de l’emploi peut influencer la spe´cialisation
au niveau international. Leurs re´sultats montrent que les exportations des pays
avec un marche´ du travail plus flexible sont biaise´es vers les industries ou` la
volatilite´ est plus e´leve´e.
Certaines approches the´oriques ont aussi suivi une approche a` plusieurs
secteurs. C’est le cas des artciles de Davidson et al. (1999), Sener (2001),
et Davidson et Matusz (2004). Par exemple, dans Davidson et al. (1999), les
auteurs de´veloppent un mode`le de type Heckscher-Ohlin avec des frictions tout
aussi bien sur le marche´ du travail comme sur celui du capital. Ils montrent
qu’une grande e´conomie comme les Etats-Unis devrait connaˆıtre une hausse de
son choˆmage en s’ouvrant au commerce puisqu’il s’agit d’une e´conomie abon-
dante en capital et qu’elle utiliserait son travail d’une manie`re moins intensive.
Toutefois, leur me´canisme repose sur une re´allocation de travailleurs ne´cessaire
d’une industrie a` l’autre. Or, il est connu qu’une telle re´allocation s’ave`re
limite´e. Meˆme a` tre`s long terme, Wacziarg et Wallack (2004) ont montre´ que
la libe´ralisation du commerce n’a pas d’effet sur les re´allocations de travailleurs
d’un secteur a` l’autre et, si un tel effet peut s’observer pour des niveaux de
de´sagre´gation plus e´leve´s, il s’ave`re tre`s petit.
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D’autres articles ont reconnu la capacite´ limite´e des travailleurs a` changer
de secteur. Comme il est bien connu des e´conomistes du travail, le changement
structurel ge´ne`re plus de destructions que de cre´ations en l’absence de mobilite´,
du moins dans un contexte de court terme. Par exemple, Caballero et Hammour
(1996) analysent la libe´ralisation du commerce dans le cas des e´conomies en voie
de de´veloppement dans un contexte a` plusieurs secteurs. L’ouverture au com-
merce ne´cessite des re´allocations de travailleurs du secteur des importations vers
celui des exportations, mais comme l’e´conomie qu’ils conside`rent est caracte´rise´e
par des imperfections sur le marche´ du capital, ce marche´ pre´sente des proble`mes
de hold-up, ce qui est un frein aux cre´ations d’emplois dans le secteur des expor-
tations. D’autres travaux inte´ressants comme Lamo et al. (2006) and Saint-Paul
(2005) conside`rent que le travail n’est pas mobile a` cause de la spe´cificite´ du cap-
ital humain. L’ouverture au commerce de´truit donc plus d’emploi qu’elle n’en
cre´e parce que certains travailleurs ne sont pas dote´s des compe´tences spe´cifiques
au secteur des exportations. Ce chapitre de la the`se montre que ce phe´nome`ne
peut e´galement s’observer au sein d’un meˆme secteur. L’analyse s’appuie donc
sur une approche a` un secteur comme dans Krugman (1980). L’ouverture au
commerce ne de´truit donc pas que des emplois dans les secteurs en de´clin, mais
e´galement dans ceux qui suivent un processus d’expansion.
Malheureusement, le mode`le de Melitz (2003) a e´te´ critique´ parce que la
productivite´ au niveau de la firme est exoge`ne et ale´atoire, ce qui a motive´
d’autres approches comme celle de Yeaple (2005), ou` des firmes qui sont iden-
tiques ex-ante choisissent d’adopter des technologies diffe´rentes. Cependant,
une litte´rature empirique importante a e´tudie´ l’e´volution de l’emploi au niveau
de la firme et a montre´ que les entreprises doivent faire face a` des chocs idiosyn-
cratiques et persistants. Cette e´vidence a motive´ d’autres mode`les comme celui
de Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Ce dernier s’ave`re approprie´ a` l’e´tude des
cycles de la dynamique du marche´ du travail. Le mode`le de Melitz semble donc
ade´quat a` un tel contexte.
Il va de soi que nos re´sultats ne se ge´ne´ralisent pas a` l’e´conomie dans son
l’ensemble. Ils illustrent en fait la situation d’un secteur en particulier. La
mode´lisation n’implique qu’une seule industrie et des critiques similaires concer-
nent la partie empirique. Les e´conomistes en commerce international se re´fe`rent
quelque fois a` une approche dite d’e´quilibre partiel pour de´signer une telle
me´thodologie, une approche d’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral conside´rant plusieurs secteurs a`
la fois. Par conse´quent, alors que l’emploi au niveau d’un secteur diminue, on
ne peut pas conclure que cette e´volution sera commune a` toute l’e´conomie. En
effet, le travail peut tre`s bien se re´allouer vers d’autres secteurs. De ce point de
vue, l’approche doit s’interpre´ter comme les conse´quences a` moyen termes de la
libe´ralisation, ou` l’ajustement s’est effectue´ au sein du secteur qui s’ouvre, amis
aucun re´e´quilibrage n’apparait dans le reste de l’e´conomie.
1.2.2 Le bien-eˆtre dans les mode`les de commerce avec
firmes he´te´roge`nes.
Le mode`le re´cent de Melitz (2003) a de´ja` e´te´ intense´ment utilise´ en commerce
international. C’est de´sormais un pilier de ce champ de la science e´conomique et
a meˆme attire´ l’attention de certains e´conomistes du travail. En plus d’ajouter
une nouvelle dimension a` la mode´lisation e´conomique, l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ en ter-
mes de productivite´, l’aspect inte´ressant du mode`le de Melitz est la facilite´ avec
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laquelle une telle he´te´roge´ne´ite´ peut s’e´tudier. Le mode`le est une simple exten-
sion du mode`le de Krugman (1980), ou` la production est caracte´rise´e par des
rendements d’e´chelle et l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ est due au fait que la productivite´ d’une
entreprise est de´termine´e d’une manie`re ale´atoire a` l’aide d’une distribution de
probabilite´ exoge`ne. Alors que de nombreux mode`les en macroe´conomie et en
the´orie de la consommation requiert l’utilisation d’ordinateurs dans la re´solution
de leur e´quilibre, le mode`le de Melitz fournit une solution e´crite, ce qui rend le
de´bat en e´conomie bien plus facile. En particulier, on peut de´sormais e´tudier
a` un couˆt nul l’impact sur la productivite´ agre´ge´e de politiques de concurrence
telles que la de´re´gulation ou encore la suppression des barrie`res au commerce.
Le deuxie`me chapitre de cette the`se est un commentaire des implications en
termes de bien-eˆtre du mode`le de Melitz. Le me´canisme principal par lequel
la libe´ralisation du commerce ame´liore le bien-eˆtre agre´ge´ est la re´allocation
d’emplois. Puisque seulement les entreprises les plus productives exportent, la
suppression des barrie`res au commerce implique un accroissement de la taille des
exportateurs et me`ne au de´clin des entreprises les moins productives, voire a` leur
destruction. Le processus de re´allocation a par conse´quent un effet positif sur la
productivite´ agre´ge´e et, naturellement, sur le bien-eˆtre. Apre`s la libe´ralisation,
les travailleurs peuvent be´ne´ficier de salaires plus e´leve´s, ainsi que de prix moins
e´leve´s, car la production est concentre´e parmi les entreprises les plus produc-
tives.
L’aspect que nous voulons mettre en avant dans ce chapitre est que l’ame´lioration
du bien-eˆtre est due a` la forme particulie`re que prend la courbe de demande de
travail agre´ge´e. Dans le mode`le, cette courbe est croissante dans l’espace emploi-
salaire. Cela implique que tout mouvement de la courbe de droite a` gauche me`ne
a` un accroissement des salaires et, si l’offre de travail est e´lastique, a` une hausse
de l’emploi e´galement.
Une raison pour laquelle la courbe de demande agre´ge´e8 est croissante est due
a` la nature des couˆts fixes que les entreprises doivent payer durant le processus
de production. Dans le mode`le de Melitz, ce couˆt repre´sente une quantite´ mini-
male de travail ne´cessaire pour commencer le processus de production. Dans ce
chapitre, nous illustrons le cas d’une e´conomie qui diffe`re de celle de Melitz par
la nature des couˆts fixes. Dans cette e´conomie, ces couˆts ne repre´sentent pas
de travail, mais une certaine quantite´ de bien final et nous montrerons que, en
modifiant cette caracte´ristique, la courbe de demande de travail agre´ge´e peut se
re´ve´ler de´croissante. Cela implique que tout mouvement de la courbe de droite
a` gauche ne me`ne plus a` une hausse des salaires. Les salaires diminuent et, si
l’offre de travail est e´lastique, l’emploi e´galement. De plus, il est inte´ressant de
noter que cela ge´ne`re aussi une diminution de la production agre´ge´e et ainsi que
du bien-eˆtre.
Bien que cette hypothe`se puisse sembler simplificatrice, nous montrerons
dans ce chapitre qu’elle a des implications bien plus importantes.
8Notons que le terme “agre´ge´” ici est important. La demande de travail au niveau de la
firme est de´croissante, mais une fois que nous prenons en compte le processus d’entre´e et de
sortie des firmes la courbe de demande de travail agre´ge´e re´sultante est croissante.
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1.2.3 Capital social local, mobilite´ ge´ographique et choˆmage
en Europe
La mobilite´ ge´ographique est le signe d’une e´conomie performante: elle re´ve`le
la capacite´ a` s’adapter au changement ainsi qu’a` re´allouer des facteurs de pro-
duction la` ou` ils sont le plus efficaces. Sur cette dimension, il semblerait que
les taux de mobilite´ en Europe continentale sont extreˆmement faibles si on les
compare au Royaume-Uni ou aux Etats-Unis. Ceci a quelques fois e´te´ conside´re´
comme l’une des explications du choˆmage en Europe. Par exemple, le travail
de Bertola et Ichino (1996) a e´te´ l’un des premiers a` documenter l’importance
du couˆt pour les travailleurs europe´ens de bouger vers les re´gions les plus dy-
namiques. Ce phe´nome`ne apparaˆıt selon les auteurs car la compression de la
distribution des salaires rend la mobilite´ moins inte´ressante. Si on conside`re
la mobilite´ en Europe, la part des individus qui ont bouge´ vers une autre aire
ge´ographique durant les trois dernie`res anne´es est typiquement trois fois moins
e´leve´e en Europe continentale, soit environ 2,5%, alors qu’au Royaume Uni elle
est de 7,2%. La mobilite´ pour des raisons non lie´es au travail est de 2,5 points
moins e´leve´s en Europe continentale qu’aux Royaume-Unis. Des comparaisons
entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis re´ve`lent la meˆme caracte´ristique. Wasmer et
al. (2005, Table 4.1) montre, par exemple, qu’aux Etats-Unis, environ 30% des
individus sont ne´s dans un Etat diffe´rent de celui dans laquelle ils se trouvent.
Ce chiffre avoisine les 20% environ pour des pays ou` la taille des re´gions est
similaire a` celle des Etats-Unis: il est de 19,2% en Belgique, 12,7 au Portugal,
16,8 en Autriche, et 23,5% en Espagne. La moyenne pour ces quatre pays est
de 18,1%.
Dans le troisie`me chapitre de cette the`se, afin de comprendre les de´terminants
et les implications de la faible mobilite´ en Europe, nous ne nous inte´ressons
pas aux gains de la mobilite´, comme Bertola et Ichino (1996) l’ont fait, mais,
d’une perspective duale, a` ses couˆts. Un grand nombre d’analyses the´oriques
en e´conomie urbaine et re´gionale ont cependant souvent conside´re´ que les couˆts
et les gains a` la mobilite´ comme exoge`nes. Dans ce troisie`me chapitre, nous
nous fixons comme but de donner plus de substance aux couˆts de la mobilite´
ge´ographique. Pour cette raison, nous introduisons le concept de capital social
local qui affecte notamment les couˆts de la mobilite´. Le capital social local car-
acte´rise les liens que les agents peuvent avoir avec leur aire de re´sidence ou leur
re´gion. Celui-ci se de´pre´cie en partie, voire totalement, lorsque les individus
de´cident de de´me´nager vers une autre re´gion, ce qui affecte ne´gativement leur
bien-eˆtre.
Nous appuyons notre analyse sur des travaux re´cents sur le capital social,
notamment un article de Glaeser et al. (2002) qui introduit une the´orie ex-
plicite du capital social endoge`ne, se caracte´risant dans leur travail par le fait
d’eˆtre membre d’une association. Ils montrent d’ailleurs que le stock de capital
social diminue lorsque la mobilite´ anticipe´e se re´ve`le plus importante. Il s’ave`re
que le lien entre capital social local et mobilite´ a deux causalite´s. D’une part,
l’anticipation du de´placement vers une autre re´gion affecte l’investissement en
capital social comme dans Glaeser et al. (2002). Si les agents se voient comme
tre`s attache´s a` un village, une ville ou une re´gion, ils investiront beaucoup en
capital social local parce que les gains des liens locaux sont e´leve´s. D’autre part,
un stock de capital social local e´leve´ accroit les couˆts lie´s a` la mobilite´. Enfin, si
les individus anticipent que leur amis resteront dans leur voisinage e´galement,
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les gains a` cre´er des liens locaux s’ave`rent alors tre`s larges. Cette externalite´
sociale ge´ne`re des e´quilibres multiples dans le mode`le et donc renforce la faible
mobilite´ de certaines re´gions ou groupes de´mographiques.
A cause du renforcement de ces deux causalite´s ainsi que de l’externalite´, il
est plausible que, dans le contexte des pays europe´ens ou` la mobilite´ ge´ographique
est faible, le capital social local soit un frein au changement. Cette possibilite´
se re´ve`le assez attractive et nous l’explorons dans ce troisie`me chapitre. Notre
travail est plutoˆt un premier pas que la formalisation d’une conclusion de´finitive,
mais toute l’e´vidence empirique nous sugge`re que nous avons besoin d’accroitre
notre compre´hension des interactions entre mobilite´, capital social et choˆmage.
Il faut tout de meˆme remarquer que le capital social n’est pas exclusivement lo-
cal et peut meˆme eˆtre utilise´ de manie`re a` promouvoir la mobilite´. Un tre`s bon
exemple est le de´veloppement des clubs Rotary au de´but du vingtie`me sie`cle aux
Etats-Unis qui, a` l’origine, e´tait destine´s a` reproduire l’environnement social de
travailleurs ayant de´me´nage´, ce qui leur fournissait un substitut au capital so-
cial local pre´cise´ment. Sur la page internet du Club Rotary on peut lire qu’il
s’agit justement d’une institution voulant recre´er l’amitie´ que les travailleurs
avaient connu dans leur petite ville natale, le nom “Rotary” venant meˆme du
mot “rotation”.
Dans ce troisie`me chapitre, nous revoyons tout d’abord la litte´rature sur
le capital social et mettons en valeur la dimension ge´ographique qui apparait
soit de manie`re implicite ou explicite. Il est inte´ressant de voir que la plupart
des travaux insistent sur le roˆle positif que le capital social peut avoir sur la
performance des marche´s du travail, alors que nous avons tendance a mettre en
valeur des me´canismes ne´gatifs. Un contre-exemple est Bentolila et al. (2004),
qui se focalisent spe´cifiquement sur les pays europe´ens et insistent sur le lien
ne´gatif entre capital social et marche´ du travail. En particulier, ils argumentent
que les emplois obtenus via les re´seaux sociaux tendent a` en diminuer le salaire
propose´, ce qui peut s’interpre´ter comme une distorsion vers une plus grande
inefficience.
Puis, nous explorons les liens entre mobilite´ et capital social en Europe.
D’abord, nous essayons de mesurer le capital social tel que nous devrions le
faire dans un contexte europe´en. Par exemple, le capital social local peut
s’approximer par des mesures de l’intensite´ des relations entre amis, alors qu’eˆtre
membre d’un club est un type plus global de capital social. Nous nous preˆtons a`
une se´rie d’exercices empiriques afin de souligner notre me´canisme. La premie`re
causalite´, de capital social a` mobilite´, est teste´e a` l’aide de donne´es individuelles
en provenance de la base de donne´es European Community Household Panel.
Traitant d’abord le capital social comme pre´de´termine´ et conside´rant que la mo-
bilite´ est un changement d’aire de re´sidence d’une anne´e a` l’autre, nous trouvons
que nos mesures de capital social local re´duisent fortement la mobilite´. Puis,
nous utilisons toute une se´rie d’instruments pour le capital social telles le capital
au niveau de la re´gion, les caracte´ristiques des individus une anne´e auparavant,
la composition de la famille, le taux de participation aux e´lections et la densite´
de population. Les re´sultats restent valides. La significativite´ diminue quelques
fois, mais les coefficients estime´s s’ave`rent souvent plus grands. La deuxie`me
causalite´, de la mobilite´ au capital social, est aussi ve´rifie´e dans les donne´es: les
individus ayant ve´cu dans une re´gion diffe´rente de leur re´gion natale ont en effet
accumule´ moins de capital social. Enfin, nous explorons l’impact du capital so-
cial sur le choˆmage. Il est alors inte´ressant de noter que le capital exclusivement
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local tend a` rendre le choˆmage plus probable, alors que le fait d’eˆtre membre
d’un club a un effet contraire.
Afin de rationaliser ces re´sultats, nous de´veloppons une the´orie illustrant les
me´canismes observe´s dans les donne´es. Nous caracte´risons comment plusieurs
types de capital social ont des impacts diffe´rents sur les taux de mobilite´ et de
choˆmage. Nous de´finissons le capital social en nous focalisant sur deux dimen-
sions: une dimension locale, c’est-a`-dire qu’une fraction de ce capital se de´pre´cie
lorsqu’un agent de´me´nage vers une autre re´gion, et une dimension profession-
nelle, c’est-a`-dire qu’une fraction se de´pre´cie si lorsque l’agent se retrouve au
choˆmage. Les deux taux de de´pre´ciation se re´ve`lent de´terminants pour ce qui
est des de´cisions de mobilite´ et d’acceptation d’emplois. Nous illustrons d’abord
un premier e´le´ment de la causalite´ bilate´rale: le capital social local re´duit la mo-
bilite´ dans un mode`le simple d’offre de salaires. Nous trouvons e´galement que le
capital social augmente la probabilite´ d’eˆtre au choˆmage si la dimension locale du
capital social domine sa dimension professionnelle, c’est-a`-dire si la de´pre´ciation
du capital social est plus grande apre`s un de´placement ge´ographique que suite a`
la perte d’un emploi. Le fait que les taux de de´pre´ciation relatifs importent pour
le signe de l’impact du capital social sur le choˆmage justifie les deux dimensions
du capital social puisqu’ils aident a` comprendre les re´sultats empiriques.
Puis, nous explorons les de´terminants du capital social. Nous identifions
l’existence de deux maxima locaux dans les gains du capital social, ce qui im-
plique que des individus qui sont a priori proches dans les donne´es peuvent tre`s
bien se comporter de manie`res tre`s diffe´rentes: certains n’investiront pas beau-
coup en capital social local, ils seront alors plus mobiles avec plus de chances de
trouver un emploi, alors que d’autres investiront plus en capital social local et
pre´fe`reront donc marginalement rester au choˆmage localement. Il s’agit d’une
premie`re comple´mentarite´ entre immobilite´ et capital social. Nous permettons
alors aux agents de choisir leur type de capital social (local ou professionnel)
sous contrainte et illustrons une autre comple´mentarite´: lorsque la probabilite´ ex
ante d’eˆtre au choˆmage est plus grande que la probabilite´ ex ante de se de´placer
vers une autre re´gion, les agents investissent alors plus en capital social local.
Enfin, nous introduisons plusieurs extensions. La premie`re concerne les ex-
ternalite´s sociales. Nous conside´rons que s’il est probable que les amis d’un
agent restent dans sa zone ge´ographique, alors les gains du capital social local
se voient renforcer. Cette extension me`ne a` des e´quilibres multiples et donc a`
une troisie`me comple´mentarite´: un e´quilibre est caracte´rise´ par un fort stock de
capital social local, une mobilite´ faible et un taux de choˆmage e´leve´, et inverse-
ment pour le second e´quilibre. Dans une deuxie`me extension, nous montrons
que la protection de l’emploi renforce les incitants a` investir en capital social
local. Enfin, nous explorons en quoi le capital social permet de mieux compren-
dre les diffe´rences intra-europe´ennes en termes de choˆmage au niveau de chaque
pays.
Les conclusions de notre travail ne sont pas de´finitives. Elles indiquent seule-
ment que choˆmage et mobilite´ sont lie´s en Europe. En outre, elles montrent que
si l’immobilite´ est due en partie a` des facteurs e´conomiques, elle est aussi due
en grande partie a` des facteurs sociaux, c’est-a`-dire des e´le´ments sur lesquels
les de´cideurs politiques ont peu d’influence. De cette manie`re, les re´formes
du marche´ du travail en Europe doivent tenir compte de la complexite´ de
l’organisation des socie´te´s.
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1.2.4 L’impact de la croissance e´conomique sur la qualite´
de l’appariement: le roˆle du capital humain
Le quatrie`me chapitre est une contribution a` la litte´rature sur la croissance
et les marche´s du travail. La litte´rature a identifie´ typiquement deux effets de
la croissance sur la demande de travail9. D’une part, l’effet de “capitalisation”
se re´fe`re au fait qu’en cas de croissance plus rapide les entreprises anticipent des
revenus futurs plus e´leve´s et les cre´ations d’emplois sont donc plus importantes.
D’autre part, l’effet de “destruction cre´atrice” implique qu’une acce´le´ration de
la croissance me`ne a` une obsolescence technologique plus rapide et donc a` plus
de destructions d’emplois. Il est e´vident que les deux effets ont des conse´quences
diffe´rentes sur le taux de choˆmage d’une e´conomie. Certaines e´tudes ont donc es-
saye´ d’analyser l’importance des deux me´canismes en s’inte´ressant a` l’e´volution
des flux d’emplois ou a` celle du niveau du choˆmage. Ce quatrie`me chapitre de
la the`se s’inse`re dans un tel contexte, mais nous nous focalisons sur un autre
aspect du marche´ du travail, le mismatch des compe´tences entre travailleurs et
entreprises.
Une e´tude re´cente de Pissarides et Vallanti (2007) a essaye´ d’e´valuer em-
piriquement l’effet d’une croissance de la productivite´ totale des facteurs sur le
taux de choˆmage. Leur re´sultats indiquent un impact ne´gatif fort, ce qui les
ame`ne a` affirmer que la destruction cre´atrice ne joue aucun roˆle pour ce qui est
de la dynamique du choˆmage d’e´quilibre. Ils sugge`rent que la recherche dans le
futur devrait conside´rer d’autres classes de mode`les de croissance de manie`re a`
tenir compte des diffe´rences observe´es entre the´orie et pratique empirique. Cela
a par exemple mene´ a` de nouvelles contributions telles que Michelacci et Lopez
Salido (2007).
A contrario, les e´tudes utilisant des donne´es au niveau des entreprises et dont
le but est d’e´valuer le lien entre les re´allocations d’emplois et la productivite´
agre´ge´e semblent contredirent les re´sultats de Pissarides et Vallanti (2007). Ces
e´tudes englobent par exemple Foster et al. (2001), Davis et Haltiwanger (1999a)
et Campbell (1998) et montrent que les pe´riodes de changement technologique
rapide sont caracte´rise´es par un taux de sortie d’entreprises e´leve´ et ainsi que
des destructions d’emplois importantes. En particulier, la mort des entreprises
les moins productives permet des re´allocations de facteurs de productions vers
celles qui sont dote´es d’une productivite´ plus e´leve´e. Cela me`ne alors a` un
accroissement de la productivite´ agre´ge´e. Ce phe´nome`ne a par exemple e´te´
illustre´ dans le cas de la de´re´gulation du marche´ des te´le´communications aux
Etats-Unis (voir Olley et Pakes (1996)) ou de la libe´ralisation du commerce au
Chilli (voir Pavcnik (2002)).
De la meˆme manie`re, d’autres e´tudes telles que Bartel et Sicherman (1993,
1998) ont montre´ que des industries caracte´rise´es par de forts taux de change-
ment technologique sont associe´es a` une part plus importante d’entreprises fi-
nanc¸ant des formations a` leur travailleurs, ce qui sugge`re que le capital humain
devient plus rapidement obsole`te dans ces industries et qui peut donc mener
a` une part plus e´leve´e de travailleurs dont les compe´tences ne correspondent
pas a` ce qui est requis par le marche´. L’ensemble de ces re´sultats sugge`rent
que la destruction cre´atrice est un facteur important influenc¸ant les marche´s du
travail.
9Voir Aghion et Howitt (1994, 1998), Mortensen et Pissarides (1998) et Pissarides (2000).
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Dans le quatrie`me chapitre de cette the`se, nous pre´sentons un ensemble de
faits empiriques qui sugge`rent que, en analysant d’autres aspects du marche´
du travail tels que le mismatch des compe´tences, la destruction cre´atrice semble
encore de´terminante pour ce qui est de la caracte´risation des marche´s du travail.
Le but de notre travail n’est donc pas de montrer que l’effet de capitalisation
ne joue aucun roˆle dans la de´termination du mismatch et que la destruction
cre´atrice en est le seul de´terminant. Nous voulons insister sur le fait que les deux
me´canismes permettent d’expliquer un tel fait et qu’une combinaison des deux
effets est la meilleure strate´gie a` suivre. Nous pensons donc que la destruction
cre´atrice ne doit surtout pas eˆtre ne´glige´e comple`tement par la litte´rature.
Notre strate´gie est de tout d’abord observer ce que les donne´es nous sugge`rent,
ce qui nous permet d’identifier les diffe´rentes variables macroe´conomiques qui
sont corre´le´es au mismatch et notamment le signe de ces corre´lations. En par-
ticulier, nous remarquons que le mismatch est corre´le´ ne´gativement a` la crois-
sance de la productivite´ totale des facteurs et positivement avec l’importance
de la le´gislation en termes de protection de l’emploi. La corre´lation entre le
choˆmage et mismatch est elle positive, mais faible. Dans cette partie empirique
du chapitre, le but est d’illustrer les faits stylise´s concernant le mismatch afin
d’obtenir une base sur laquelle nous pourrons nous appuyer afin d’e´valuer un en-
semble de mode`les impliquant croissance et mismatch. la capacite´ des mode`les
a` reproduire l’ensemble des faits stylise´s est un moyen permettant donc de juger
leur validite´.
Tout d’abord, nous pre´senterons un premier mode`le de croissance et mis-
match que nous nommerons “mode`le de destruction cre´atrice pur” parce qu’aucun
effet de capitalisation ne s’y trouve. La mode´lisation est similaire a` celle pre´sente
dans Pissarides (2000) et Mortensen et Pissarides (1998) ou` le progre`s tech-
nologique est incorpore´ a` toute nouvelle entreprise et le marche´ du travail est
caracte´rise´ par des frictions a` la Pissarides. La diffe´rence avec le mode`le de
Pissarides (2000) est la pre´sence de mismatch. Dans le mode`le, l’assignation
des nouveaux emplois aux travailleurs est purement ale´atoire, ce qui implique
que les compe´tences des travailleurs peuvent correspondre ou non a` ce qui est
requis par l’emploi. La possibilite´ de pouvoir chercher un emploi alors qu’ils
travaillent leur permet alors d’ame´liorer la qualite´ de leur situation. L’esprit de
cette partie du mode`le est en fait proche d’Albrecht et Vroman (2002) et Dolado
et al. (2004). Ces articles conside`rent une approche ou` les travailleurs qualifie´s
peuvent accepter des emplois qui sont en principe destine´s a` des travailleurs
non qualifie´s. Alors qu’ils sont dans l’attente de trouver un emploi de qualite´,
les travailleurs qualifie´s sont alors dispose´s a` accepter de mauvaises offres parce
que le marche´ du travail est caracte´rise´ par des imperfections, l’assignement
ale´atoire des nouveaux emplois me`ne alors a` un mismatch temporaire.
Le mode`le est clairement incapable de reproduire les faits stylise´s de´crits plus
haut. Tout d’abord, l’influence de la croissance sur le mismatch est ambigu¨e.
Le mode`le est caracte´rise´ par deux effets oppose´s sur le mismatch. Le premier
implique que la croissance me`ne a` plus de mismatch car elle re´duit la dure´e des
emplois. L’effet de la dure´e des emplois sur le mismatch est duˆ au fait que le
travailleur a ainsi plus (ou moins) de temps pour trouver l’emploi approprie´ et,
s’il le trouve, c’est pour une pe´riode plus longue (ou plus courte). Un tel effet a
par exemple e´te´ mis en valeur par Burdett (1978) et Manning (2003), ce qui les a
amene´ a` reconside´rer l’explication via le capital humain de la corre´lation positive
entre dure´e de l’emploi (ou age) et salaire (en effet, si l’appariement s’effectue
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de manie`re ale´atoire, un travailleur peut tarder a` trouver un bon emploi; il va
accepter toute une se´ries de petits emplois interme´diaires jusqu’a` trouver celui
qui le convient, ce qui implique la corre´lation positive). Dans ce contexte, la
qualite´ de l’appariement a la meˆme interpre´tation que le salaire.
D’autre part, une acce´le´ration de la croissance de´truit proportionnellement
plus de mauvais que de bon emplois car les mauvais appariements sont moins
productifs, ce qui implique l’ambigu¨ite´ de l’effet sur le mismatch. De plus, la
croissance a un effet positif sur le choˆmage, ce qui est re´fute´ par les donne´es et
ainsi que par l’e´tude de Pissarides et Vallanti (2007).
Puis, nous pre´sentons un deuxie`me mode`le qui fournit la possibilite´ aux en-
treprises de´ja` existantes d’investir dans la technologie la plus re´cente a` un certain
couˆt. Le deuxie`me mode`le est une modification du premier ou` la recherche
d’emploi n’est pas permise si les travailleurs en posse`dent de´ja` un. Cette
extension ame´liore conside´rablement la capacite´ du mode`le a` reproduire les
faits stylise´s. Pour un certain intervalle de parame`tres, investir dans les nou-
velles technologies est alors profitables aux bons appariements, mais ne l’est
pas pour les mauvais parce que leur productivite´ est trop faible et le couˆt de
l’investissement est donc trop e´leve´. Ce me´canisme nous permet d’annuler le
premier effet de la croissance sur le mismatch du premier mode`le et ainsi de
permettre a` la marge de destruction d’eˆtre le de´terminant majeur de l’impact
de la croissance sur le mismatch. Dans ce cas, le mismatch n’est de´termine´ que
par la destruction des mauvais emplois, alors que la tension sur le marche´ du
travail n’a aucun effet. Ceci implique que la destruction cre´atrice est le seul
me´canisme a` pouvoir influencer le mismatch, alors que l’effet de capitalisation
affecte le choˆmage via l’investissement dans les nouvelles technologies.
Enfin, nous conside´rons un troisie`me mode`le, qui donne la possibilite´ aux
travailleurs qui ont de´ja` un emploi d’en trouver un meilleur. Il s’agit d’une
extension naturelle puisque la possibilite´ pour les travailleurs de chercher un
emploi alors qu’ils en ont de´ja` un leur permet d’ame´liorer la qualite´ de leur
situation. Dans ce contexte, la tension sur le marche´ du travail a e´galement
un effet sur le mismatch car elle permet de modifier la mobilite´ des travailleurs
des mauvais vers les bons emplois, ce qui n’e´tait pas le cas dans le deuxie`me
mode`le. Ceci sugge`re que l’effet de capitalisation pourrait a` lui seul expliquer la
corre´lation positive entre mismatch et croissance. Alors pourquoi devrions-nous
nous inte´resser a` l’effet de destruction cre´atrice? La re´ponse est quantitative.
Nos faits stylise´s montrent que le mismatch est fortement corre´le´ a` la croissance,
mais la corre´lation entre choˆmage et mismatch est, elle, faible. La destruction
cre´atrice peut alors expliquer cette observation: en renforc¸ant la marge de de-
struction, on peut alors accroitre l’effet de la croissance sur le mismatch et aussi
re´duire la corre´lation avec le choˆmage.
Une dernie`re section dans ce chapitre conside`re l’effet de la protection de
l’emploi. Les re´sultats sugge`rent que les faits stylise´s peuvent eˆtre reproduits si
on s’inte´resse a` la fois aux destructions et aux cre´ations d’emplois. La protection
de l’emploi augmente alors le taux de mismatch car elle re´duit la destruction
des mauvais emplois ainsi que la mobilite´ des travailleurs des mauvais vers les
bons emplois.
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Chapter 2
Does trade liberalization
lead to job loss?
Abstract. Exporting firms are larger and more productive than non-exporting
firms. Trade openness leads to an increase in intra-industry firm turnover. As
trade is liberalized, large firms need more labor to produce and small firms exit,
leading to a reallocation of labor from the latter to the former. This mechanism
leads to improvement in aggregate productivity.
I build a heterogeneous-firm model of international trade with search fric-
tions on the labor market and do comparative statics on the level of employment.
I find that higher trade exposure is associated with a lower level of employment,
suggesting that trade generates more job destruction than creation. I test the
model predictions by applying GMM panel data methods to US sectoral job
flows. The empirical findings confirm the theoretical results.
2.1 Introduction
The most important insight in international economics is that trade leads to
welfare gains. Gains from trade arise from many different channels. By trading,
economies can benefit from their respective diversity. International specializa-
tion leads to efficiency gains and, as the “home market” effect states, the re-
sulting concentration of production in one place might bring scale economies1.
Economic integration can even raise the worldwide rate of growth by increasing
flows of ideas through the R&D sector, as claimed by Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991).
Recent literature on firm heterogeneity in international economics has iden-
tified yet another mechanism leading to welfare improvement when an economy
gets more exposed to trade. It appears that the presence of a sunk entry cost
to international markets causes only the most productive firms (which are the
largest2) to take part in international trade3. Because of this sunk cost, trade
1See Krugman (1980).
2Intra-industry trade which represents the most important portion of international trade
occurs when there are economies of scale. This implies that the most productive firms are
also the largest.
3See Bernard and Jensen (1995 and 1999), Aw et al. (2000), Clerides et al. (1998), Eaton
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openness then has an effect on intra-industry reallocations. As trade is liber-
alized, those large firms that are exporting need more labor to produce as new
markets provide them with new investment opportunities. This rise in labor
demand from large firms makes workers to relocate from the least to the most
productive firms. Large firms become larger and, since they are more productive
than small firms, aggregate productivity increases. In addition, as large firms
are able to set lower prices, small firms are forced out of the industry, which
again raises average productivity.
A model aimed at explaining the reallocation of labor from small to large
firms is Melitz (2003)4. In his model, firms are heterogeneous because of the
uncertainty inherent to market entry investment. Then, because of the existence
of a sunk entry cost to exports markets, only the most productive firms export
and trade liberalization results in higher aggregate productivity, larger firms,
but a smaller number of producers. The smallest firms are thrown out of the
market because the largest push real wages up.
Those conclusions are drawn from a full-employment framework. Hence, in
a world characterized by frictions in the labor market, a natural question arises:
what are the consequences for employment of this reallocation? Indeed, the
average level of employment per firm increases but, as the set of domestic firms
is reduced, one might actually expect this second effect to dominate the first
one and cause a loss in employment.
As a matter of fact, while many economists would anticipate that trade
liberalization leads to a decrease in prices5, some studies6 have shown that lib-
eralization does not generate any significant scale effect as Krugman (1979)
suggests. The scale effect refers to the fact that trade liberalization leads ex-
porters to face a larger market, which allows them to reduce the average cost of
producing and so prices. This should occur when competition becomes tougher.
However, when competition does not increase following trade liberalization, no
scale effect may appear. This is typically the case when preferences are CES
as markups do not depend on the mass of firms under this specification. The
absence of scale effect has been illustrated in the context of the Canadian econ-
omy by Head and Ries (1999, 2002) and Trefler (2004), Mexico (Tybout and
Westbrook 1995) and Chile (Tybout et al. 1991). Instead, trade appears to gen-
erate large selection effect, which implies that production is biased to a subset
of firms. According to Feenstra (2004), the size of the selection effect is bound
to cause unemployment.
This paper tries to answer this question. I construct a heterogeneous-firm
model along the lines of Melitz (2003) by assuming labor-market search frictions7
to understand how employment is affected by trade liberalization. In my model,
the use of CES preferences allows to shut down any scale effect and to shed light
on the influence of the selection effect. I do comparative statics on the level of
employment and show that higher trade exposure is associated with a lower
et al. (2004), Head and Ries (1999), Levinsohn (1999), Pavcnik (2002), and Roberts and
Tybout (1997). See also Tybout (2002) and Bernard et al. (2007) for a literature review.
4See Bernard et al. (2003) as well.
5For instance, Cox and Harris (1985) estimated the gains from tariff reduction for the
Canadian economy with a general equilibrium model. Their results suggested an increase in
GNP by 8-10%. The main reason is because liberalization for Canada means access to a larger
market (the US), which allows firms to achieve scale economies and so decrease prices.
6See Feenstra (2006) for a survey.
7See Pissarides (2000).
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level of equilibrium employment. This suggests that the reallocation process
is dampened by sclerosis: job destruction due to small firms exit exceeds job
creation by large firms.
The reason of the decrease in employment is twofold8. Firstly, the absence
of scale effect in the economy is an impediment to firm entry. Secondly, mo-
nopolistic competition implies that marginal revenue decreases with firm size,
meaning that incentives to hire new workers are lower for large firms9. Following
the trade-induced reallocation, large firms do not increase their level of employ-
ment so as to compensate the employment loss due to the death of small firms
because they are able to extract higher rents by limiting the amount of job cre-
ation. As a result, trade liberalization is productivity-enhancing, but, because
of the presence of frictions in both labor and goods markets, employment drops.
The mechanism is in fact similar to the introduction of higher barriers to
entry in the goods market, which causes equilibrium employment to decrease.
In Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), they explain the high level of European un-
employment by high barriers to entry in the goods market10. In my model,
trade liberalization has a similar effect: because trade benefits are biased to-
wards large firms, more trade exposure is in fact boosting barriers to entry and
small firms are crowded out11.
Secondly, I analyze together the evolution of gross job flows with two indices
of trade exposure (i.e. import and export penetration ratios) for 418 4-digit
sectors of the US economy over the 1974-1988 period. As compared to previous
studies, I find that more exposure to trade generates more job destruction than
job creation (both for an increase in import and export ratios). The estimation
is implemented by controlling for various aggregate shocks and fixed effects.
In addition, the use of the Generalized Method of Moments enables to handle
endogeneity issues.
As many empirical works have shown, an increase in import pressure reduces
employment12. I find that a one-point increase in import penetration ratio
makes job destruction rate to increase by 14.7 points and does not imply a
significant increase in job creation. An interesting result of the empirical part of
the present paper is that an increase in export share also has a short-run negative
impact on employment. A one-point increase in the export ratio generates an
increase in job creation by 4.5 points and an increase in job destruction by 6.5
points.
This paper is of course not the first to analyze employment in an inter-
national context. A large share of the literature is based on a multi-sector
approach. Empirical works illustrate that more open industries display higher
8In a companion paper, I study how these assumptions are related to the shape of the
labor demand curve and what are the consequences for welfare. See Janiak (2007) for more
details.
9This is in line with the empirical literature on gross job flows, which has analyzed their
magnitude in relation to firms characteristics. It appears that large firms display lower job
creation rate. See Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999a).
10See also Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) for empirical evidence.
11In Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2004, 2006), they analyze the Melitz model in a growth
context and finds that the increase in the productivity threshold resulting from trade liberal-
ization also has a negative impact on growth. They claim that the selection effect in Melitz
(2003) raises the expected cost of introducing a new variety and tend to slow the rate of
growth.
12See Trefler (2004), Kletzer (2002), and Revenga (1992, 1997), among others, for studies
focusing on OECD countries.
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turnover rates. See for instance Davis et al. (1996) and Magee et al. (2005).
In Cun˜at and Melitz (2006), they follow this idea and try to understand how
employment protection legislation can shape comparative advantage. Their re-
sults suggest that the exports of countries with more flexible labor markets are
biased towards high-volatility industries.
Some theoretical approaches also follow a multi-sector approach. See David-
son et al. (1999), Sener (2001), and Davidson and Matusz (2004). For instance,
in Davidson et al. (1999), they develop a Heckscher-Ohlin type of model with
frictions in both labor and capital markets and show that a large economy like
the US would experience a rise in unemployment when opening to trade since
it is a capital-abundant economy and would therefore use its labor at a lower
intensity. However, they rely on a required reallocation of labor across sectors.
Such a reallocation process is known to be limited. Even at long horizons, it has
been shown in Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) that trade liberalization episodes
do not have any effect on inter-sectoral labor reallocations and, if it does at
higher levels of disaggregation, it is statistically weak and small in magnitude.
Other papers have recognized the limited ability of workers to move be-
tween sectors. As it is well-known by labor economists, structural change in the
absence of mobility generates more destruction than creation, at least in the
short run. For instance, in Caballero and Hammour (1996), they analyze trade
liberalization in developing countries in a multi-sector model. Liberalization
requires the movement of labor from the import to the export sector, but their
economy is characterized by imperfections in the capital market. This generates
hold-up problems that are a break on job creation in the export sector. Other
interesting papers are Lamo et al. (2006) and Saint-Paul (2005). They argue
that labor is not mobile because of human capital sector-specificities. Opening
to trade then destroys more jobs than it creates because some workers are not
endowed with the skills specific to the export sector. My paper shows that this
phenomenon can even hold within an industry. The analysis is then based on a
one-sector approach as in Krugman (1980). More trade exposure then does not
only destroy jobs in the declining sector, but in the booming one as well13.
Unfortunately, the Melitz (2003) model has been criticized because produc-
tivity at the firm-level is exogenous and random. This has motivated other
approaches like the Yeaple (2005) model, where ex-ante identical firms choose
to adopt different technologies. However, there is a large empirical literature
studying the evolution of employment at the plant-level14 which reports evi-
dence of persistent idiosyncratic shocks. This evidence has been a motivation
for other models such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), which appears to be
appropriate for the study of labor market dynamics at business cycle frequencies,
implying that the Melitz model perfectly fits in this framework.
Of course, my results do not generalize to the whole economy. They rather
illustrate the situation of a particular sector. The modeling approach I select
only involves one industry. In this sense, trade economists sometimes call such
a framework ‘partial equilibrium’, while a ‘general equilibrium’ approach would
involve several sectors. The same limit applies to the empirical results. Conse-
quently, while employment at the sectoral level decreases, one cannot draw as a
13Recently, other papers have incorporated labor market frictions into models with hetero-
geneous firms. In Egger and Kreickemeier (2006), they introduce fair wages while Davis and
Harrigan (2007) consider efficiency wages.
14See for instance Davis et al. (1996).
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conclusion that the same evolution characterizes the aggregate level of employ-
ment. Indeed, labor may reallocate to other sectors. From this perspective, the
results should be interpreted as the medium-run consequences of trade liberal-
ization, i.e. adjustment has occured within a sector, but not across sectors.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the setup
of the model is introduced and the equilibrium is analyzed in both a closed and
an open-economy context. In particular, the closed-economy setup will shed
light on two important elements, which are (i) the interactions between goods
and labor markets imperfections and the complementarity they generate and
(ii) the absence of scale effect. This will make easier to understand the impact
of trade, which will be assessed in Section 2.3. An extension of the model with
endogenous wages is also explored in this Section. Section 2.4 introduces an
empirical application. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Closed economy: setup of the model
Preferences. Time is continuous. Goods markets are characterized by an
Acemoglu (2001) type of configuration with monopolistic competition: there is
a unique consumption good produced in quantities Q and the production of this
good requires a continuum of intermediate goods as inputs, indexed by z ∈ Z ,
where Z is the set of all available intermediate goods and z one variety of input15.
Each variety is produced by one firm, which uses labor in its production process.
The firms sell their inputs on different markets characterized with monopolistic
competition as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The price of the final consumption
good is normalized to one. Formally, the production function of the consumption
good is16:
Q =
[∫
z∈Z
q(z)ρdz
] 1
ρ
(2.1)
where 0 < ρ < 1, q(z) is the quantity of input z used in the production process
and p(z) stands for its price. σ = 11−ρ is the elasticity of substitution between
goods.
The above assumption about preferences is considered for two reasons. Firstly,
CES preferences close down any scale effect from trade liberalization. This al-
lows us to assess why the selection effect may lead to job loss. Secondly, the
use of an aggregate consumption good is made for simplicity, in that it does
not involve an aggregate price index in the demand formulation and all prices
are expressed in terms of the price of the aggregate consumption good, which
is normalized to one. Consequently, equilibria are computed more easily.
The labor market. There is a unique labor market in the economy involving
a continuum mass of workers normalized to one. Those are hired by firms
producing the intermediate goods through a matching process and firms may
employ different measures of workers. The measure of matches m is an in-
creasing function of the amount of those unemployed u and the mass of posted
15I will refer to the input industry as the goods market.
16From now on the time subscript t is omitted for simplicity. This will not matter since the
focus of the paper will be on steady-state values.
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vacancies v . As is commonly assumed17, m is homogeneous of degree one and
concave. Hence, the probabilities to fill a vacancy, h, and for a worker to be
hired, g, are respectively:
h(θ) =
m(u, v)
v
= m(θ−1, 1)
g(θ) =
m(u, v)
u
= m(1, θ)
θ = vu is typically called the labor market tightness and is an indicator of how
dynamic the labor market is. h(θ) and g(θ) are then respectively decreasing and
increasing in θ, and they are linked by the following property: g(θ) = θh(θ).
In addition, separations occur exogenously at a rate δ and, for simplicity,
on-the-job search is not modeled here18.
Large firms and pricing to market. A large pool of potential entrants may
enter the industry of inputs, but only a mass M of firms will remain in the
industry. M is endogenous.
In order to enter, firms have to make an initial investment and pay a fixed
entry cost ce. The productivity φ of a firm producing z is then drawn from
a common distribution F (φ), so that the quantities produced by a firm with
productivity φ are q(φ) = φn(φ), where n(φ) is the level of employment in a
firm with productivity φ.
Denote by φ∗ the level of productivity as above which the entry into the
industry is successful, that is, if a firm draws a productivity parameter below
φ∗, it will earn negative profits and exit the industry. In the same manner, a
shock pushing this value upwards would kill all firms for which productivity is
lower than the new productivity cutoff19.
If entry is successful, firms can then start posting vacancies to hire workers.
The production process is then characterized by scale economies as in Krugman
(1980) and Melitz (2003), but, in addition, firms face turnover costs.
Any firm with productivity φ has to maximize the following present-discounted
value of profits: ∫ +∞
0
e−rt {p(φ)q(φ)− wn(φ)− cvv(φ)− c} dt
where w is the (exogenous) wage20, cv the flow cost of posting a vacancy, c a fixed
cost independent of the productivity level φ and v(φ) the number of vacancies
posted by this firm. The above present-discounted value is maximized by taking
into account the behavior of the firm producing the final consumption good and
the following law of motion for n(φ):
n˙(φ) = h(θ)v(φ)− δn(φ) (2.2)
17See Pissarides (2000) and, for empirical evidence, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
18Melitz (2003) also considers that firms are subject to death. Adding such a feature would
not alter any qualitative result.
19As an interesting analogy, this productivity cutoff could be interpreted as the reservation
productivity from the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model.
20The literature related to the large firm matching model (Cahuc and Wasmer (2001))
has shown how important the strategic behaviors in wage negotiation can be. Here, such
considerations are so far assumed exogenous because they are not directly linked to the main
purpose of the paper. See Section 2.3.3 for an extension that allow for Nash-bargaining in
wage negotiations.
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Market clearing. Finally, the final consumption good market has to clear:
Q =
∫
z∈Z
p(z)q(z)dz (2.3)
The interpretation of this condition is the following. First, remember that the
price of the aggregate good is normalized to one. Thus, the left-hand side of
the equation refers to the total supply of aggregate good in the economy. The
right-hand refers to income. Indeed, by selling its production on the goods
market, the income a firm earns is p(z)q(z). This income in turn distributes
among wages, profits and the payment of fixed and vacancy costs. Finally, by
integrating over all z, one computes total income in the economy. This condition
will allow us to determine the equilibrium mass of firms in the industry.
2.2.2 Equilibrium in the closed economy
Optimal decisions
Demand for intermediate goods. The demand for input z is:
q(z) = Qp(z)−σ (2.4)
Optimal firms decisions. As was stated before, firms maximize their profits
by taking into account their production function, the demand formulation (2.4)
and the law of motion (2.2) for employment. The Appendix 2.6.1 describes the
maximization program. After solving for the firms’ dynamic program we get
that, in steady state, a firm with productivity φ sets its level of employment
according to21
ρφρQ1−ρn(φ)ρ−1 = C(θ) (2.5)
with
C(θ) = w + (r + δ)
cv
h(θ)
(2.6)
Equation (2.5) describes the job creation decision. It states that firms determine
their level of employment such that the marginal revenue of employment equals
marginal cost. The left-hand side of (2.5) corresponds to marginal revenue. It
is decreasing in employment because it takes into account the pricing behavior
of the firm, i.e., as employment increases, incentives to hire more workers are
lower because firms want to benefit from market power so as to keep prices and
profits high. The right-hand side of the equation refers to marginal cost, which
is increasing in the labor market tightness θ. It decomposes into wage and hiring
cost. The latter is the expected cost of hiring a worker cvh(θ) once the probability
21This first-order condition also corresponds to the firm’s decision along its adjustment
path, that is it considers that aggregate variables, like labor market tightness for instance,
are in steady state, but employment at the firm level may have not reached its steady-state
level. The Appendix 2.6.1 shows that after entry the strategy of the firm follows a two-tier
structure. Once productivity is revealed, the firm posts a large amount of vacancies so as
to reach its steady state immediately. Then, it keeps posting vacancies according to (2.7) so
as to maintain employment constant. The reason for this immediate adjustment is because
vacancy costs are linear in the mass of vacancies.
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of filling a vacancy is taken into account, which has to be multiplied by the rate
(r + δ) because hiring occurs prior to production.
The amount of posted vacancies is
v(φ) =
δ
h(θ)
n(φ) (2.7)
which is the steady-state formulation of (2.2): in steady state, the amount of
posted vacancies is such that the flow of new hirings equals separations. Finally,
a firm with productivity φ fixes its price according to
p(φ) =
C(θ)
ρφ
(2.8)
which follows a fixed markup over labor costs. The value of the markup de-
creases with productivity and is independent of the number of firms in the
industry. Equation (2.8) is obtained by replacing (2.5) into (2.4) and using the
equality q(φ) = φn(φ).
Two remarks follow from above. First, notice that the most productive firms,
which are also the largest in equilibrium, set lower prices. Indeed, for any φ1
and φ2 greater than φ∗, we have:
n(φ1) = n(φ2)
(
φ1
φ2
)σ−1
; p(φ1) = p(φ2)φ2φ1 ; q(φ1) = q(φ2)
(
φ1
φ2
)σ
.
Second, from (2.5), monopolistic competition implies decreasing returns to scale
in employment. This suggests that as employment at the firm-level increases,
incentives to create more jobs are lower.
Aggregation
The analysis of the labor market equilibrium below will show that aggregate
employment is merely equal to
1− u =Mn¯.
This equation states that employment equals the mass of firms M multiplied
by average employment n¯. Thus, to understand how trade affects employment,
one has to analyze (i) how the equilibrium mass of firms evolves and (ii) how
average employment is affected. The results in the next Section will show that
trade increases average employment (for a fixed Q), but leads to a decrease in
the mass of firms, the net effect being negative for the level of employment. I
will now try to illustrate the intuition behind this result in the closed-economy
case.
Equilibrium mass of firms. The market clearing condition (2.3) allows to deter-
mine the equilibrium mass of firms in the economy:
LEMMA 1. The equilibrium mass of firms,
M = p(φe)σ−1, (2.9)
is decreasing in the price fixed by a firm with productivity φe, reflecting the
absence of scale effect in the economy.
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Proof. See the Appendix 2.6.1.
In equation (2.9), φe is the average productivity across all firms belonging
to the industry and is a function of the productivity cutoff φ∗:
φe(φ∗) =
(∫ ∞
0
φσ−1µ(φ)dφ
) 1
σ−1
where µ(φ) is the distribution of φ among the producing firms:
µ(φ) =
{
f(φ)
1−F (φ∗) if φ ≥ φ∗
0 otherwise
A nice property of the Melitz model is that the value of φe will summarize all
the information relevant for all aggregate variables. It is an increasing function
of the reservation productivity φ∗, under which firms do not enter the market
or leave it and above which they go on producing.
Equation (2.9) shows that the equilibrium mass of firms is increasing in the
price fixed by a firm with productivity φe. Hence, for a fixed labor market tight-
ness θ, the equilibrium mass of firms is decreasing in the average productivity φe
according to equation (2.8). This result comes from the particular structure of
preferences in (2.3), which are CES. Indeed, under this specification, markups
are fixed over labor costs and do not depend upon the mass of firms in the
economy. This implies that no effect through tougher competition may appear,
leading to an increasing relation between M and p(φe) in (2.9). In a context
where competition may influence the outcome, scale effect would be possible
and the relation would possibly be decreasing.
On labor force concentration and the labor market state. Given the above no-
tation φe, some properties of the economy can already be derived. Indeed, all
relations described so far and referring to any given productivity value φ of
course hold for the particular value φe. In particular, equation (2.5) character-
izes an important interaction between goods and labor markets imperfections,
which leads to a complementarity between firms pricing behavior and the level
of labor market tightness. Together with the absence of scale effect, this comple-
mentarity will explain the main mechanism derived in the open-economy model.
As a firm has to determine its level of employment when choosing the price of
the good it will sell, this equation links labor market tightness to firm-level
employment. Specifically, the first-order condition for the average firm is22:
n(φe) = ρσC(θ)−σQφeσ−1 (2.10)
In the economy, the variable n(φe) is actually an indicator of concentration of
the labor force in a given set of firms. When n(φe) is high, it means that a
large amount of workers is contained in few firms, while a low value of n(φe)
suggests a rather spread labor force. From this equation and holding Q and φe
constant, it follows that a high concentration of workers is associated with a
low level of labor market tightness, while a low concentration suggests a lower
competition between workers in the labor market. This remark is summarized
in the following Lemma:
22n(φe) is the level of employment of a firm with productivity φe, but it can be shown it is
also the average level of employment in the economy, i.e. n¯ = n(φe).
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PROPOSITION 1. The economy is characterized by a complementarity be-
tween goods and labor market imperfections. Holding the aggregate state of the
economy Q and φe constant,
• a slack labor market (low θ) leads to a high concentration of workers in
few firms (a high average level of employment n(φe)).
• In turn, a shift of resources from small to large firms deteriorate the labor
market situation.
Proof. The result follows directly from equation (2.10).
Equilibrium
Goods market equilibrium. The equilibrium on the goods market, as dis-
played in Figure 2.1, is determined by two relations, the free entry and zero
cutoff profit conditions. Both relations involve the values of average profits pie
and reservation productivity φ∗. The first accounts for the entry decision of
firms that relies on the equality between entry cost and expected profits. It is
increasing in the (φ∗, pie) space since a high productivity cutoff means a high
average productivity and, because of increasing returns to scale, higher expected
profits. The second one determines when firms incur negative profits and exit
the market. It is decreasing in the (φ∗, pie) space. Indeed, a high productivity
cutoff means high real wages, which reduces profits. This equilibrium exists and
is unique23. If one compares those two relations with those in Melitz (2003),
one would notice that the introduction of search frictions on the labor market
does not affect the expression of both the free entry and the zero cutoff profit
conditions. One could find this surprising as turnover cost push total labor
costs upwards and expect that for a given productivity cutoff the required level
of average profits should be higher for firms to enter the industry. However, this
is not the case and the reason is due to markup adjustment: when labor costs
increase by 1%, so will selling prices. Hence the following Lemma:
LEMMA 2. The goods market equilibrium, defined as the pair (φ∗, pie), is given
by the intersection of the two locus:
pie =
rce
1− F (φ∗) (FE-1)
pie = c
{(
φe(φ∗)
φ∗
)σ−1
− 1
}
(ZCP-1)
Proof. See the Appendix 2.6.1.
Labor market equilibrium. Given the equilibrium on the goods market, the
one on the labor market follows. As displayed in Figure 2.2, this equilibrium
is the intersection of two curves: a Beveridge curve and a job creation curve.
The first states that flows into unemployment must equate outflows in steady
state. The second is the aggregation of the job creation decision of each firm
and implies that total steady-state employment merely equals the mass of firms
times average employment per firm.
Hence the following Lemma:
23The proof is in Melitz (2003).
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Figure 2.1: Goods market equilibrium
LEMMA 3. Labor market equilibrium:
• The equilibrium on the labor market, defined as the pair (θ, u), is given by
the intersection of the two locus:
u =
δ
δ + θh(θ)
(BC-1)
1− u = n(φe)M (JC-1)
where the second equation rewrites as:
u = 1−
(
C(θ)
ρ
)σ−2
pie + c
φeσ−1
σ
• A sufficient condition for the labor market equilibrium to exist and to be
unique is ρ ≤ 12 .
• If ρ > 12 , then the labor market equilibrium either does not exist or is
multiple.
Proof. See the Appendix 2.6.1.
The Beveridge curve is strictly decreasing to zero, meaning that the greater
the vacancy-unemployment ratio is, the easier a worker will find a job and the
lower is the unemployment rate. But the sign of the slope of the job creation
condition is ambiguous and depends on the value of the elasticity of substitu-
tion. This ambiguity is due to two effects. On the one hand, equation (2.5)
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Figure 2.2: Labor market equilibrium
states that as labor market tightness increases, it is harder for firms to hire
new workers, which increases turnover cost and so reduces employment. On the
other hand, as equation (2.8) suggests, firms benefit from market power and
any increase in turnover cost is so reported into prices. Then, as prices grow,
new firms enter the industry and the strength of this effect depends on the elas-
ticity of substitution (as (2.9) suggests). Consequently, with a large elasticity
of substitution, either multiple labor market equilibria might characterize the
economy or no equilibrium might exist.
I will from now on rely on the following assumption, which ensures the
existence and uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium24:
ASSUMPTION 1. ρ ≤ 12 ⇐⇒ σ ≤ 2
Note that under Assumption 1 an increase in φ∗ shifts the job creation
curve upwards, which increases unemployment, while an increase in pie shifts it
downwards, leading to a drop in unemployment.
24Some may argue that this threshold is actually too low, which is supported by empirical
studies on the elasticity of substitution. In Janiak (2007), I actually show that by slightly
modifying the preferences given in (2.1), one can increase the value of the threshold.
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2.2.3 Opening to trade
The extended framework
The economy considered previously is now able to trade part of its inputs z
with γ other economies that are exactly identical25. Formally, when analyzing
the impact of greater exposure to trade on unemployment, we will consider an
increase in the γ parameter.
In addition to the sunk cost a firm has to pay when entering the industry, the
payment of another cost is required if it wants to export to the other economies.
Since there is no uncertainty about firms’ productivity once this second fix cost
is paid, the open economy model is equivalent to a model where, instead of an
entry cost to the export market, a flow cost cx has to be paid when producing.
This latter specification is now considered.
I also consider an iceberg transportation cost specification, so that if a firm
wants to sell 1 unit of good abroad it needs to ship τ units. A decline in cx or
τ also corresponds to an increase in trade exposure.
The cx and τ costs will be considered as being large enough (i.e., τσ−1cx >
c ) so that a partitioning among firms will be observed. The firms, which
productivity is not high enough will only sell on the domestic market, others
will serve both (the most productive firms).
This implies that we need to consider another productivity cutoff φ∗x to dis-
tinguish between firms that are exporting and those that are not. The product
z will then be sold on the domestic market in quantities qd(z) and qx(z) in any
given foreign market. In the same fashion, the use of the superscript notation d
and x refer to variables that concern domestic and export markets respectively,
whereas the superscript T refers to total sales.
The dynamic program for a firm that does not export remains the same as
before, while for a firm exporting the following expression should be maximized:∫ +∞
0
e−rt
{
pd(φ)qd(φ) + γpx(φ)qx(φ)− w(nd(φ) + γnx(φ))− cv(vd(φ) + γvx(φ))− c− γcx
}
given:
n˙d(φ) = h(θ)vd(φ)− δnd(φ)
n˙x(φ) = h(θ)vx(φ)− δnx(φ)
Finally, the market clearing condition is:
Q =
∫
z∈Z
pd(z)qd(z)dz + γ
∫
z∈Z
px(z)qx(z)dz (2.11)
Here, Q corresponds to the production of aggregate good in one of the (1 + γ)
economies.
I now analyze how trade affects agents’ decisions.
Demand and firms’ strategy. The demand for z remains as in equation (2.4).
In steady state, a firm with productivity φ, selling only on the domestic mar-
ket, sets its level of employment, its amount of posted vacancies and its price
25Thus, our trade area will be composed of (γ+ 1) economies.
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according to (2.5), (2.7) and (2.8), but when exporting, its strategy becomes:
ρφρQ1−ρnd(φ)ρ−1 = C(θ) (2.12)
ρ
(
φ
τ
)ρ
Q1−ρn
x(φ)ρ−1 = C(θ) (2.13)
vi(φ) =
δ
h(θ)
ni(φ),∀i ∈ {d, x} (2.14)
pd(φ) =
C(θ)
ρφ
(2.15)
px(φ) = τ
C(θ)
ρφ
(2.16)
where C(θ) is defined as in (2.6). The proof is in the Appendix 2.6.1.
Firstly, notice that, for a given variety z, the amount of labor used to pro-
duce the exported good tends to be larger than the one required for the domestic
market when liberalizing trade since firms face a larger market26: resources de-
voted to exports are γτ1−σ times larger than for the domestic market, which
also brings a larger amount of posted vacancies. This implies that, when liber-
alizing, large firms labor demand increases, which explains the reallocation of
labor from small to large firms.
Secondly, for a given variety, exported goods are more expensive than goods
sold on the domestic market. The reason for this is due to the iceberg trans-
portation cost assumption. This implies that the marginal cost is τ times higher
when producing goods to be shipped abroad. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in τ
should then reduce the average price.
Finally, the open economy also displays a complementarity between goods
and labor market imperfections as in the closed economy.
Aggregation in the open economy
The partitioning of firms requires to distinguish between different types of
average productivities. Hereafter, φed denotes the average productivity across all
firms selling on the domestic market, i.e. excluding imported goods; φex refers
to average productivity across all national firms exporting abroad and, finally,
φeT is the average productivity across all firms selling their goods to one of the
(γ+1) economies. Hence,
φeT =
[
Mφed
σ−1 + τ1−σγMxφex
σ−1
MT
] 1
σ−1
where
φed =
{∫∞
φ∗ φ
σ−1f(φ)dφ
1− F (φ∗)
} 1
σ−1
and φex =
{∫∞
φ∗x
φσ−1f(φ)dφ
1− F (φ∗x)
} 1
σ−1
In the above expression, M refers as before to the number of firms in one of
the (γ+1) economies and Mx < M is the mass of firms that are exporting and
26This is true only if γ is large enough with respect to τ .
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belonging to one economy. Mx is then defined asMx =
1−F (φ∗x)
1−F (φ∗)M . Finally, MT
refers to the total mass of firms (national and foreign) providing with inputs a
given economy. Thus, MT =M + γMx =
[
1 + γ 1−F (φ
∗
x)
1−F (φ∗)
]
M .
As shown in the Appendix 2.6.1, it is possible to derive the relationship
linking φ∗x to φ
∗:
φ∗x = φ
∗τ
(cx
c
) 1
σ−1
(2.17)
Equilibrium in the open economy
Goods market equilibrium. When considering trade opportunities, the equi-
librium on the goods market is still represented by a free entry and a zero cutoff
profit conditions. As before, the introduction of search frictions does not alter
the equations presented in Melitz (2003)27:
pie =
rce
1− F (φ∗) (FE-2)
pie = c
{(
φe(φ∗)
φ∗
)σ−1
− 1
}
+
1− F (φ∗)
1− F (φ∗x)
γcx
{(
φex(φ
∗
x)
φ∗x
)σ−1
− 1
}
(ZCP-2)
Trade liberalization, which is modeled as an increase in the number of trade
partners γ or a decrease in trade costs cx and τ , increases both φ∗ and pie.
Equilibrium mass of firms. As in the closed economy framework, the use of
the market clearing condition can determine the equilibrium mass of firms sell-
ing their products to a given economy28,
MT = pd(φeT )
σ−1 ⇔M = p
d(φeT )
σ−1
1 + γ 1−F (φ
∗
x)
1−F (φ∗)
, (2.18)
which is decreasing in the price fixed by a firm with productivity φeT .
Labor market equilibrium. Opening to trade modifies the labor market equi-
librium as follows:
LEMMA 4. Labor market equilibrium:
• In the open economy, the labor market equilibrium, defined as the pair
(θ, u), is given by the intersection of the two locus:
u =
δ
δ + θh(θ)
(BC-2)
1− u = nd(φed)Md + γnx(φex)Mx (JC-2)
where the second equation can be rewritten as:
u = 1− C(θ)
σ−2
ρσ−2φeT
σ−1
[1− F (φ∗)](pie + c) + γ[1− F (φ∗x)]cx
1− F (φ∗) + γ[1− F (φ∗x)]
σ
27See the Appendix 2.6.1.
28See the Appendix 2.6.1.
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Figure 2.3: Trade openness: impact on the goods market
• Under Assumption 1, the labor market equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. See the Appendix 2.6.1.
When looking at the labor market equilibrium, it seems that an increase
in trade exposure - e.g. higher γ - has an ambiguous effect on unemployment.
Indeed, trade liberalization makes firms larger on average, since they want to
invest in new markets (higher profits pie), but destroys many small firms as well
- i.e., the productivity cutoff jumps and from (2.18) it can be seen that the
resulting mass of firms is smaller. Thus, one might expect this second effect to
overcompensate the first, which could be interpreted as a rise in unemployment.
The aim of the next section is now to determine the net impact of trade on
unemployment.
2.3 The impact of trade
2.3.1 Unemployment
The impact of trade on the goods market is twofold. Due to the existence of
fixed costs cx when exporting, trade leads to an increase in both the productivity
cutoff φ∗ and average profits pie: large firms become larger and some small
firms that do not engage in international trade shrink or die, labor is therefore
reallocated from the latter group to the former. This mechanism is displayed in
Figure 2.3.
However, when labor markets are characterized by frictions, it is not known
whether job creation and destruction are balanced. A contribution of the present
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paper is to understand how this analysis extends to labor market outcomes and,
in particular, to assess the consequences in terms of employment. As we saw in
the previous Section, those consequences are a priori ambiguous. On the one
hand, new investment opportunities abroad make profits higher for the most
productive firms, which is an incentive for them to hire more workers.
On the other hand, reallocation of labor and profits pushes φ∗ upwards.
Some small firms then exit the industry. Further, with an increase in the num-
ber of trade partners γ, as the productivity cutoff φ∗ increases, the reservation
productivity that determines whether firms enter international markets or not,
φ∗x, increases as well. Some exporting firms then return to pure domestic activ-
ities, which leads them to dismiss workers.
Formally, in order to determine the net impact on unemployment, we need
to know whether the job creation curve shifts up or down after an increase in
trade exposure. Below, a simpler formulation for the job creation curve precisely
helps to determine the net impact of trade on unemployment, in that it omits
average profits pie:
u = 1−
(
C(θ)
ρ
)σ−2
c
φ∗σ−1
σ (2.19)
Proof. See the Appendix 2.6.1.
The above equation shows that, for a given value of θ, u is increasing in
the productivity threshold φ∗. This implies that trade liberalization leads to an
increase in unemployment:
PROPOSITION 2. Under Assumption 1, greater trade exposure increases
unemployment. In particular,
• The first derivative of steady-state unemployment with respect to the num-
ber of trade partners γ is positive.
• The first derivative of steady-state unemployment with respect to the vari-
able trade cost τ is negative.
• The first derivative of steady-state unemployment with respect to the fixed
trade cost cx is negative.
It follows that more exposure to trade makes unemployment to rise. The
excessive deaths of small firms are not compensated by sufficient new hirings.
Figure 2.4 illustrates this impact: the job creation curve goes up and unemploy-
ment grows.
A set of frictions are the cause of this increase in unemployment29. First,
the fixed cost paid when exporting generates the observed partitioning among
firms between exporters and non-exporters, which allows the complementarity
between goods and labor markets imperfections described in Proposition 1 to
play a role. Absent the cx cost, trade liberalization would not lead to any
improvement in aggregate productivity and would not have any impact on un-
employment. When cx > cτ1−σ, gains from trade liberalization do not favor
small firms, but are in fact biased toward large firms30. Workers fired by small
firms are not all hired by the large because large firms want to profit from market
29For a discussion of the role played by these frictions and the impact they have on welfare,
see Janiak (2007).
30Baldwin (2005) sees this mechanism as a Stolper-Samuelson type of effect.
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Figure 2.4: Trade openness: impact on the labor market
power. They then restrain their hirings to increase their profits. Interestingly,
this mechanism can actually be seen as analogous to the introduction of higher
barriers to entry in the economy31.
Secondly, had the specification for the aggregate consumption good Q not
been CES, competition effects could also play a role in the outcome. Indeed,
with a CES specification, markups are fixed over labor cost and any scale effect
from international trade disappears32. A specification with markups responding
to the mass of firms in the market, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), would
add another channel through which unemployment would be affected. When the
number of firms providing a given market increases, the elasticity of substitution
increases, raising the incentives to hire more workers for large firms.
Third, another rigidity which explains this rise in unemployment is the fixed
distribution of productivity draws F . If this was not assumed in the model
and firms could instead ‘choose’ their productivity level, unemployment would
probably remain constant. However, this is clearly not the case, as argued
by the empirical literature that states that firm-specific uncertainty dominates
firm-level dynamics. This literature has justified other approaches such as the
Hopenhayn (1992) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) models33.
31High barriers to entry is a standard view explaining the high level of unemployment in
Europe as they are an impediment to job creation. See, among others, Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) or Bertrand and Kramartz (2002).
32Empirical studies have shown that trade liberalization episodes do not lead to any signif-
icant scale effect. See Head and Ries (1999, 2002), Trefler (2004), Tybout et al. (1991) and
Tybout and Westbrook (1995).
33One may argue that my model can be seen as an analysis of the short-run effect of trade
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2.3.2 Productivity and unemployment
In Melitz (2003), the exit of the least productive firms is due to an increase
in wages. Because exporters are more productive, the trade-induced increase in
labor demand by large firms pushes wages up and so small firms exit because
labor costs are too high.
This is not true in my model. In Section 2.3.3, I show that, when wage
is endogenous, it actually decreases after an increase in trade exposure. The
negative effect on wages is reconciled with the exit of the smallest firms be-
cause the produced amount of aggregate good Q decreases34. Indeed, in the
Appendix 2.6.1, I show that Q can be rewritten as
Q = (1− u)C(θ)
ρ
. (2.20)
Notice that, with exogenous wages and no friction in the labor market, welfare
is not affected by an increase in trade openness. Since unemployment increases
in my model, equation (2.20) shows that Q decreases.
Interestingly, in my model, trade liberalization leads to opposite effects on
employment and productivity35:
PROPOSITION 3. The more productivity-enhancing is trade liberalization
(in the sense of an increase in φ∗), the sharper will the increase in equilibrium
unemployment be.
Proof. The result directly follows from equation (2.19).
The result presented in Proposition 3 is a caveat for policy makers. It seems
that after the emergence of the literature on trade with heterogeneous firms,
some policy recommendations, which were not pushed in the past, have now
been suggested. An example is the will of the French government to protect the
so-called national champions. Under these recommendations, it seems a good
idea to concentrate production in a smaller number of production units if they
are more productive, justifying financial support for those firms. Proposition 3
shows that in the absence of a well-established competitive structure, those
policies may have negative consequences, at least in terms of employment.
Firm entry seems to be the margin to be privileged. Indeed, in the literature
on gravity equation estimation, some studies36 have recently incorporated such
an element in their analysis. In these papers, trade flows have been decomposed
according to two margins: the intensive and the extensive margins. The former
refers to the number of firms exporting and the latter to average exports per
since the distribution of productivity draws remains unchanged. A long-run approach would
allow the productivity distribution to evolve over time and adapt to new market conditions.
See for instance Sener (2001) or Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), where trade encourages the
flow of ideas in the R&D sector.
34Notice that this result does not necessarily imply a drop in welfare because one also has
to know how fixed and vacancy costs are affected. In Janiak (2007), I study the impact of
trade liberalization on welfare in models of heterogeneous firms a` la Melitz. I show that the
sign of the increase in welfare depends on the shape of the aggregate labor demand curve, i.e.
whether it slopes upwards or downwards. Under the former, welfare increases, while under
the latter, it diminishes.
35Here, I consider that trade fosters productivity when φ∗ increases. The reason is because in
Melitz (2003) a decrease in cx may not necessarily rise φeT if the productivity of new exporters
is lower than the current average. A decrease in τ or an increase in γ always increase φeT .
36See Helpman et al. (2007) and Chaney (2007).
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firm. They show that the extensive margin is the dominant factor explaining
trade flows between two countries. Under the same reasoning, employment can
increase only to the extend that the required market structure is met.
2.3.3 Extension: endogenous wages
The extended framework. In the analysis from the preceding Section, wages
were taking an exogenous value set to w. I now consider the possibility of
endogenous labor compensation. To this end, I first need to model labor supply
decisions.
The flow value of unemployment is normalized to zero and wages are assumed
to be determined under a Nash-Bargaining rule as in Pissarides (2000)37. β
denotes the workers’ bargaining power.
The steady-state present-discounted value of being unemployed can then be
written as:
rU = g(θ)
∫ ∞
φ∗
[E(φ′)− U ] η(φ′)dφ′ (2.21)
with
rE(φ) = w(φ) + δ [U − E(φ)]
and where E(φ′) is the value of being employed in a firm with productivity φ′
and η(φ) denotes the distribution of employment over productivities.
One obtains the following formulation for wages, first-order conditions and
prices, in the case of firms providing the domestic market:
w(φ) = (1− β)rU + βρφρQ1−ρn(φ)ρ−1 (2.22)
(1− β)ρφ
ρQ1−ρn(φ)ρ−1 − rU
r + δ
=
cv
h(θ)
(2.23)
p(φ) =
rU + (r + δ) cvh(θ)
ρφ(1− β)
In the case of exporting firms, one simply has to modify the marginal values
in the above equations as in (2.13) and (2.16). Equation (2.22) merely states
that wages are a linear combination of workers’ threat point rU and the marginal
revenue they bring to the firm.
Combining the first-order condition for a firm with productivity φ with the
Nash-bargaining rule and (2.21), one can show that:
rU =
β
1− β θcv
This implies the following formulation for wages, employment and prices:
w(φ) = βθcv + βρφρQ1−ρn(φ)ρ−1
(1− β)ρφρQ1−ρn(φ)ρ−1 − βθcv
r + δ
=
cv
h(θ)
p(φ) =
βθcv + (r + δ) cvh(θ)
ρφ(1− β)
37See Chapter 3.
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When aggregating, neither the zero-cutoff profit condition, nor the free-entry or
the Beveridge curve are affected by the Nash bargaining rule. The Job Creation
curve reads as follows:
u = 1−
(
β
1−β θcv + (r + δ)
cv
h(θ)
)σ−2
ρσ−2
[
1− ρ
(
β
1−β θcv+δ
cv
h(θ)
β
1−β θcv+(r+δ)
cv
h(θ)
)] c
φ∗σ−1
For a fixed value for θ, the value of aggregate employment is then proportional
to the one from the (JC-2) equation with exogenous wages. This means that
the introduction of endogenous wages into the framework does not affect quali-
tatively the results.
Response of wages to trade liberalization. Even if the extended framework does
not change qualitatively the impact of trade on unemployment, it is a neverthe-
less interesting extension since it allows to assess the response of wages following
an increase in trade exposure. Some empirical studies have already illustrated
a negative impact of trade liberalization on wages. In particular, the study by
Revenga (1997) suggests that trade liberalization has reduced the rent captured
by workers in the Mexican manufacturing sector. The results displayed below
show that the modeling strategy I have followed actually meet this literature.
In order to derive this comparative static, it is worth showing that, in spite
of firm heterogeneity in productivity and labor market search frictions, the
economy actually displays a unique wage. As previously described, wages are
a linear combination of workers’ threat point and the marginal revenue they
bring to the firm (see equation (2.22)). The first component is constant across
workers since they are all alike, while the second component may differ across
firms since firms are heterogeneous. It can actually be proved that this second
component does not differ and the reason is because hiring costs cvh(θ) do not
depend on the firm’s productivity. This implies that, if firms hire workers up
to the point where the marginal revenue they generate is equal to the search
cost (see equation (2.23)), this marginal value has to be equal across all firms.
As a result, wages take a unique value whichever firm’s productivity is. This is
stated in the following Lemma.
LEMMA 5. The economy is characterized by a unique wage: ∀φ > φ∗, w(φ) =
w. In particular, the wage takes the following value:
w =
β
1− β θcv + (r + δ)
β
1− β
cv
h(θ)
This value decreases following trade liberalization because of two effects,
which in fact are complementary. Those two effects result from the interaction
between goods and labor markets imperfections that is described in Proposition
1. The first reason is the decrease in the workers’ threat point. As unemploy-
ment increases, labor market tightness decreases. This implies that it becomes
harder for a worker to find a new job, reducing her bargaining power when wages
are negotiated. The second effect is due to the concentration of the labor force
in a smaller set of firms. Remember the goods market displays monopolistic
competition implying that firms have some market power. As a consequence,
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the revenue firms earn is characterized by decreasing returns to scale in em-
ployment. A higher firm level employment then decrease the marginal revenue
workers generate, reducing the wage they earn.
The complementarity between these two effects comes from the first-order
condition (2.23). From this equation, we clearly see that labor market tightness
and firms’ marginal revenue are positively related, implying that if competition
between workers in the labor market becomes more tight, hiring cost decreases
for firms, which in turn is an incentive for them to increase employment at
the firm level and decrease marginal revenue. On the other hand, following a
reallocation shock, the concentration of workers in few firms, which leads to a
decrease in the marginal revenue, has to be compensated by a decrease in the
search cost.
The following Proposition summarizes these results:
PROPOSITION 4. Trade liberalization leads to a decrease in wage, as
• it decreases the workers’threat point and
• it reduces the marginal value workers bring to the firm.
Proof. See the Appendix 2.6.1.
Intrafirm wage bargaining. In a paper by Cahuc et al. (2005), it is argued that,
in a large firm setting, when revenues generated by workers are characterized
by decreasing returns to scale, firms can actually increase their level of employ-
ment so that the marginal value workers generate is lower and so wages. This
possibility should also be considered in my model of trade and unemployment.
The results that have been presented so far are in fact robust to a so-called
framework with intrafirm wage bargaining. The reason is because the absence
of scale effect does not have anything to do with the way wages are determined.
Indeed, from Cahuc et al. (2005), it can be shown in this setting that the first
order condition becomes
(1− β)
ρφρQ1−ρn(φ)ρ−1
1−β+βρ − rU
r + δ
=
cv
h(θ)
.
When comparing this equation with (2.23), one can see that the only difference
comes from the left-hand side of the equation, where marginal revenue is mul-
tiplied by a factor 11−β+βρ > 1. This means that the results that have been
presented so far are not qualitatively affected by intrafirm wage bargaining.
2.3.4 Towards an empirical test of the model
The main conclusion of my model is that an increase in trade exposure leads
to more job destruction than creation, which results in a drop in employment.
Indeed, the law of motion for employment is
N˙ = g(θ)(1−N)− δN − I
[
φ˙∗ > 0
] (
n(φ∗)µ(φ∗)Mφ˙∗
)
(2.24)
where N = 1 − u and I is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the
expression between brackets is true and zero otherwise. The time subscripts
t are suppressed for notational convenience and dots refer to derivatives with
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respect to time. From above, we see that the variation in employment is the sum
of three types of flows. The first term refers to total new hirings, the second is
exogenous job separations and the last is job destruction driven by the death of
the least productive firms. Thus, both variations in θ and φ∗ affect the variation
in employment.
Equation (2.24) gives us a reduced form of the model which can be tested
for instance by using sectoral data. Because employment decreases when trade
exposure increases, we know that the first term in (2.24) is lower than both ex-
ogenous and endogenous separations. An empirical test would so assess whether
creation is lower than destruction. This is the purpose of the next Section.
2.4 Empirical evidence
Existing empirical literature on firm heterogeneity in international economics
shows that trade liberalization leads to the decline of small firms and the ex-
pansion of large firms. In a full-employment framework, these results suggest
a reallocation of labor from small to large firms. In this Section, empirical evi-
dence suggests that firm turnover generates more job destruction than creation.
2.4.1 Data
The data is a panel dataset of annual frequency. Gross job flows are taken
from the Davis et al. (1996) database, which provides us with data on job
creation and job destruction rates for the period 1973-1988 over 447 4-digit
manufacturing sectors (1972 SIC definition). Since the SIC sectors was revised
in 1987, I use the methodology of Bartelsman and Gray (1996) to allow the
correspondence between the 1987 and 1988 sample to the previous subsample.
I calculate penetration ratios38 by using data on sectoral imports and exports
from the NBER International Trade database39 as:
P impi,t =
Mi,t
Yi,t +Mi,t
P expi,t =
Xi,t
Yi,t +Mi,t
Mi,t denotes sectoral imports for sector i at time t, Xi,t sectoral exports and
Yi,t industry shipments. Data on industry shipments are taken from the NBER
Manufacturing Productivity database40.
Aggregate variables are constructed using employment shares as provided
by Davis et al. (1996) database.
Sectors with missing data are dropped, I chose to remove them. Those
represent a total of 29 sectors, or 6.5% of the total 447 sectors available. The
list of the dropped sectors is provided in Table 6 in the Appendix 2.6.2.
38I follow Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) in the definition of the ratios. I have to also tried to
estimate the equations (2.25) and (2.26), which will be introduced below, with the following
definitions of exposure ratios: P impi,t =
Mi,t
Yi,t
and P expi,t =
Xi,t
Yi,t
. Under this specification, the
results (not reported) are qualitatively similar.
39See Feenstra (1996, 1997) for more details on the database.
40See Bartelsman and Gray (1996).
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We end up with a balanced panel of 15 years over the period 1974-1988 and
a total of 418 sectors for the US.
It would certainly be interesting to also use data on tariffs in order to assess
the impact of trade liberalization. This data is available on the NBER web site.
However, the time period doe not match with my data on job flows.
On the other hand, one could argue that my measures of trade exposure
are actually better suited to assess the impact of globalization. First, these
are effective measures of trade exposure. They account for phenomena such as
trade diversion that are not necessarily considered when using tariff data. For
instance, suppose the US trade with both France and Spain. If the US decrease
the tariffs on Spanish imports, it may be the case that total imports in the
economy are not affected at all because French imports are substituted by their
Spanish counterpart. While this example would correspond to an increase in
trade exposure if one uses data on tariffs, my measure of trade exposure would
properly claim that no increase in international exposure has occurred in this
case. Second, they also account for other trade costs like non-tariff barriers to
trade. In particular, a report from the Swedish National Board of Trade show
that when a country experiences a decrease in tariffs, it usually switch to other
forms of trade barriers41. My measure of trade exposure accounts for those
effects.
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Estimating the impact of a greater exposure to international trade on job
flows is a difficult task. Indeed, both international and domestic markets are
characterized by several types of shocks that continuously interact. The work
by Davis et al. (1996) did not find any significant relation in the long run:
sectors that are more open did not appear to be characterized by a different
evolution of job flows. However, the calibration by Bernard et al. (2003) on
the short-run effects reveals some more significant results. They suggest that
a 5% fall in geographic barriers would increase job creation by 1.5% and job
destruction by 2.8% in the manufacturing sector, making employment to drop
by 1.3%. But their model is based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) which, despite
of fitting the data very well, considers a frictionless labor market.
This section describes the evolution of our aggregate variables of interest,
i.e. gross job flows and trade exposure ratios in order to motivate why we need
to take care of several factors in order to assess the effect of trade liberalization.
This will motivate the approach I will consider for my estimations: the use of
panel data techniques.
The well-known behavior of aggregate job destruction and creation42 is dis-
played in Figure 2.5. One can notice that the two variables are negatively
correlated, mainly reflecting the impact of aggregate shocks. As will be ex-
plained further, those a priori totally closed economy considerations need to be
accounted for in an open-economy framework as well.
Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of aggregate import and export ratios, calcu-
lated as in Section 2.4.1. Two features can be observed. Firstly, both variables
display an upward trend, reflecting a growing exposure of the US to interna-
41See Kommerskollegium (2006).
42See Davis et al. (1996) for a comprehensive study.
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tional trade. Secondly, a negative correlation around this trend illustrates the
impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the trade balance.
Those facts imply we should be careful when analyzing the link between
trade exposure and employment: other variables are affecting our two variables,
meaning that we will have to distinguish between the effect we are interested in
(a greater exposure to international trade) and other shocks such as aggregate
and exchange rate fluctuations.
Indeed, in the empirical literature, it has been largely shown that aggregate
shocks extensively affect job flows. See for instance Abraham and Katz (1986),
Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999b). But, there
has also been a debate regarding the effect of real exchange rate fluctuations
on intra-sectoral job reallocation. In particular, this debate has focused on the
nature of such shocks, i.e. whether they are allocative or aggregate43. The first
paper on this issue is Gourinchas (1998) who claims that the existing matching
models aimed at fitting the behaviors of job creation and destruction, such as
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), cannot account for the effects of real exchange
rate fluctuations on job reallocations. He finds with US data that such a type of
shock has an allocative effect, i.e. it induces a positive correlation between job
creation and destruction, whereas traditional matching models would instead
show that it induces a negative correlation between the two variables. Surpris-
ingly, he then finds in French data44 that an aggregate interpretation better
fits the observed behavior and justifies this finding by asserting that the real
exchange rate fluctuations of the French Franc cannot be anticipated. Actu-
ally, Klein et al. (2003) investigate the same issue on US data and find the
shock to be aggregate in nature. They argue that the results in Gourinchas
(1998) are due to sample selection bias. In my estimations below, I will rely on
Klein et al. (2003) as a benchmark model (i.e. exchange rate shocks are not
allocative but aggregate). Thus, controlling for aggregate shocks is important
since those shocks are affecting trade and labor market variables at the same
time. An estimation procedure using panel data is thus appropriate since panel
data techniques allow the econometrician to disentangle between aggregate and
sector-specific shocks.
Finally, Figure 2.7 shows the importance of aggregate shocks. This picture
depicts the evolution of net employment growth and changes in trade exposure
ratio45. Both variables are standardized. Basically a positive correlation be-
tween the two variables can be noticed, suggesting a positive impact of trade
exposure on employment. Indeed, the overall correlation coefficient is around
0.37. But, if one pays more attention to these evolutions, it can be seen that
there is a strong positive correlation essentially over three periods: the oil shock
in 1975, the crisis at the beginning of the 1980’s and the large fluctuations in
the dollar in the late 1980’s. Outside those periods a negative correlation can
instead be observed. Even though this negative correlation seems smaller in
magnitude, the effect is present, suggesting that, after controlling for exchange
rate and other aggregate effects, an increasing exposure to international trade
might induce a drop in employment.
The empirical strategy I propose is to use panel data techniques since it
is otherwise hard to identify all the relevant effects at the aggregate level and
43That is whether they induce a positive or a negative correlation between job flows.
44See Gourinchas (1999).
45This last variable refers to the sum of import and export penetration ratios.
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because such techniques help to control for aggregate shocks. Indeed, although
we observe an increasing exposure to international trade at the aggregate level,
data at the sectoral level will be more informative: some sectors become less
connected to the rest of world, whereas others experience an increase in their ex-
posure46. Further, I will be able to disentangle between the effect of an increase
in trade exposure and other aggregate effects. Finally, when the time span is
short, panel data techniques allow to exploit all the cross section dimension.
The next Subsection explains my methodology more in details.
2.4.3 Estimation and results
I propose to estimate the following set of dynamic equations:
JCi,t = α1(L)∆P
imp
i,t +α2(L)∆P
exp
i,t +α3(L)JCagg,t+α4(L)JCi,t−1+ηjc,i+jc,i,t
(2.25)
JDi,t = β1(L)∆P
imp
i,t +β2(L)∆P
exp
i,t +β3(L)JDagg,t+β4(L)JDi,t−1+ηjd,i+jd,i,t
(2.26)
where JCi,t and JDi,t are respectively job creation and destruction rates in
sector i at time t. From the theoretical part of the present paper, trade lib-
eralization induces an increase in both P impi,t and P
exp
i,t ratios. The coefficients
of interest are then α1, α2, β1 and β2, which give the impact of a one-point
increase in import and export shares on job creation and destruction rates re-
spectively. Recall that a balanced increase in job flows following an increase
in trade exposure should imply α1 = β1 and α2 = β2. Aggregate variables are
included in order to control for macroeconomic shocks, e.g., productivity, oil
prices or exchange rate shocks. This enables us to control for shocks that have
an impact on the trade balance, rather than not taking into account a proper
increase in trade exposure. In addition, the aggregate shock also controls for
the well-known shift from manufacturing to services. The η•,i are fixed effects
and •,i,t sectoral shocks in sector i at time t. The introduction of fixed effects
is important in our framework: they control for sector-specific characteristics
omitted by the model. For instance our results are insensitive to whether the
sector is a booming or a declining one. Time dummies could also have been
introduced, but as previously argued another strategy was followed in order to
control for aggregate effects. Results are however not very different if one in-
cludes or not time dummies. Moreover, as all variables are stationary, I do not
need to control for any trend.
As the panel has a small number of time periods T and a large number of
sectors I, I choose to use Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) techniques
applied to panel data in a two-step robust procedure47 to estimate equations
(2.26) and (2.25). The asymptotic properties of this estimator have been derived
in Alvarez and Arellano (2003).
Regarding moment conditions, differences in import and export share and
aggregate variables are considered to be strictly exogenous and the dependent
variables as predetermined. Note that the strict exogeneity of trade exposure
could be criticized. But, an incremental Sargan test below will not reject the
hypothesis.
46See Gourinchas (1998).
47See Arellano (2003) or Arellano and Honore´ (2001) for more details.
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Results. The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 (GMM column). The
optimal length of the lag polynomial is determined by removing the lags that
are not significant but at the same time keeping at least the first element of
the polynomial. For the sake of comparison, results using a fixed effects pro-
cedure (FE column), as well as a GMM procedure where trade exposure ratios
are considered as predetermined (GMM2 column), are reported. In the FE
case, the lagged dependent variable is omitted as it would bias the results. The
m1, m2 and Sargan statistic rows respectively indicate the autocorrelation and
overidentification tests from Arellano and Bond (1991).
From Tables 1 and 2, one can first notice that the results are very similar
across specifications. This is because the coefficient on the lagged dependent
variable is not significant and overall small in magnitude, which tends to reduce
the bias (if it exists).
Secondly, as well known, job flows variables are highly correlated with ag-
gregate shocks48. For both job creation and destruction rates, the coefficient
relative to aggregate flows is indeed very close to one and very significant, and
across all specifications.
Thirdly, all tests specific to GMM estimation, i.e., m1 and m2 tests and
the Sargan overidentification test are satisfactory. m1 is negative and large,
m2 is close to zero and the Sargan tests do not seem to indicate any type of
overidentification in the moment conditions.
All of the above elements allow us to interpret the coefficients on trade expo-
sure ratios, having controlled for aggregate shocks. The results are the follow-
ing. A greater trade exposure does not affect job creation (for both imports and
exports shares). The coefficient is not significant even in the fixed effects speci-
fication which is expected to yield more precise coefficients. But, in contrast, it
does have an effect on job destruction. The coefficients relative to imports and
exports shares are indeed highly significant and tell us that a 1 point increase
in import share increases job destruction rate by 14.7 points, while an increase
in export share in the same proportion increases job destruction by 6.3 points.
It is not surprising to observe that an increase in import penetration destroys
more jobs as compared to an increase in the export ratio as the former leads
to a decline in the respective domestic sectors and to dismissals in those same
sectors in the short run49. But, we need to pay more attention to the shrinkage
in employment even in the sectors that are exporting more. Even though it is
smaller in magnitude, it remains negative. This findings confirm the theoretical
results from Section 2.3, i.e. following an increase in trade exposure, the sub-
sequent labor reallocation process within sector is characterized by higher job
destruction than creation.
Robustness. As the strict exogeneity of trade exposure ratios can be criticized,50
I performed an incremental Sargan test, to test the null hypothesis of strict ex-
ogeneity against the alternative according to which variations in trade exposure
48See Abraham and Katz (1986), Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Davis and Haltiwanger
(1999b).
49See Revenga (1992) or Baldwin et al. (1980).
50As the estimations were not precise enough (see GMM2), further moment conditions were
required in order to indentify the model and get significant coefficients. This is the well-known
trade-off between a consistent and an efficient estimator. The incremental Sargan test shows
that the bias is not strong, establishing us to maintain the assumption of exogeneity.
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ratios are correlated only with current and past shocks. The χ2 statistics are re-
spectively 61.14 for the job creation and 48.70 for the job destruction equations,
which does not reject the null hypothesis and suggests no overidentification.
Another critique to the use of our measures of exposure to trade is that they
are sensitive to the business cycle. As long as international and business cycles
are not aligned, a drop in Y does not a fortiori imply the same decrease in X.
Suppose that there is a domestic recession in a specific sector with no impact
on X nor M . This would imply an increase in our index of openness to trade
and an increase in job destruction, but those variations would actually be due
to domestic shocks rather than a proper change in exposure to trade.
I partly control for this as I included aggregate shocks and fixed effects
into the regression, but it is certainly interesting to check the sensitivity of the
results when using a measure of openness to trade that is not subject to this
critique. I then filter my series for Y , X and M by using a low-pass filter in
order to remove frequencies that are lower than 6 years. Table 3 displays the
results when considering measures of trade exposure that are constructed from
the filtered series. As one can see, there is no much change with respect to the
results presented in Tables 1 and 2, which indicates our measures of exposure
to trade are in fact not very sensitive to sectoral cycles.
As a further robustness check, I regressed job flows at time t on the variation
in trade penetration ratios at time t+1 in a simple fixed effect framework. One
might indeed think that firms hire their workers today in order to sell their
products abroad in a year. The results are reported in Table 4 and enable
us not to reject that trade implies massive job destruction: no coefficient is
significant, except for the impact of an increase in import ratio on job creation,
which is highly significant and negative.
In addition (not reported) I also added to the regression monetary growth as
an explanatory variable as Davis et al. (1996) suggest that the aggressive mon-
etary policy in the 70’s could explain the observed high rate in job reallocation.
I also included real effective exchange rate growth and government expenditure
growth. Results remain robust.
The only case where I found that more exposure significantly increases job
creation is when squared terms are included (see Table 5)51. The reason for
introducing squared terms is because, according to my model, job reallocation
should occur for both an increase and a decrease in trade exposure. This means
that we should observe job creation by large firms when trade exposure in-
creases and job creation by small firms when it decreases. But, even in this
case creations do not compensate destructions: a one-point increase in export
share generates an increase in job creation by 4.5 points and an increase in job
destruction by 6.5 points52; and a one- point increase in import ratio does not
seem to generate any significant increase in job creation while job destruction
is increased by 13.8 points.
To summarize our previous results: higher exposure to international trade
increases job destruction since small firms are forced out of the market, but
51Care should be given when reading this Table. A one-point increase in penetration ratio
corresponds to a value of 0.01, meaning that when one wants to take the square, one has to
consider a value of 0.0001.
52It could be argued that the two coefficients might not be significantly different. Therefore
I regressed the sectoral net employment growth on increases in sectoral penetration ratios.
The results indicate a decrease in employment when opening to trade.
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at the same time job creations are not large enough to compensate the fall in
employment.
2.5 Conclusion
While nations gain from international trade, international trade hurts par-
ticular groups of agents. Thus gains from trade are unequally distributed. Some
groups win, others lose.
This was already known of models of inter-industry trade. This paper illus-
trates that also intra-industry trade hurts some agents. When trade is liberal-
ized, workers relocate from the least to the most productive firms, leading to
an increase in aggregate productivity. But, when labor markets are character-
ized with search frictions, job destruction due to small firms exit exceeds job
creation by large firms. The reason why all displaced workers are not absorbed
by the remaining firms is because under monopolistic competition marginal rev-
enue is decreasing in firm-level employment, reflecting the pricing behavior of
the firm and leading to the complementarity between goods and labor markets
imperfections which was illsutrated in this paper.
This trade-off between aggregate productivity and employment leads to the
following caveat: the greater the gains in productivity, the steeper the opposition
to globalization will be as the rise in equilibrium unemployment will be sharper.
An example are the recent demonstrations against the American Free Trade
Agreement during the 4th American Summit in November 2005 at Mar del
Plata in Argentina. The protesters were curiously opposing free trade against
employment. This paper gives an explanation of why such a statement can be
made.
An interesting implication of this result is that we should not see opposition
to trade only in import-competing industries, but also in expanding industries.
According to my model and the results from the empirical part of the paper,
even the growth of large multinationals gives rise to a short-run decrease in
employment in those sectors. This gives a rationale for the presence of labor
unions or groups of protesters in those sectors.
As claimed by Kletzer (2001), it is then necessary to think carefully about
possible redistribution mechanisms and other economic policies that should
accompany trade liberalization. In this way, in addition of being welfare-
improving, such policies would make globalization Pareto-improving.
Of course, some limits apply to the analysis developed in this paper. The
conclusions in terms of employment should not be generalized to the whole
economy since the modeling approach as well as the empirical assessment of the
effect of trade only involve one industry. Indeed, one could think that labor
could relocate to other sectors, which would limit the impact of trade on the
overall level of employment in the economy. From this perspective, the results of
my paper should be interpreted as the medium-run consequences of employment,
that is the industry which gets more exposed to trade is allowed to reach its
steady-state, but I completely disregard the impact of trade on the rest of the
economy.
Consequently, if trade reduces employment at the sectoral level, future re-
search should try to answer the following questions. First, what are the conse-
quences for the rest of the economy? Reallocation across industries should then
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be carefully analyzed. If there are impediments to reallocation, the impact on
aggregate employment may be detrimental. For instance, a possible theory of
the divergence between Europe and the US in the rate of unemployment may be
a reallocation problem from traded to non-traded sectors53. It would be inter-
esting to analyze this question in more details. Second, the period analyzed in
the paper is the 70s-80s. At that time, only part of the economy was liberalized,
mainly the manufacturing sector. Would the impact of trade be similar, if the
whole economy is liberalized? Indeed, the difference between globalization some
years ago and the way followed nowadays is that, with the introduction of new
technologies, trade liberalization can now affect any sector in a given economy.
In this context, workers may not know where to relocate.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proofs
Closed economy
Maximization program of the firm
Proof. The Hamiltonian H for the maximization program is:
H = e−rt{p(φ)q(φ)− wn(φ)− cvv(φ)− c}+ Ξt{h(θ)v(φ)− δn(φ)}
Where Ξt is the Lagrange multiplier evaluated at time t. We set ξt = e−rtΞt.
When plugging the production function and the demand equation (2.4) into the
above expression, we have:
H = e−rt{Q1−ρφρn(φ)ρ − wn(φ)− cvv(φ)− c}+ Ξth(θ)v(φ)− δn(φ)
The first order conditions are:{
−cve−rt + Ξth(θ) = 0
e−rt{ρQ1−ρφρn(φ)ρ−1 − w} − δΞt = −Ξ˙t
From the first equation of the system, we have ξt = cvh(θt) and ξ˙t =
d[cv/h(θt)]
dt .
When plugged into the second equation and after noticing Ξ˙t = −re−rtξt +
e−rtξ˙t, this leads to the first-order condition
cv
h(θt)
=
ρQ1−ρφρn(φ)ρ−1 − w + d[cv/h(θt)]dt
r + δ
With θ˙ = 0, the condition is similar to (2.5). The first-order condition implies
that, after entry, adjustment in employment at the firm-level follows a two-tier
structure. Call n∗(φ) the steady-state level of firm-level employment. At time
0, the firm posts an amount v0 =
n∗(φ)
h(θ) of vacancies so as to reach immediately
its steady-state level. Then, at time t > 0, it posts vt =
δn∗(φ)
h(θ) vacancies so that
the employment stock keeps constant over time.
53Rogerson (2007) has explored this explanation. He does not focus specifically on trade
but puts a lot of emphasis on reallocation between sectors. He also explains differences in
terms of employment rate due to differences in the tax system.
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This two-tier structure implies that, in addition to the entry cost ce, a firm
with productivity φ pays a cost cvn
∗(φ)
h(θ) once its productivity is revealed so that
its employment level reaches immediately its steady-state level. Equivalently,
one can consider that this additional entry cost is spread over the whole lifetime
of the firm. This implies that the cost per employee when producing is increased
by rcvh(θ) . This is a convenient way of thinking about the behavior of the firm as
it will ease the analysis of entry. I will come back to this when I will study the
value of a firm below.
Finally, (2.8) is obtained by substituting (2.5) and the production function
into (2.4). 
Lemma 6: value of a firm. Before understanding how firm entry into the
industry operates, it is necessary to analyze profits. Below, I will analyze the
value of a firm when aggregate variables are in steady state. But, I will allow
firms to be on their adjustment path. Hence, the following Lemma:
LEMMA 6. When aggregate variables are in steady state, the value of a firm
with productivity parameter φ is:
V (φ) =
{
(1−ρ)R(φ)−c
r if φ > φ
∗
0 otherwise
where R(φ) = p(φ)q(φ) is the revenue earned by a firm with productivity φ.
Proof. The value of a firm with productivity parameter φ is:
V (φ) =
{
pi(φ)
r if φ > φ
∗
0 otherwise
where pi(φ) are the steady-state profits for a given firm with productivity φ.
Profits are equal to
pi(φ) = R(φ)− wn(φ)− cvv(φ)− c− r cv
h(θ)
n(φ) (2.27)
The last term r cvh(θ)n(φ) follows from the dynamic behavior of the firm
54. It
refers to the fact that, once its productivity is revealed, a firm has to pay
a cost cvn(φ)h(θ) so that employment (at the firm level) reaches immediately its
steady-state level. Equivalently, instead of considering that this cost is paid once
productivity is revealed, it is an additional cost per employee when producing
equal to r cvh(θ) . This is why r
cv
h(θ)n(φ) appears in (2.27).
Since the mass of vacancies has to be chosen such that hirings equate sep-
arations, we have that wn(φ) + cvv(φ) + r cvh(θ)n(φ) =
(
w + (r + δ) cvh(θ)
)
n(φ),
which yields:
pi(φ) = R(φ)−
(
w + (r + δ)
cv
h(θ)
)
n(φ)− c
Note that R(φ) = p(φ)q(φ) = p(φ)φn(φ) and recall the pricing equation (2.8).
One gets:
pi(φ) = (1− ρ)R(φ)− c
54See the Appendix 2.6.1 for a description.
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This leads to the result. 
Goods market equilibrium
Proof. Before making the investment to enter the industry, the expected value
of a firm is:
V¯ = F (φ∗).0 + [1− F (φ∗)]E[V (φ)|φ > φ∗]− ce
In equilibrium, this expected value has to be zero, i.e. V¯ = 0: firms will enter
the market until expected profits cover entry costs, which gives the free entry
condition (FE-1).
To determine the zero cutoff profit condition, we need the following Lemma:
R(φ1)
R(φ2)
=
(
φ1
φ2
)σ−1
(2.28)
which follows from (2.4) and (2.8). Indeed,
R(φ1)
R(φ2)
=
p(φ1)q(φ1)
p(φ2)q(φ2)
,
from (2.4),
R(φ1)
R(φ2)
=
p(φ1)Qp(φ1)−σ
p(φ2)Qp(φ2)−σ
,
and from (2.8),
R(φ1)
R(φ2)
=
(
w+(r+δ) cv
h(θ)
ρφ1
)1−σ
(
w+(r+δ) cv
h(θ)
ρφ2
)1−σ ,
which leads to (2.28).
The zero cutoff profit condition determines when a firm exits the market
once entered, i.e. when profits are negative. That is:
pi(φ∗) = 0
From Lemma 6, we have
pi(φ∗) = (1− ρ)R(φ∗)− c = 0⇔ R(φ∗) = cσ (2.29)
From (2.28):
R(φe) =
(
φe(φ∗)
φ∗
)σ−1
R(φ∗) (2.30)
We substitute (2.29) in (2.30):
R(φe) =
(
(φe(φ∗))
φ∗
)σ−1
cσ
Finally, using Lemma 6 applied to this last expression, the zero cutoff profit
condition follows. 
Equilibrium mass of firms.
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Proof. From (2.3) and (2.4), we have:
Q =
∫ ∞
φ∗
Qp(φ)1−σMµ(φ)dφ
Then, from (2.8):
M =
[∫ ∞
φ∗
µ(φ)
(
C(θ)
ρφ
)1−σ
dφ
]−1
And from the definition of φe, we finally have:
M =
(
C(θ)
ρφe
)σ−1
= p(φe)σ−1

Labor market equilibrium
Proof. With a fixed φ∗, the variation in unemployment is equal to:
u˙ = δ(1− u) + θh(θ)u
The first term corresponds to job separations and the second to total hirings in
the economy.
Setting u˙ = 0 gives the Beveridge curve, i.e. the steady state level of unem-
ployment given the labor market tightness.
The job creation curve is obtained by aggregation of equation (2.5):
1− u =
∫ ∞
0
n(φ)Mµ(φ)dφ
1− u =
∫ ∞
0
{
ρφρQ1−ρ
C(θ)
}σ
Mµ(φ)dφ
with C(θ) = w + (r + δ) cvh(θ) .
1− u = ρ
σQ
C(θ)σ
M
∫ ∞
0
φσ−1µ(φ)dφ
Since by definition φe =
{∫∞
0
φσ−1µ(φ)dφ
} 1
σ−1 ,
1− u = ρ
σQ
C(θ)σ
Mφeσ−1
From (2.5), one notices that n(φe) = ρ
σQ
C(θ)σ φ
eσ−1. Hence,
1− u = n(φe)M
This equation also implies that average employment is equal to the employment
of a firm with productivity φe, i.e. n¯ = n(φe).
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From this expression, we need to determine the steady-state values of n(φe)
and M . To determine n(φe), we use the production function and the definition
of revenues:
n(φe) =
q(φe)
φe
=
R(φe)
p(φe)φe
and Lemma 6 implies
n(φe) =
pie + c
C(θ)
(σ − 1).
Finally, by use of (2.9), we replace the steady-state value for M = p(φe)σ−1 =(
C(θ)
ρφe
)σ−1
and complete the proof. 
Existence and uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium.
Proof. The Beveridge curve is decreasing from one to zero as
dθ
du
∣∣∣∣
BC
= − θ
u(1− u)η(θ) < 0, limθ→0
δ
δ+θh(θ) = 1 and limθ→∞
δ
δ + θh(θ)
= 0
Rewrite the Job Creation curve as
u = 1−AB(θ) with A = σ pie+c
ρσ−2φeσ−1 > 0 and B(θ) = C(θ)
σ−2
Notice that when θ → 0 the Job Creation curve is below the Beveridge curve
as
u|JC,θ→0 = 1−A
wσ−2
1− ρ
Thus, a sufficient condition for the labor market equilibrium to exist and to be
unique requires the Job Creation curve to be increasing.
We have
du
dθ
∣∣∣∣
JC
= −AB′(θ) = −A(σ − 2)C(θ)σ−3C ′(θ)
Notice C ′(θ) = −(r + δ)cv h(θ)
2
h′(θ) > 0.
From above, we see that when σ ≤ 2, i.e. ρ ≤ 12 , dudθ
∣∣
JC
≥ 0, implying
that the equilibrium exists and is unique in this case. When σ > 2, then the
Job Creation is decreasing over the whole range of possible values for θ. Then,
as limθ→∞ u|JC = −∞ when σ > 2, the number of labor market equilibria is
either zero or two.
Open economy
Inter-temporal maximization program of the firm.
Proof. The dynamic behavior of a firm is of course similar in the open-economy
case.
The Hamiltonian H˜ for the maximization program is:
H˜ = e−rt{pd(φ)qd(φ) + γpx(φ)qx(φ)− w(nd(φ) + γnx(φ))− cv(vd(φ) + γvx(φ))− c− γcx}
+Σdt {h(θ)vd(φ)− δnd(φ)}+Σxt {h(θ)vx(φ)− δnx(φ)}
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The first-order conditions are:
−cve−rt +Σdth(θ) = 0
−γcve−rt +Σxt h(θ) = 0
e−rt{ρQ1−ρφρnd(φ)ρ−1 − w} − δΣdt = −Σ˙dt
γe−rt{ρQ1−ρφρτ−ρnx(φ)ρ−1 − w} − δΣxt = −Σ˙xt
Given Σ˙it = −re−rtςit + e−rtς˙it , ∀i ∈ {d, x} and setting ς˙it = 0, we then get in
steady state: 
ςit =
cv
h(θ) , ∀i ∈ {d, x}
ςdt =
ρQ1−ρφρnd(φ)ρ−1−w
r+δ
ςxt =
ρQ1−ρφρτ−ρnx(φ)ρ−1−w
r+δ
which leads to equations (2.12) and (2.13).
Equation (2.14) is the steady state formulation of the law of motion that
drives firm-level employment.
Finally, (2.15) and (2.16) are obtained by substituting (2.12), (2.13) and the
production function into (2.4).
Notice that, as for the closed-economy case, firms’ strategy follows a two-tier
structure. Once productivity is revealed, they post a large amount of vacancies
so as to immediately reach their steady state. Then, they keep posting vacancies
in order to maintain their stock of employment constant over time. The fact
that they immediately post a large amount of vacancies after entry implies an
additional fixed cost equal to cvh(θ) (n
d(φ)+γnx(φ)), which is actually equivalent
to a cost per employee equal to r cvh(θ) when producing.
Lemma 7: value of a firm. In the open economy framework, the counterpart
of Lemma 6 is:
LEMMA 7. In steady state, the value of a firm with productivity parameter φ
is:
V (φ) =

(1−ρ)[γRx(φ)+Rd(φ)]−c−γcx
r if φ
∗
x ≤ φ
(1−ρ)Rd(φ)−c
r if φ
∗ ≤ φ < φ∗x
0 otherwise
where Ri(φ) = pi(φ)qi(φ), i = d, x, is the revenue earned from each specific
market by a firm with productivity φ.
Proof. The result follows directly from the proof of Lemma 6.
This allows us to determine the relation (2.17) linking φ∗ and φ∗x:
Let us denote by pid(φ) and pix(φ) the amount of profits a firm with produc-
tivity φ earns from domestic and export sales respectively.
By definition of φ∗ and φ∗x: pi
d(φ∗) = 0 and pix(φ∗x) = 0.
From Lemma 7 and the fact that Rx(φ) = τ1−σRd(φ∗), this yields:
Rx(φ∗x)
Rd(φ∗)
= τ1−σ
(
φ∗x
φ∗
)σ−1
=
cx
c
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which leads to the result.
Goods market equilibrium.
Proof. The free entry condition is obtained in the same way as the one used for
the proof of Lemma 1.
To determine the zero cutoff profit condition in the open economy bench-
mark, we use the following two definitions:
pid(φ∗) = 0 ⇔ pid(φe) = c
{
(
φe(φ∗)
φ∗
)σ−1 − 1
}
pix(φ∗x) = 0 ⇔ pix(φex) = cx
{
(
φex(φ
∗
x)
φ∗x
)σ−1 − 1
}
Given (2.17) and the definition of pie in the open economy framework,
pie = pid(φe) +
1− F (φ∗x)
1− F (φ∗)γpi
x(φex),
the result follows.
Equilibrium mass of firms.
Proof. From (2.11) and (2.4), we have:
Q =
∫ ∞
φ∗
Qpd(φ)1−σMµ(φ)dφ+ γ
∫ ∞
φ∗x
Qpx(φ)1−σMxµ(φ)dφ
Then, from (2.15):
M−1 =
∫ ∞
φ∗
(
C(θ)
ρφ
)1−σ
µ(φ)dφ+ γτ1−σ
1− F (φ∗x)
1− F (φ∗)
∫ ∞
φ∗x
(
C(θ)
ρφ
)1−σ
µ(φ)dφ
And from the definitions of φeT and MT , we finally have:
MT =
(
C(θ)
ρφ
)1−σ
= pd(φeT )
σ−1

Labor market equilibrium.
Proof. The Beveridge curve is derived as in the closed economy framework.
For the job creation curve to be derived, one needs to aggregate equations
(2.12) and (2.13):
1− u =
∫ ∞
φ∗
nd(φ)Mµ(φ)dφ+ γ
∫ ∞
φ∗x
nx(φ)Mxµx(φ)dφ
1− u =
∫ ∞
φ∗
(
ρφρQ
1
σ
C(θ)
)σ
Mµ(φ)dφ+ γ
∫ ∞
φ∗x
(
ρφρτ−ρQ
1
σ
C(θ)
)σ
Mxµx(φ)dφ
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1− u = ρ
σQM
C(θ)σ
∫ ∞
φ∗
φσ−1µ(φ)dφ+
ρσγτ1−σQMx
C(θ)σ
∫ ∞
φ∗x
φσ−1µx(φ)dφ
1− u = ρ
σQM
C(θ)σ
φed
σ−1 +
ρσγτ1−σQMx
C(θ)σ
φex
σ−1
which leads to (JC-2).
Then, the steady state values of nd(φed) and n
x(φex) are determined through
the production function and the results from Lemma 7:
nd(φed) =
q(φed)
φed
=
R(φed)
φep(φed)
=
pied + c
C(θ)
σρ
nx(φex) =
q(φex)
φex
=
R(φex)
φexp(φex)
=
piex + cx
C(θ)
σρ
Substituting those values into (JC-2) and using the definition of pie and the
steady state value for M gives rise to the result.
Trade impact
Job creation equation.
Proof. By use of its definition, one can rewrite φeT as:
φeT
σρ =
[1− F (φ∗)]φed + γτ1−σ[1− F (φ∗x)]φex
[1− F (φ∗)] + γ[1− F (φ∗x)]
When replacing this value into (JC), one gets:
u = 1− C(θ)
σ−2
ρσ−2
[1− F (φ∗)](pie + c) + γ[1− F (φ∗x)]cx
[1− F (φ∗)]φed + γτ1−σ[1− F (φ∗x)]φex
σ
By replacing pie by its value in (ZCP), we get:
u = 1− C(θ)
σ−2
ρσ−2
[1− F (φ∗)]c
(
φed
φ∗
)σ−1
+ γ[1− F (φ∗x)]cx
(
φex
φ∗x
)σ−1
[1− F (φ∗)]φedσ−1 + γτ1−σ[1− F (φ∗x)]φexσ−1
σ
Finally, replacing φ∗x by φ
∗τ
(
cx
c
) 1
σ−1 leads to:
u = 1− C(θ)
σ−2
ρσ−2
c
φ∗σ−1
σ

Aggregate consumption good The amount of consumption good produced
is derived from the exit condition.
As a firm with productivity φ∗ earns zero profits,
p(φ∗)q(φ∗)− wn(φ∗)− cvv(φ∗)− c = 0
From q(φ∗) = (φ∗)n(φ∗) and v(φ∗) = δh(θ)n(φ
∗), we have
n(φ∗)
(
p(φ∗)φ∗ − w − δ cv
h(θ)
)
= c
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Using the first order condition, we replace n(φ∗) and p(φ∗):
Qφ∗σ−1ρσ
C(θ)σ
(
C(θ)
ρ
− w − δ cv
h(θ)
)
= c
⇐⇒ Q = C(θ)
σ−2
ρσ−2
c
φ∗σ−1
C(θ)
ρ
σ
From the job creation equation,
⇐⇒ u = 1− C(θ)
σ−2
ρσ−2
c
φ∗σ−1
σ
we finally have
Q = (1− u)C(θ)
ρ
Remember trade liberalization leads to an increase in u and a decrease in θ, this
implies it also leads to a decrease in Q.
Wages Remember from Lemma 5 that wages take a unique value. This im-
plies that ∀φ > φ∗.
w(φ) = βθcv + βχ,
where χ is the marginal value workers brings to the firm, which has to be equal
across all firms.
From the first order condition,
χ− w
r + δ
=
cv
h(θ)
,
we have
w(φ) = βθcv + βw + β(r + δ)
cv
h(θ)
It implies
w(φ) =
β
1− β θcv + (r + δ)
β
1− β
cv
h(θ)
As trade liberalization decreases labor market tightness, it also reduces wages.
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2.6.2 Graphs and tables
Figure 2.5: US Aggregate Job Creation and Destruction Rates, 1972-1986, quar-
terly data. Source: Bureau of Census
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Figure 2.6: US Aggregate Export and Import Shares, 1972-1986, quarterly data.
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Figure 2.7: US Net Employment and Trade Exposure Ratio Changes, 1972-1986,
quarterly data, standardized aggregate variables. Source: Bureau of Census and
OECD Main Economic Indicators.
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Table 2.6: Missing Sectors in the Data
Missing Trade Exposure Ratios
SIC Codes Label
2024 ICE CREAM AND FROZEN DESSERTS
2075 SOYBEAN OIL MILLS
2079 SHORTENING AND COOKING OILS
2092 FRESH OR FROZEN PACKAGED FISH
2097 MANUFACTURED ICE
2141 TOBACCO STEMMING AND REDRYING
2259 KNITTING MILLS, NEC
2269 FINISHING PLANTS, NEC
2517 WOOD TV AND RADIO CABINETS
2732 BOOK PRINTING
2789 BOOKBINDING AND RELATED WORK
2791 TYPESETTING
3273 READY-MIXED CONCRETE
3398 METAL HEAT TREATING
3451 SCREW MACHINE PRODUCTS
3471 PLATING AND POLISHING
3479 METAL COATING AND ALLIED SERVICES
3498 FABRICATED PIPE AND FITTINGS
3731 SHIP BUILDING AND REPAIRING
3761 GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES
3953 MARKING DEVICES
3995 BURIAL CASKETS
Missing Job Creation Rates
SIC Codes Label
2076 VEGETABLE OIL MILLS, NEC
2271 WOVEN CARPETS AND RUGS
2351 MILLINERY
2823 CELLULOSIC MAN-MADE FIBERS
3263 FINE EARTHENWARE FOOD UTENSILS
3333 PRIMARY ZINC
Missing Job Destruction Rates
SIC Codes Label
3031 RECLAIMED RUBBER
96
Bibliography
[1] Abraham, K. and Katz, L.F. (1986)“Cyclical Unemployment: Sectoral Shifts
or Aggregate Disturbances?” Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 507-22.
[2] Acemoglu, D. (2001)“Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs,” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 19(1), 1-21.
[3] Alvarez, J. and Arellano, M. (2003),“The Time Series and Cross-Section
Asymptotics of Dynamic Panel Data Estimator,” Econometrica, 71(4), 1121-
59.
[4] Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991)“Some Tests of Specification for Panel
Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,”
Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277-297.
[5] Arellano, M. and Honor´e, B. (2001),“Panel Data Models: Some Recent
Developments,” in Heckman, J.J. and E. Leamer (Eds), Handbook of Econo-
metrics, vol. 5, chapter 53, North-Holland.
[6] Arellano, M. (2003) Panel Data Econometrics, Advanced Texts in Econo-
metrics, Oxford University Press, New York.
[7] Aw, B.Y., Chung, S. and Roberts, M.J. (2000),“Productivity and Turnover
in the Export Market: Micro-level Evidence from the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan (China),” World Bank Economic Review, 14, 65-90.
[8] Baldwin, R.E., Mutti, J.H. and Richardson, J.D. (1980)“Welfare Effects on
the United States of a Significant Multilateral Tariff Reduction,” Journal of
International Economics, 10(3), 405-423.
[9] Baldwin, R. (2005)“Heterogeneous Firms and Trade: Testable and
Untestable Properties of the Melitz Model,” NBER working paper 11471.
[10] Baldwin, R. and Robert-Nicoud, F. (2004)“The Impact of Trade on Intrain-
dustry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity: A Comment,”
NBER working paper 10718.
[11] Baldwin, R. and Robert-Nicoud, F. (2006)“Trade and Growth with Het-
erogeneous Firms,” NBER working paper 12326.
[12] Bartelsman, E.J. and Gray, W. (1996),“The NBER Manufacturing Produc-
tivity Database,” NBER technical working paper 205.
97
[13] Bernard, A.B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J.B. and Kortum, S. (2003)“Plants and
Productivity in International Trade,” American Economic Review, 93(4),
1268- 90.
[14] Bernard, A.B. and Jensen, J.B. (1995),“Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in US
Manufacturing: 1976-1987,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity. Microe-
conomics, 67-119.
[15] Bernard, A.B. and Jensen, J.B. (1999),“Exceptional Exporter Performance:
Cause, Effect, or Both?” Journal of International Economics, 47, 1-25.
[16] Bernard, A.B. and Jensen, J.B., Redding, S.J. and Schott, P.K. (2007)
‘Firms in International Trade,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, forthcom-
ing.
[17] Bertrand, M. and Kramarz, F. (2002)“Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job
Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117, 1369-1413.
[18] Blanchard, O.J. and Diamond, P. (1989)“The Beveridge Curve,” Brooking
Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-76.
[19] Blanchard, O.J. and Giavazzi, F. (2003)“Macroeconomic Effects of Regu-
lation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 118(3), 879-909.
[20] Caballero, R. and Hammour, M. (1996)“On the Ills of Adjustment,” Jour-
nal of Development Economics, 51, 161-92.
[21] Cahuc, P. and Wasmer, E. (2001)“Does Intrafirm Bargaining Matter in the
Large Firm’s Matching Model?” Macroeconomic Dynamics, 5, 742-47.
[22] Cahuc, P., Marque, F. and Wasmer, E. (2005)“A Theory of Wages and
Labor Demand with Intrafirm Bargaining and Matching Frictions,” Interna-
tional Economic Review, forthcoming.
[23] Chaney, T. (2007) “Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Mar-
gins of International Trade,” Unpublished.
[24] Clerides, S.K., Lach, S. and Tybout, J.R. (1998),“Is Learning by Exporting
Important? Micro-Dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico and Morocco,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 903-47.
[25] Cox, D. and Harris, R. (1985) “Trade Liberalization and Industrial Orga-
nization: Some Estimates for Canada,” Journal of Political Economy, 93(1),
115-45.
[26] Cun˜at, A. and Melitz, M.J. (2006)“Volatility, Labor Market Flexibility, and
the Pattern of Comparative Advantage,” Unpublished.
[27] Davidson, C., Martin, M. and Matusz, S.J. (1999)“Trade and Search Gen-
erated Unemployment,” Journal of International Economics, 48(2), 271-99.
[28] Davidson, C. and Matusz, S.J. (2004) International Trade and Labor Mar-
kets. Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications, W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research, Kalamazoo, Michigan.
98
[29] Davidson, C. and Matusz, S.J. (2006)“Long-Run Lunacy, Short-Run San-
ity: A Simple Model of Trade with Labor Market Turnover,” Review of In-
ternational Economics, 2(5), 261-76.
[30] Davis, S.J., Haltiwanger, J. and Schuh, S. (1996), Job Creation and De-
struction, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[31] Davis, S.J. and Haltiwanger, J. (1999a) “Gross job flows,” In: Ashenfelter,
O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labour Economics, 3B, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 2711-97.
[32] Davis, S.J. and Haltiwanger, J. (1999b)“On the Driving Forces Behind
Cyclical Movements in Employment and Job Reallocation,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 89(5), 1234-58.
[33] Davis, D. and Harrigan, J. (2007) “Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and Trade Lib-
eralization,” Unpublished.
[34] Dixit, A. and Stiglitz, J. (1977)“Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity,” American Economic Review, 67, 297-308.
[35] Eaton, J. and Kortum, S. (2002)“Technology, Geography and Trade,”
Econometrica, 70(5), 1741-79.
[36] Eaton, J., Kortum, S. and Kramarz, F. (2004)“Dissecting Trade: Firms,
Industries, and Export Destinations,” American Economic Review Papers
and Proceeding, 93, 150-4.
[37] Egger, H. and Kreickemeier, U. (2006) “Firm Heterogeneity and the Labour
Market Effects of Trade Liberalization,” Unpublished.
[38] Feenstra, R.C. (1996)“U.S. Imports, 1972-1994: Data and Concordances,”
NBER working paper 5515.
[39] Feenstra, R.C. (1997)“U.S. Exports, 1972-1994: With State Exports and
Other U.S. Data,” NBER working paper 5990.
[40] Feenstra, R.C. (2004) Advanced International Trade. Theory and Evidence,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
[41] Feenstra, R.C. (2006) “New Evidence on the Gains from Trade,” Review
of World Economics, 142 (4), 617-41.
[42] Gomez-Salvador, R. Messina, J. and Vallanti, G. (2004) “Gross Job Flows
and Institutions in Europe,” Labour Economics, 11, 469-485.
[43] Gourinchas, P.O. (1998)“Exchange Rates and Jobs: What Do We Learn
from Job Flows?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
[44] Gourinchas, P.O. (1999)“Exchange Rates Do Matter: French Job Realloca-
tion and Exchange Rate Turbulence, 1984-1992,” European Economic Review,
43, 1279- 1316.
[45] Helpman, E., Melitz, M.J. and Rubinstein, Y. (2007) “Estimating Trade
Flows: Trading Partners and Trading Volumes,” Unpublished.
99
[46] Head, K. and Ries, J. (1999)“Rationalization Effects of Tariff Reductions,”
Journal of International Economics, 47, 295-320.
[47] Head, K. and Ries, J. (2002)“Increasing Returns versus National Prod-
uct Differentiation as an explanation for the Pattern of US-Canada Trade,”
American Economic Review, 91, 858-76.
[48] Hopenhayn, H.A. (1992)“Entry, Exit and Firm Dynamics in Long Run
Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 60(5), 1127-50.
[49] Janiak, A. (2007) “Welfare in Models of Heterogeneous Firms,” Unpub-
lished.
[50] Klein, M.W., Schuh, S. and Triest, R.K. (2003)“Job Creation, Job Destruc-
tion, and the Real Exchange Rate,” Journal of International Economics, 59,
239-65.
[51] Kletzer, L.G. (2001) Job Loss from Imports: Measuring the Costs, Institute
for International Economics, The Globalization Balance Sheet Series.
[52] Kletzer, L.G. (2002) Imports, Exports, and Jobs: What Does Trade Mean
for Employment and Job Loss? W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Re-
search.
[53] Kommerskollegium (2006) Open for Business? A Comparative Analysis of
the Trade Policies of the European Union, the United States, Canada and
Japan, Stockholm: Swedish National Board of Trade.
[54] Krugman, P. (1979)“Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and
International Trade,” Journal of International Economics, 9, 469-79.
[55] Krugman, P. (1980)“Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the
Pattern of Trade,” American Economic Review, 70(5), 950-59.
[56] Lamo, A., Messina, J. and Wasmer, E. (2006)“Are Specific Skills an Ob-
stacle to Labour Market Adjustment? Theory and an Application to the EU
Enlargement,” Unpublished.
[57] Levinsohn, J. (1999)“Employment Responses to International Liberaliza-
tion in Chile,” Journal of International Economics, 47, 321-44.
[58] Magee, C.S.P., Davidson, C. and Matusz, S.J. (2005)“Trade, Turnover and
Tithing,” Journal of International Economics, 66, 157-76.
[59] Melitz, M.J. (2003)“The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations
and Aggregate Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 71(6), 1695-1725.
[60] Melitz, M.J. and Ottaviano, G.I.P. (2005)“Market Size, Trade and Produc-
tivity, Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
[61] Mortensen, D. and Pissarides, C.A. (1994)“Job Creation and Destruction in
the Theory of Unemployment,” Review of Economic Studies, 61(3), 397-416.
[62] Pavcnik, N. (2002),“Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improve-
ments: Evidence from Chilean Plants,” Review of Economic Studies, 69, 245-
76.
100
[63] Petrongolo, B. and Pissarides, C.A. (2001)“Looking into the Black Box:
A Survey of the Matching Function,” Journal of Economic Literature, 38,
390-431.
[64] Pissarides, C.A (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[65] Revenga, A. (1992)“Exporting Jobs? The Impact of Import Competition
on Employment and Wages in US Manufacturing,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 107(1), 255-84.
[66] Revenga, A. (1997)“Employment and Wages Effects of Trade Liberaliza-
tion: The Case of Mexican Manufacturing,” Journal of Labor Economics,
15(3), S20-43.
[67] Rivera-Batiz, L. and Romer, P. (1991)“Economic Integration and Economic
Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), 531-556.
[68] Roberts, M.J. and Tybout, J.R. (1997)“The Decision to Export in Colom-
bia: An Empirical Model of Entry with Sunk Costs,” American Economic
Review, 87(4), 545-64.
[69] Rogerson, R. (2007) “Structural Transformation and the Deterioration of
European Labor Market Outcomes,” NBER working paper 12889.
[70] Saint-Paul, G. (2005)“Making Sense of Bolkenstein-Bashing: Trade Liber-
alization under Segmented Labor Markets,” Unpublished.
[71] Sener, F. (2001)“Schumpeterian Unemployment, Trade and Wages,” Jour-
nal of International Economics, 54, 119-48.
[72] Trefler, D. (2004)“The Long and Short of the Canada-US Free Trade Agree-
ment,” American Economic Review, 94(4), 870-95.
[73] Tybout, J.R. (2002)“Plant and Firm-Level Evidence on New Trade The-
ories,” In Handbook of International Economics, J. Harrigan (ed.), Vol. 38,
Basil-Blackwell.
[74] Tybout, J.R., de Melo, J., and Corbo, V. (1991)“The Effects of Trade
Reform on Scale and Technical Efficiency: New Evidence from Chile,” Journal
of International Economics, 31, 231-50.
[75] Tybout, J.R. and Westbrook, D.M. (1995)“Trade Liberalization and Di-
mension of Efficiency Change in Mexican Manufacturing Industries,” Journal
of International Economics, 39, 53-78.
[76] Yeaple, S.R. (2005)“A Simple Model of Firm Heterogeneity, International
Trade, and Wages,” Journal of International Economics, 65, 1-20.
[77] Wacziarg, R. and Wallack, J.S. (2004)“Trade Liberalization and Intersec-
toral Labor Movements,” Journal of International Economics, 64, 411-39.
101
102
Chapter 3
Welfare in models of trade
with heterogeneous firms
Abstract. I illustrate that the welfare improvement property of the Melitz
model is due to the shape of the aggregate labor demand curve, which slopes
upwards. By slightly changing some assumptions in the model, this curve may
have a negative slope. In this case, increases in aggregate productivity result
in a reduction in welfare. For example, this may occur when fixed costs are
normalized by the price of aggregate output instead of the wage.
3.1 Introduction
The Melitz (2003) model has been extensively used in international eco-
nomics. It is now the cornerstone of the field and has also attracted the attention
of some labor economists. On top of adding a new dimension to economic mod-
eling - heterogeneity in productivity, the interesting aspect of the Melitz model
is that it does it in a very simple manner. The model is a simple extension
of Krugman (1980), where production is characterized by scale economies and
heterogeneity arises because a firm’s productivity is a drawn from an exogenous
distribution function. While many models in macroeconomics and consumption
theory require the use of computers to solve for equilibrium, this model provides
a close-form solution, which makes the debate in economics easier. In partic-
ular, it has become costless to study the impact on aggregate productivity of
competition policies such as deregulation or trade barriers.
This paper is a comment on the welfare implications of the model. The main
channel through which trade liberalization improves aggregate welfare is labor
reallocation. As only the most productive firms export, the removal of trade
barriers increases the size of exporters and makes the less productive firms to
shrink or even die. The reallocation process consequently has a positive effect on
aggregate productivity and, naturally, on welfare. After liberalization, workers
can enjoy higher wages and lower prices because a larger share of production is
concentrated in more productive firms.
The point I want to address is that the welfare improvements of the model
are actually due to the particular shape of the aggregate labor demand curve. In
the model, this curve is increasing in the space employment-wage. This implies
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that any movement of the curve from the right to the left leads to an increase
in wages and, if labor supply is elastic, in employment as well.
A reason why the aggregate labor demand curve1 is increasing is because of
the nature of the fixed cost firms have to pay while producing. In the Melitz
model, this cost represents a minimum mass of labor, which is required for
production to take place. I will illustrate below the case of an economy which
merely differs from the Melitz’s in the nature of the fixed cost. In this economy,
the cost does not represent labor, but output and I will show that by changing
this characteristic the aggregate labor demand curve may actually be decreasing.
This implies that any movement of the curve from the right to the left does not
lead to an increase in wages anymore. The wage decreases and, if labor supply
is elastic, employment as well. More importantly, this generates a reduction in
aggregate output and welfare.
This assumption can be thought in the literature as a simplifying one2, I
will show it can be more than that.
3.2 One model, two different assumptions
I consider the closed-economy version of Melitz (2003). The exposition of
the model will nevertheless be different in that, instead of considering the wage
as the reference price, I will normalize another price so as to highlight the
mechanism taking place in the labor market. The reason why I will only focus
on the closed-economy framework is because trade liberalization in the Melitz
model takes the form of an increase in aggregate productivity. Consequently,
any shock increasing productivity in the closed economy will have similar effects.
Time is continuous. Welfare is derived from the consumption of an aggregate
good, which is produced in quantities Q from a set of inputs Z according to the
production function
Q =
[
Mη
∫
z∈Z
q(z)ρdz
] 1
ρ
, (3.1)
where z is a given variety of inputs consumed in quantities q(z) and M is the
mass of varieties. ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that is related to the elasticity of
substitution σ = 11−ρ between inputs and η > −1 influences the love for variety
in the model, which is increasing in η. For example, when η = 0, equation (3.1)
reduces to the standard utility function with love for variety as in Melitz (2003)
or Krugman (1980). When η = ρ − 1, the function is rescaled as in Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) so as to neutralize any love for variety. In the extreme case
where η = −1, only average consumption of varieties matter for the value of Q
and a larger mass of varieties do not have any impact on Q. The price of the
aggregate good is normalized to one.
Under specification (3.1), the demand of input z writes as q(z) = QMησp(z)−σ.
1Here the term ’aggregate’ is important. Labor demand at the firm level is a decreasing
function of the wage, but once we take into account the process of firm entry, the resulting
aggregate labor demand curve is upward sloping.
2Some models of trade and unemployment have relied on such an assumption. See for
instance Egger and Kreickemeier (2006) and Janiak (2007). Felbermayr and Prat (2007)
also make this assumption, but as they rely on preferences that neutralize any external scale
economies, their result on welfare is in line with Melitz (2003).
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Inputs are produced by firms which use labor as a factor of production and
compete under a monopolistic framework. Labor is supplied inelastically in
quantity L. Firms differ in productivity. When productivity is equal to φ,
then a variety is produced in quantities q(φ) = φn(φ) and profits are equal to
pi(φ) = r(φ)−wn(φ)−C, where r(φ) = p(φ)q(φ) is revenue, p(φ) the fixed price,
w the wage, n(φ) firm-level (production) employment and C is a fixed cost paid
by the firm.
I will compare two economies, which are called A and B and only differ in
the nature of the fixed cost C paid by a firm when producing. The economy A is
similar to Melitz’s: in this economy, the fixed cost takes the form of a minimum
mass of labor which is required for production to take place. Hence, in the
economy A, C = cw, where c > 0 is the labor requirement. In the economy
B, the fixed cost represents a certain amount of the aggregate good. In this
economy, C = c.
In order to enter the industry of inputs, a firm has to pay a sunk cost
Ce. Like for the fixed cost C, this sunk cost takes the form of labor in the
economy A and aggregate output in B. In the former Ce = cew and in the
latter Ce = ce. Once the sunk cost is paid, productivity is revealed. It is a
draw from a cumulative distribution function F , with f the associated density.
I denote by φ∗ the productivity threshold such that if a firm draws a productivity
parameter higher than φ∗ profits are positive and the firm chooses to stay in
the industry. If the productivity draw is lower, then the firm decides not to
enter. I denote by Me the mass of firms paying the sunk cost, which writes as
Me = δ1−F (φ∗)M in steady state.
Finally, while producing, a given firm can be hit by a negative productivity
shock with probability δ and is forced out of the industry.
3.3 Equilibrium
Under the above framework, the first-order conditions of a firm with produc-
tivity φ imply the following firm-level labor demand (excluding the fixed cost)
and markup:
ρφρMηQ1−ρn(φ)ρ−1 = w and p(φ) =
w
ρφ
,
which allows to link the relevant firm-level variables for two firms with produc-
tivity φ1 and φ2:
p(φ1)
p(φ2)
=
φ2
φ1
; n(φ1)n(φ2) =
(
φ1
φ2
)σ−1
;
r(φ1)
r(φ2)
=
(
φ1
φ2
)σ−1
. (3.2)
In steady state, expected profits before entry have to be equal to the sunk entry
cost and profits for a firm with productivity φ∗ are zero. As in the Melitz model,
these conditions respectively lead to the two relations
pie =
δCe
1− F (φ∗) (3.3)
and
pie = C
{(
φe(φ∗)
φ∗
)σ−1
− 1
}
, (3.4)
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where φe =
(∫∞
φ∗ φ
σ−1 f(φ)
1−F (φ∗)dφ
) 1
σ−1
is average productivity, which is increas-
ing in φ∗.
In the case of the economy B, (3.3) and (3.4) give the equilibrium value of
expected profits pie = pi(φe) and the productivity threshold φ∗. In the case of
the economy A, the costs C and Ce are endogenous, then (3.3) and (3.4) give
the ratio of profits to wage pi
e
w and the threshold φ
∗. In both economies, higher
c (or lower ce) is associated with higher φ∗.
The aggregate labor demand is
N =Mn(φe) +Mc+Mece (3.5)
in the economy A and
N =Mn(φe) (3.6)
in the economy B. Equations (3.5) and (3.6) tell us that in the economy A labor
is allocated to several tasks, which are production, minimum employment re-
quirement and investment in new varieties, while in the economy B employment
is only allocated to production.
Of course, the nature of the cost also influences the value of welfare in the
model. In the economy A, since the costs represent labor, an increase in the
values of these (for a fixed output Q) does not reduce welfare. The reason is
because the increase is simply translated into more wages in the economy, while,
in the case of the economy B, it means more waste. But, interestingly, once one
solves for the equilibrium value of Q, the two expressions are not very different:
W = Q =
w
ρ
(L− cM − ceMe) (3.7)
in the economy A and
W = Q− cM − ceMe = w
ρ
L− cM − ceMe (3.8)
in the economy B.
3.4 Love for variety
In this Section, I consider the case where η = 0, i.e. the economy displays a
love for variety as in Melitz (2003). In this case, the equilibrium mass of firms
is
M = p(φe)σ−1 (3.9)
in the two economies. Equation (3.9) states that the lower the price fixed
by firms is on average, the smaller the mass of varieties is. The absence of
competition effect is due the particular form of the function (3.1), which implies
that markups are independent of the mass of firms in the economy. Together
with (3.2)-(3.6), (3.9) allows to derive the aggregate labor demand functions in
terms of φ∗ and w, which is
N =
(
w
ρ
)σ−1 [
c
φ∗σ−1
(σ − 1) + c
φeσ−1
+
δ
1− F (φ∗)
ce
φeσ−1
]
(3.10)
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in the economy A and
N =
(
w
ρ
)σ−2
c
φ∗σ−1
σ (3.11)
in the economy B. If the elasticity of substitution is lower than 2, then the ag-
Figure 3.1: Labor market impact of an increase in φ∗ in the two economies
w w
S S
D’
D
D
N N
D’
Economy A Economy B
Notes: in the two graphs, S is the labor supply curve, D and D’ are the initial and final labor demand curves
respectively, w is the wage and N is employment.
gregate labor demand curve is increasing in w in the economy A and decreasing
in the economy B3. This implies that any movement of the curve from the right
to the left leads to a different impact on wages. For instance, a shock increasing
the productivity threshold φ∗ (e.g. a decrease in ce) has a positive impact on
wages in the economy A and a negative one in B4. This difference is illustrated
in Figure 5.3.3.
More importantly, implications in terms of welfare are different as equa-
tions (3.7) and (3.8) suggest. In the economy A, the increase in φ∗ is welfare
improving, while the shock leads to a decrease in welfare in the economy B.
3.5 Rescaling preferences
With the standard love-for-variety specification of (3.1), the aggregate labor
demand curve is always increasing in the economy A, while in the economy B,
the elasticity of substitution has to be large for the curve to have this shape.
In this Section, I want to stress that another parameter influences the form of
3In the next Section, I show one can increase the threshold on the elasticity of substitution
by playing with the value of η.
4If labor supply is elastic, an increase in φ∗ raises equilibrium employment in the economy
A and diminishes it in the economy B. See Janiak (2007).
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the curve, which is the love for variety. I now consider that η can take any
value higher than ρ − 1. Remember that the larger η is, the stronger is the
love for variety in the economy. It results that a large value of η leads to a
downward-sloping aggregate labor demand curve in the economy B.
Under this generalization, equation (3.9) takes the form
M = p(φe)
σ−1
1+ησ . (3.12)
Aggregate labor demand is then
N =
(
w
ρ
) σ−1
1+ησ
[
φe
ση
1+σησρ
φ∗σ−1
c(σ − 1) + c
φe
σ−1
1+ησ
+
δ
1− F (φ∗)
ce
φe
σ−1
1+ησ
]
(3.13)
in the economy A and
N =
(
w
ρ
) (1−η)σ−2
1+ησ φe
ησ
1+ησσρ
φ∗σ−1
cσ (3.14)
in the economy B.
When η > 2ρ − 1, the aggregate labor demand curve in the economy B is
decreasing. It is always increasing the economy A. In this range of parameter
values, a shock increasing the productivity threshold φ∗ leads to lower wages
and welfare in the economy B and welfare improvement in the economy A.
3.6 Decreasing external returns to scale
Suppose now the parameter η takes value between −1 and ρ − 1. The
technology associated with the aggregate good then displays decreasing returns
to scale in the number of varieties. In this case, the aggregate labor demand
curves still write as in (3.13) and (3.14). However, the difference is that, for these
values of η, the curve is now downward sloping in the economy A and upward
sloping in the economy B, leading to opposite effects of productivity-enhancing
shocks.
3.7 Generalization
I consider now the generalized case of an economy where a share α of the fixed
costs represents labor and a share (1− α) is a certain amount of the aggregate
good. In this economy, C = αc + (1 − α)cw and Ce = αce + (1 − α)cew. If
α = 1, then the economy is identical to the economy A previously described and
if α = 0 it is the same as the economy B. It can be shown that the aggregate
labor demand curve is then
N = αNA(w) + (1− α)NB(w),
where NA(w) and NB(w) are the labor demands described in equations (3.13)
and (3.14).
Thus, aggregate demand is simply a linear combination of the aggregate
demands in the two economies A and B. If the curve had a positive slope in
A and a negative one in B, then the generalized economy may be characterized
by multiple equilibria as depicted in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Labor market equilibria in the generalized economy
S
w D
N
Notes: S is the labor supply curve, D is the labor demand curve, w is the wage and N is employment.
3.8 The aggregate labor demand curve in the
empirical literature
The literature on empirical labor economics usually does not really aim to
study the aggregate shape of the labor demand curve as a primary topic. Most of
the studies adopt a micro perspective and are rather interested in the individual
firm behavior. However, before working with firm-level data, those studies were
relying on aggregate or industry-level datasets. Hamermesh (1996) provides an
excellent review of this literature. See for instance the papers by Berndt and
Khaled (1979), Berndt and Wood (1975), Chung (1987), Diewert and Wales
(1987), Griffin and Gregory (1976), Magnus (1979), McElroy (1987), Morrison
(1986, 1988), Pindyck (1979), Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) and Segerson
and Mount (1985), among others. All those studies rely on aggregate data or
data at the large-industry level. They also take into account simultaneity issues
between supply and demand in the estimation procedure. They may so provide
a description of the aggregate labor demand curve. All of them actually report
negative wage elasticity of the demand for labor, suggesting that this curve
slopes downward.
Moreover, other papers have tried to study the behavior of firm entry and
exit following wage shocks. These analysis have unfortunately not been included
into the whole estimation of an aggregate labor demand curve. Anyway they
produce results which are in line with a downward-sloping labor demand curve.
109
Some estimate the probability of plant closing in terms of the wage level; see
for instance Hamermesh (1988, 1996), Dunne and Roberts (1990) and Carneiro
and Portugal (2003). They predict that increase an in wages leads to greater
plant closing. Others have analyzed the role of wages in plant openings and
show that high wages tend to deter entry; see Hamermesh (1996) for a review.
3.9 Conclusion
Is labor demand an upward- or a downward-sloping curve ? Most labor
economists would argue that demand of labor decreases when the wage is higher.
But, when an economy is characterized by increasing returns to scale, one may
think of the opposite. Only empirical studies can answer this question.
As this comment has illustrated, the slope of the aggregate labor demand
curve has important implications in the Melitz model. When demand is increas-
ing in the wage, an increase in the productivity threshold has a positive effect on
welfare, while the impact is negative when demand is a downward-sloping curve.
The shape of the curve depends on several assumptions such as the nature of
the fixed cost, the elasticity of substitution and the taste for variety.
For instance, with the standard CES utility function, when the fixed cost
represents a minimum mass of labor which is required for production to start,
aggregate labor demand is an upward-sloping curve. In this case, productivity-
enhancing shocks are welfare improving. On the other hand, if one considers
a different normalization scheme for fixed costs, the results may be reverted;
aggregate labor demand is a downward-sloping curve and increases in the pro-
ductivity threshold have negative welfare consequences. This is the case when
the fixed cost represents a certain amount of output instead of labor.
Several conclusions can be drawn from my comment. If we believe that re-
allocations are welfare improving and the aggregate labor demand curve slopes
upward, a first interpretation of my results is that the Melitz model fails at
reproducing an aggregate labor demand curve which fits empirical studies. In
this case, the Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) model may be the right answer to
this criticism. This model is an extension of Melitz (2003) which introduces
competition effects that may revert the shape of the labor demand curve and
provides welfare-improving properties of reallocation shocks. A second possible
conclusion is the following. We believe in the Melitz model and, given the partic-
ular shape of the aggregate labor demand curve illustrated by empirical studies,
we think that policy makers should pay attention to the competitive structure
specific to each industry before liberalization5. Finally, empirical studies of ag-
gregate labor demand may needs improvement. They do not account for the
process of firm entry and exit in their analysis, which may bias the estimates. I
think all three interpretations may be correct and only future research will be
able to provide the right answer to these questions.
5See Janiak (2007) for an application of this argument to employment issues.
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Chapter 4
Local social capital,
geographical mobility and
unemployment in Europe
Abstract1. European labor markets are characterized by the low geographical
mobility of workers. The absence of mobility is a factor behind high unemploy-
ment when jobless people prefer to remain in their home region rather than to
go prospecting in more dynamic areas. In this paper, we attempt to understand
the determinants of mobility by introducing the concept of local social capital.
Investing in local ties is rational when workers anticipate that they will not
move to another region. Reciprocally, once local social capital is accumulated,
incentives to move are reduced. Our model illustrates several types of comple-
mentarity leading to multiple equilibria (a world of local social capital and low
mobility vs. a world of low social capital and high propensity to move). It also
shows that local social capital is systematically negative for mobility, and can
be negative for employment, but some other types of social capital can actually
raise employment.
An empirical illustration based on various measures indicates that social
capital is a dominant factor of immobility. It is also a fairly large factor of
unemployment when social capital is clearly local, while other types of social
capital are found to have a positive effect on employability. We also find evi-
dence of the reciprocal causality, that is, individuals born in another region have
accumulated less local social capital. This gives some credibility to a theory of
multiple equilibria. Finally, observing that individuals in the South of Europe
appear to accumulate more local social capital, while in Northern Europe they
tend to invest in more general types of social capital, we argue that part of the
European unemployment puzzle can be better understood thanks to the concept
of local social capital.
1This chapter is a joint work with Quentin David and Etienne Wasmer.
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4.1 Introduction
Geographical mobility is one of the signs of a well-performing economy: it
reveals the ability to cope with change and to reallocate factors of production
where they are more efficient. Precisely along this dimension, it appears that
mobility rates are extremely low in Continental Europe as compared to the UK
or the US. This has sometimes been suggested as a first-order explanation of
high European unemployment. For instance, the influential work by Bertola
and Ichino (1996) was among the very first to document the inability of Eu-
ropean workers to move to more dynamic regions. This arises because, as the
authors argued, wage and income compression lower the returns from mobility.
Table 1 displays coherent intra-European data on mobility: the fraction of in-
dividuals having moved from one area to another within the last three years is
typically three times lower in Continental Europe—about 2.5% a year—than it
is in the UK, where this rate reaches 7.2%. Mobility for job-related reasons is
also roughly 2.5 less frequent in Continental Europe than in the UK. EU-US
comparisons reveal the same pattern. Wasmer et al. (2005, Table 4.1) report,
for instance, that in the US, about 30% of individuals were born in a different
state. In Europe, this number is typically around 20% for countries where re-
gions have similar size as US states: e.g. it is 19.2% in Belgium, 12.7 in Portugal,
16.8 in Austria, it is slightly higher in Spain (23.5%) but with smaller regions.
On average in these 4 countries, the rate is 18.1%2.
To understand the determinants and implications of low mobility, we do not
focus on the returns of mobility, as in Bertola and Ichino (1996), even though this
dimension will be present, but, in a dual perspective, on the costs of mobility.
In many theoretical analyses including large portions of urban and regional
economics, however, mobility costs are often taken to be exogenous. Here, we
attempt to give more substance to such geographical mobility costs. For that,
we will develop a concept of local social capital which affects the cost of moving.
Local social capital will characterize the ties of agents to their region/area of
origin and is partly or fully depreciated upon mobility, leading to a decline in
the welfare of movers.
We base our analysis on recent work on social capital, surveyed in the next
section, and notably a recent paper by Glaeser et al. (2002), who introduce
an explicit theory of endogenous social capital characterized, in their work, as
association membership. They notably argue that “social capital declines with
expected mobility” and confirm the prediction with an expected probability score
based on demographics. As a matter of fact, the relation between local social
capital and mobility has two causalities. On the one hand, the anticipation of
mobility affects social capital investments, as in Glaeser et al. (2002). If agents
perceive themselves as being strongly attached to a village, a township or a
region, they will invest in local social capital, because the returns of those local
ties are high. On the other hand, highly local social capital raises the cost of
mobility and in turn reduces mobility. Finally, if individuals expect their friends
to remain in the neighborhood as well, the returns to creating social ties are
larger. This social externality creates multiple equilibria and thus potentially
reinforces the low mobility of some regions or demographic groups.
2Here we reported only countries with large regions, thus excluding notably the UK, which
has 46 regions, as opposed for instance to Belgium which has three 3 regions.
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As a result of these two self-reinforcing causalities and this externality, it is
plausible that, within the European countries and regions of low mobility, local
social capital is a binding factor. This is at least a quite attractive possibility
which we will formally explore in this work. Most of our work is tentative
rather than definitive, but all evidence presented here suggests that we need
to increase our knowledge of the interaction between mobility, social capital
and unemployment, which, to our knowledge, we are the first to relate within
a European perspective. It is worth noting, however, that social capital is not
exclusively local, and can instead be built in order to promote mobility. A
very good example is the development of Rotary Clubs in the beginning of the
20th century in the US, which was orginally designed to reproduce the social
environment of professionals having moved from one place to the other, as a
substitute to local social capital precisely. On the web page of the Rotary Club,
it is stated that “The world’s first service club, the Rotary Club of Chicago,
Illinois, USA, was formed on 23 February 1905 by Paul P. Harris, an attorney
who wished to recapture in a professional club the same friendly spirit he had
felt in the small towns of his youth. The name ”Rotary” derived from the early
practice of rotating meetings among members’ offices.”3 We will come back to
this example in the concluding Section.
In Section 4.2, we will first review the ample literature on social capital
and emphasize its implicit or explicit geographical dimensions, notably what we
call localness. It is interesting to note that most works surveyed emphasize the
positive role of social capital on labor market performance, while we tend to
emphasize some negative channels. A counterexample is Bentolila et al. (2004),
who focus more specifically on European countries, and emphasize the potential
negative links between social capital and labor markets - in particular, the
fact that jobs obtained through social networks tend to have a wage discount,
distorting choices towards inefficiency.
In Section 4.3, we explore the links between mobility and social capital in
Europe. First, we attempt to measure social capital relevant to the European
context: for instance, local social capital can be approximated by measures such
as the intensity of relations with friends and neighborhood connections, while
being a member of clubs, associations, etc. is a more global type of social capi-
tal. We next carry out various empirical exercises to underline the mechanisms
at work. The first causality, from social capital to mobility, is tested using
panel data analysis from the European Community Household Panel. Treating
first social capital as given or predetermined and mobility being measured as
year-to-year change of “area of residence”, we indeed find, as expected, that our
measures of local social capital lead to a strong reduction of residential mobility.
We used various instruments for social capital, such as regional social capital,
individual lags, family composition, regional turnout in elections and regional
population density. With IV techniques, the results remain valid though some-
what less significant. Coefficients may sometimes be larger in absolute value
with IVs. The second causality, from mobility to social capital accumulation,
is also verified in the data: individuals living in a region different from their re-
gion of birth indeed have accumulated less social capital. We finally explore the
role of local social capital on unemployment: here, interestingly, social capital
of various sorts have opposite effects on unemployment: neighborhood variables
3We thank Robert Putnam for this wonderful example.
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usually raise unemployment, while club membership and friends reduce it. We
finally attempt to correlate social capital with traditional labor market vari-
ables such as reservation wages - as defined by individuals and the duration of
unemployment before re-employment.
To rationalize these findings, we develop a theory embedding the mechanisms
found in the data. We will characterize how various types of social capital have
different impacts on mobility and unemployment rates. In Section 4.4, we
define social capital and notably assume it has two dimensions: a local one,
i.e. a fraction is depreciated when an agent moves to another region, and a
professional one, i.e. a fraction is depreciated when the agent is unemployed.
Both depreciation rates matter in the mobility/job acceptance decisions. We
first illustrate one side of the bilateral causality: local social capital reduces
geographical mobility within a simple, tractable model of wage offers. We also
find that social capital raises unemployment if the local dimension of social
capital dominates over its professional dimensions, that is, if depreciation of
social capital is greater after a geographical move than after job loss. The fact
that the relative depreciation rates matters for the sign of the impact of social
capital on unemployment justifies why we consider the two dimensions of social
capital, since it helps to rationalize the empirical results.
Then, in Section 4.5, we explore the determinants of social capital. We find
the existence of two local maxima in the net returns of local social capital, im-
plying that observationally close individuals may behave very differently: some
will not invest much in local social capital and will thus be more mobile and
better employed, while others will invest more in local social capital and prefer
to remain at the margin more locally unemployed. This is a first complementar-
ity between immobility and social capital. We then allow agents to choose the
type of social capital (local or professional) under constraint and find another
complementarity: when the ex-ante probability of being unemployed is larger
than the ex-ante probability of moving to another region, agents invest more in
local social capital.
In Section 4.6, we introduce various extensions, The first one is a social
externality, related to the discussion above: the more likely the friends of an
individual are to remain in a geographical area, the higher the returns to in-
vesting in social skills. This leads to multiple equilibria and thus a third type
of complementarity: a low mobility/high local social capital coexists with a
high mobility/low social capital. A second extension, employment protection,
is also shown to induce local social investments. Finally, in Section 4.7, we
explore how social capital could help understand intra-European differences in
unemployment at the country level.
Our work is considered tentative: it points out to the fact that unemployment
and low mobility are linked in Europe. In addition, it shows that if low mobility
is partly due to economic factors, it is also in a large part due to social factors,
that is, factors over which policy makers have little control. In that sense, calls
for reforms of the European labor markets must account for the complexity of
the organization of societies.
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4.2 Social capital: a selective survey
Surveying the concept of social capital is beyond the scope of this work:
definitions of social capital are numerous. The aim of this section is instead
to briefly review the existing literature on social capital under the concept of
“localness” and argue that the geographical dimension of social capital is often
implicit. This will serve as a basis for the main assumption made in this paper.
In the second part of the section, we also survey the use of social capital (local
or not) in the labor literature.
4.2.1 Localness of social capital
In their review of the literature on social capital, Durlauf and Fafchamps
(2004) point to its origin with the seminal works of Loury (1977) and later Cole-
man (1988). They mainly distinguish two different definitions of social capital.
First, there are the “outcome-oriented” definitions (see Coleman (1990), Put-
nam et al.(1993), Fukuyama (1995)). These definitions insist on the importance
of group externalities caused by the existence of social capital. They are more
concerned with the consequences of the existence of social capital than with its
nature. Second, there are definitions focussing on the nature of the relations
and the interdependence of individuals embodied in social capital (see Putnam
(2000), Bowles and Gintis (2002) and Lin (2001)). Among different authors,
Durlauf and Fafchamps identify “three main underlying ideas: (1) social capital
generates positive externalities for members of a group; (2) these externalities
are achieved through shared trust, norms and values and their consequent effects
on expectations and behavior; (3) shared trust, norms, and values arise from in-
formal forms of organizations based on social networks and associations”4. They
also consider that the notion is now used in a wide variety of social sciences and
believe that “The success of social capital as a federating concept may result
from the fact that no social science has managed to impose a definition of the
term that captures what different researchers mean by it within a discipline, let
alone across fields.”5
In what follows, we do not necessarily want to follow the distinction “function
vs. nature”, as the localness of social capital is clearly one aspect of its nature,
but at the same time the consequences of social capital notably in terms of
externality and spillover are often local too.
In the “nature category of works”, and even before the term “social capital”
was introduced, one can find studies on related issues. For instance, Jacobs’
(1961) work on large U.S. cities underlined how implicit rules matter in neigh-
borhoods. The knowledge of those implicit rules allows for building trust. She
notably showed that social ties are stronger in older neighborhoods. This work
is one of the earliest in which the geographical dimension of social capital is un-
derlined: social ties as defined here cannot be moved from one place to another.
Coleman (1990) identifies different forms of social capital: 1) obligations and
expectations that depend on the trustworthiness of the social environment; 2)
capability of information; and 3) norms accompanied by effective actions. Some
have a local dimension, others do not (think, for instance, of norms that inhibit
crime in a particular neighborhood or norms in a community that support and
4Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) p. 5
5Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) p. 3.
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provide rewards for high achievement in school, etc.). On the destruction side,
Coleman (1990, p. 321) states that “Like human capital and physical capital,
social capital depreciates if it is not renewed. Social relationships die out if not
maintained; expectations and obligations wither over time; and norms depend
on regular communication”, suggesting that being further away (geographically)
may destroy social capital, as it is harder to renew.6
Our model will be in part inspired by the “economic approach” to social
capital of Glaeser et al. (2002). They propose a theoretical framework in which
they treat social capital as an individual rather than a community characteristic.
The utility flows are determined by the individual amount of social capital
and the aggregate level. Their main findings related to our concerns are the
following: 1) Investment in social capital, like other investments, changes over
the life cycle. It tends first to increase and then to decrease with age. 2) In order
to test the effect of social capital on mobility, they build an expected mobility
measure and find a strong negative correlation between social capital and this
measure. Furthermore, they “expect that other measures of social capital might
have an even stronger relationship to mobility since some of the organizations
in [their] membership variable may have little to do with geographic location
(e.g., professional or academic societies)”7. 3) Home-ownership increases the
investment in social capital. In particular, they predict more investment in local
social capital.
On the contrary, Winters et al. (2001), analyzing the effect of networks in
the choice of migration from Mexico to the United States, find that “Results
strongly support the positive influence of migrant network on both the decision
to migrate and the number of migrants to send (...) the role of networks in
migration also affects where migrants choose to go. Migrants from a particular
network have a very high likelihood of choosing to migrate to a region where
the bulk of their network is located.”8. This suggests that some types of social
capital could constitute an incentive to migrate.
Kumar and Matsusoka (2004) consider that the observed differences in per-
formance between countries initially in the same situation may be explained
by their differences in social capital endowment. In particular, they use two
different types of social capital: village capital and market capital. The former
“consists of social networks, especially kinship, patron-client relations, and in-
formal agreements within small groups of people that are enforced by reciprocity
and social sanctions”9. They provide several examples to explain why localized
economies accumulate this kind of social capital and why it improves efficiency.
“Market capital consists of knowledge that facilitates transactions between po-
tential strangers and parties who are unlikely to transact again in the future”.
Village capital is best when economic activity is primarily local and market
capital is essential for transactions between strangers and for the development
of the economy.
Lin (2001) considers that individuals invest in social capital for utilitarian
concerns. He identifies four reasons why social capital works. First, it eases the
6Other aspects of Colemnan’s work concern welfare effects, which are actually implicitely
present in our analysis. For instance, he is one of the first authors to suggest that social
capital may have adverse effects on society as a whole.
7Glaeser et al. (2002), p. F450.
8Winters et al. (2001), pp. 181-182.
9Kumar and Matsusoka, p.9.
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circulation of information and decreases transaction costs. Second, social ties
may influence the decisions of agents. Third, the social capital of an agent may
convince an organization of the agent’s ability to provide added value to the
organization through his social ties. Finally, social relations are expected to re-
inforce the identity and recognition of individuals. The profit obtained through
social capital can be analyzed from two different points of view, depending on
the level at which return or profit is conceived: the use by individuals and re-
turns for the community. Lin sees the latter idea as a kind of group-externality
due to individual investment in social ties.
4.2.2 Social capital in labor markets
In the labor market, social capital is usually considered to improve economic
performance. The main channel in the literature is that social capital conveys
information and leads to an improvement of the quality of the match between
employers and employees, leading authors to find a positive effect on productiv-
ity and wages. For instance, Granovetter (1995) studies how workers find their
jobs. In his study, social capital improves overall welfare through the creation
of an efficient network made of social ties that allows for better expectations.
The idea that social capital improves individuals’ perspectives on the labor
market has been investigated more recently. See, for instance, Calvo´-Armengol
(2004) and Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2006). In these works, there is a
distinction between weak and strong ties, following Granovetter’s view. Calvo´-
Armengol et Jackson (2004) propose a theoretical framework where they assume
that the probability of finding a new job (for an unemployed agent) or to find a
better job (for already employed agents) depends on the social network of the
agent. This model explains both the lower rate of employment and the lower
wages of individuals endowed with a weaker social network. In Calvo´-Armengol
(2004), network structures are endogenously created by workers’ strategic ac-
tions. He shows that networks with different structures may induce different
aggregate unemployment levels.
Montgomery (1991) studies the importance of the referrals to outcomes on
the labor market. He assumes that there are both low- and high-ability workers
and that ability is not observable by firms before the match. Ties are more
likely to link different types of workers among themselves (high- with high-
ability workers and “low with low”). Before accepting a job, a worker compares
his job offers and accepts the highest-paying job. This model highlights the
importance of referrals and helps to explain why well-connected workers get
higher wages and why firms hiring workers through referrals might earn higher
profits.
In their survey analyzing the network effects on labor-market outcomes and
inequality, Ioannides and Loury (2004) emphasize seven stylized facts based
on both, the recent sociological and economic literature. First, there is a
widespread use of friends, relatives and acquaintances during job searches. Sec-
ond, this use varies by location and demographic characteristics. Third, it is
generally productive to use one’s network to get a job. The fourth and fifth
stylized facts concern the productivity of the job search, which happens to de-
pend on demographic characteristics. The sixth fact relates to the increasing
use of the Internet. Finally, they observe differences across countries in the use
of personal contacts by firms and workers.
119
Most of these works emphasize the positive links between social capital and
economic performance, while our work emphasizes potentially negative chan-
nels. In that, we follow Bentolila et al. (2004), who investigate the possible
detrimental effects social capital may have on labor-market outcomes. Using
ECHP data, as in our paper, they focus on the impact of social capital on oc-
cupational choices. They argue (page 2) that “on average, jobs found through
social contacts are obtained more quickly but also pay lower wages, since at least
some of them are filled by workers who sacrificed their productive advantage in
order to get a job more easily”. They find a wage discount of 3% to 5 % in
Europe and the US for jobs obtained through social contacts.
Finally, Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004a and b), Belot and Ermisch (2006)
and Kan (2007) share similar ideas to ours. Belot and Ermisch show from the
British Household Panel Study that geographical proximity of friends matters
for mobility decisions. Compared to our data, their dataset has the interesting
characteristic that it allows to explore two dimensions of the strength of social
ties: location of the closest friends and frequency of contacts. Their results
emphasize the importance of the first factor. While we are also interested in
the link between local ties and mobility decisions, both our theoretical model
and empirical findings highlight several complementarities between the two with
common consequences for unemployment and contribute to the debate in Eu-
rope.
In a somewhat different context, Spilimbergo and Ubeda argue that US
Blacks workers are less mobile than Whites because of family ties (2004b) and
successfully test this using the PSID survey. Kan (2007) also assesses the impact
of local social capital on residential mobility. He also explores the role of friends
and relatives usinf the PSID data. In Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004a), they
model how the double matching in the labor market and social environment
can explain migration patterns. An implication is the existence of multiple
equilibria.
4.2.3 Our concept of social capital
At this stage of the paper, there are many definitions of social capital, and we
need to define it more precisely to serve our purpose: to link it with geographical
mobility and employment decisions. The key concept here is the localness of
social capital. For that, let us think of an individual living in a region, say A.
Assume she is endowed with S units of social capital. Once she leaves region
A, her social capital is depreciated: she only retains a fraction of it. Let us
denote by δλ the depreciation rate, which describes the degree of localness of
social capital. We may think for instance that by leaving the native region, she
looses δλ of her friends, or meets her relative less frequently.
As argued in introduction, social capital is also to some extent professional,
which is a second dimension of social capital useful to consider. Indeed, this
dimension must have a first-order impact on job acceptance decisions, in the
sense that, upon loosing one’s job, one may loose a few social connections too.
Let us denote by 1−δpi the fraction retained by an individual after job loss, and
thus δpi is the associated depreciation rate.
The set of parameters (δλ, δpi) allows us to describe various types of social
capital, as follows:
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• δλ = 1 and δpi = 1 would correspond to being a member of a local and
professional association (e.g. the association of textile engineers of the
North of France)
• δλ = 1 and δpi = 0 would correspond to being a member of a local sport
club (e.g. Roubaix football club) or having friends in one’s neighborhood.
• δλ = 0 and δpi = 0 would correspond to being a member of a country-wide
association (e.g. Scrabble, chess)
• δλ = 0 and δpi = 1 would correspond to being a member of a country-wide
economic association (such as the American Economic Association).
In extensions, we will let individuals choose not only S, but also the fractions
δλ and δpi given their expectation about wage offers and mobility. Although it
may not be immediately clear why we focus on these two dimensions of so-
cial capital, we will see in the theory part that this is a necessary distinction
to rationalize the empirical results, notably the effect of social capital on the
unemployment probability.10
Definition. Social capital is said to be local if δλ > δpi, that is if more is
lost from a regional move than from job loss.
Our distinction between local and professional capital can easily be compared
to that of weak and strong ties. In Calvo´-Armengo´l et al. (2007), strong ties
is seen as linking “members of the same family or very close friends” and weak
ties as “a transitory social encounter between two persons”. However here we
will have a definition exclusively based on the depreciation of social capital, to
simplify our analysis.
4.3 An empirical investigation
We will attempt to find an empirical counterpart to the concept of local
social capital. We will base the analysis on a widely used dataset, the European
Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP). In our context, it is particularly
useful because it surveys various dimensions of the social life and social capital of
individuals. In the literature surveyed in Glaeser et al. (2002), many works rely
on trust questions to approximate social capital. However, Glaeser et al. (2002)
argue that, along with Putnam (2000), one should focus instead on association
membership. There is indeed implicitly a revealed preference argument here:
in a survey interview, talking about confidence and trust is relatively cheap.
Further, in European countries of different languages, responses may be subject
to translation bias. Here, we will indeed follow the logic of Glaeser et al. (2002)
and Putnam (2000) and use information of three types: club membership as
in Glaeser et al. (2002), and the frequency of social contacts with friends and
neighbors. We tend to prefer the latter two, because they are presumably more
closely associated with the concept of localness we have in mind. Soccer club is
local, but chess or Scrabble associations bring usually country-wide ties.
10We could have simplified the analysis and set right away δpi = 0, but we decided to
keep the general case, first to rationalize some empirical findinds, second because employment
decisions are clearly affected by the gain or loss of social capital: deciding to reject a job
offer and remain long-term unemployed can lead to such a social capital depreciation that it
becomes in principle a key element of the decision. Hence, we believe that the general case
where δpi and δλ take all values between 0 and 1 is useful.
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4.3.1 Data description
More precisely, the social capital measures are derived from the three fol-
lowing questions in the ECHP survey:
1. Are you a member of any club, such as a sport or entertainment club, a
local or neighborhood group, a party etc...?
2. How often do you talk to any of your neighbors?
3. How often do you meet friends or relatives not living with you, whether
here at home or elsewhere?
Questions 2 and 3 precisely correspond to a type of social capital that is
clearly local. The “friends” question may in part refer to professional social
capital (i.e. δpi < 1, δλ < 1). The “club” question may refer to less local social
capital. Even though it is phrased as suggesting non-professional social capital,
it may be professional if associations are professional ones. We have however no
direct evidence in one sense or the other.
The answer to the first question is yes/no (and is attributed the value 1
or 0). The answer to the last two questions defines a frequency on a discrete
support, as follows: 1. On most days ; 2. Once or twice a week ; 3. Once or
twice a month ; 4. Less often than once a month ; 5. Never. In order to simplify
the exposition of the results, we build an index measure as follows:
Zi,t = I [Xi,t = 1]+I [Xi,t = 2] .
2
7
+I [Xi,t = 3] .
2
30
+I [Xi,t = 4] .
1
60
+I [Xi,t = 5] .0,
where Zi,t is the index value for individual i at time t and Xi,t the answer to
the question. I[.] is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the expression in
brackets is true and 0 if it is wrong.11
A table with relevant summary statistics is at the end of the Appendix.
4.3.2 Short-Run Mobility
The mechanisms we want to highlight can be uncovered estimating the fol-
lowing equations:
P i,t+1m = pimx
i,t + βmfriendfreqi,t + γmneibfreqi,t + φmclubi,t + i,t+1m ,
P i,t+1u = piuxi,t + βufriendfreqi,t + γuneibfreq
i,t + φuclubi,t + i,t+1u ,
where P i,t+1m and P
i,t+1
u are respectively the probabilities of moving to another
area and of being unemployed for individual i in period t + 1, the time period
being a year. xi,t is a vector of exogenous controls: Sex (1 if female, 0 if male),
house tenure (categorical variable stating whether the individual is owner of his
house, whether he rents it or has it for free), age category (16 to 25, 26 to 35,
36 to 45, 46 to 55 and 56+), number of years of education, a dummy variable
11We have tried a few other specifications, one including the log of this variable (but we
need to replace the zero with, arbitrarily, either 1/365 or half of this number) which improves
the significance of coefficients at the cost of introducing some arbitrariness. We also tried
dummy variables for the five possible answers, to detect non-monotonicity. We did not find
any non-monotonicity for the impact of social capital on mobility, and decided to keep a
simple, linear specification throughout.
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for unemployment, household size (1, 2, 3, 4 persons or 5 and more); marital
status (married, separated, divorced, widowed or never married), time effects.
The variables friendfreqi,t and neibfreqi,t will correspond to our measures
of social capital. Hence, the predictions to be tested are whether βm, γm and
φm are negative and whether βu, γu or φu are uniformally positive or possibly
negative.
The sample is restricted to the active population. A full description of the
variables can be found in Appendix. Note that we also estimated an employ-
ment equation (instead of unemployment) of the larger sample of 26-55 year old
individuals—thus including non-participants— but found no qualitative differ-
ence. We will thus only display the mobility and the unemployment results. To
estimate these equations, we will proceed as follows. In the first set of regres-
sions, we consider social capital measures as exogenous and run simple probit
regressions. We introduce the various measures of social capital separately or
together, because there could be some positive correlation across individuals in
these three social capital variables.12 We will also check whether the inclusion
of 92 regional effects affects the results.
In a second step, we attempt to control for potential endogeneity and in-
strument social capital with various instruments. We tried several of them,
which generally yield the same kind of results. A first instrument is the lag of
individual social capital. It is highly correlated with contemporaneous social
capital, but can be criticized for not removing all endogeneity. A second type of
instrument is the average social capital in the region13. It is more likely to be
exogenous, but could be weaker, that is, less correlated with contemporaneous
social capital of the individual. In that case, we also use the lagged value of
social capital at the regional level. We will report these two types of IV esti-
mations, since each of them has pros and cons. Alternative instruments we also
used are described in Appendix.14
Table 2 offers a summary of the mobility regressions with all specifications
discussed above. Generally speaking, all three variables measuring social capital
have negative and significant effects on mobility. In IV regressions, as the full
tables in Appendix (Tables 11 and 12) indicate, the number of observations
is also reduced by 25% approximately, due to the presence of lags and, when
instruments are the regional level of social capital, due to the fact that the
region of residence is sometimes missing. There is thus some efficiency loss
12The correlation structure is actually 0.32 between “Friends” and “Neighbors” but close
to zero between “Clubs” and the first two variables.
13The richness of the dataset used by Belot and Ermisch (2006) allows them to explore
other instruments describing the environment in which the individual grew up as a child.
They consider the number of biological siblings in the household when the individual was
fourteen years old, his birth-order, the level of education of his parents and whether he grew
up in a rural or urban area.
14Technically, in all IV regressions, we follow a two-stage procedure: we first regress the
social capital measures on the instruments, and use the projection as regressors in probit
regressions. The IV regressions we present therefore have biased standard errors. The reason
for using this procedure is that the standard ivprobit procedure in Stata 9 provides the s.e.
correction but however does not support clustering and the panel dimension. We are thus left
with two alternatives: either we choose to correct for the bias in s.e. due to IV, or to correct
for the bias due to individual clustering due to the panel dimension. We chose here to correct
for clustering, the main reason being that the implementation of the correction procedure
proposed by Wooldrige (2002) for the IV correction would actually lead the s.e. to be lower
than with the uncorrected s.e. as displayed in the IV tables. The s.e. displayed here are thus
an upper bound for the “true” s.e.
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in the estimates, but generally speaking, the coefficients remain negative and
usually significant. In particular, the “neighbor” variable has a significant and
negative impact on mobility, while the “club” variable is typically no longer
significant. Note also from the full Tables 11 and 12 that the other variables
included present reasonable coefficients: women are less mobile, as well as house
owners, older people, large families and married individuals. Unemployed are
not significantly more mobile, but the educated are clearly much more mobile.
To be exhaustive, Table 13 in Appendix produces fixed effect regressions for the
mobility equation. Without surprise, the coefficients of social capital turn out
to be much less significant, even though the “neighbor” variable remains quite
significant. This indicates that even the —necessarily moderate—variations in
time in social capital “Neighbors” for a given individual generate a decline in
mobility. Other coefficients displayed are those for which time variation was
observed.
Table 3 shows a summary of individual unemployment regressions. Results
are relatively stable across specifications, but with interesting changes in sign
and significance across social capital measures. The main findings are that the
“neighbor” has a positive impact on the unemployment probability, while “club”
has a negative impact on unemployment, this with or without regional effects.
The “Friends” variable is generally not significant, or marginally positive, except
in the last set of IV regressions when instruments are social capital at the
regional level.15 Full tables 14 to 16 present the other coefficients.
Finally, we attempted to estimate a multinomial logit model where the de-
pendent variable, denote it by yi,t+1, takes value 1 if the individual stays in the
region and works, 2 if she stays and is unemployed, 3 if she moves and works,
4 if she moves and is unemployed. However, at this stage, the multinomial one
fails at explaining individual unemployment, where the coefficient are never sig-
nificant, but the same results as in Tables 2 and 3 are obtained for inter-area
mobility. We do not reproduce those results, available upon request.
We can summarize the effect of social capital on mobility and unemploy-
ment in offering a summary, as displayed in Table 4. This table calculates the
conditional mobility rate and the conditional unemployment rate for two groups
of individuals in the sample (say, an Italian male, owner, 36-45 years old, etc...
and a dutch woman, tenant with rent, 26-35 years old, etc...). The mobility rate
is respectively, in the absence of social capital (all social capital variables fixed
to zero) 0.20% and 6.31%, while unemployment rates are 4.18% and 7.79%.
We next consider the impact of the maximum amount of social capital (1 for
“Club” and the highest possible frequency of visits of friends and neighbors).
The largest impact on mobility is the “Friend” variable, which can bring back
the mobility rate almost to zero for the Italian male and reduces it by two thirds
for the Dutch woman. The impact of social capital on unemployment is more
ambiguous. As far as “Club” is concerned, the unemployment risk is reduced
by a third, while instead, the other two variables contribute to an increase of
15The lack of significance of “Friends” can also be explained by a light non monotonicity of
its effect on unemployment. Indeed, individuals with both very low or very high frequency of
visits to friends are those with highest unemployment rates, while individuals with interme-
diate frequency have lower unemployment. To make sense of the non-monotonicity, we would
need to introduce additional ingredients in the theory exposed next Section, notably search
and network effects a` la Granovetter. See e.g. the series of papers by Calvo (2004), Calvo
and Jackson (2004) or Calvo and Zenou (2005). Here, we do not explore further this very
interesting question and leave it for future research.
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that risk by a third approximately.
These are extremely large numbers, however obtained in the most favorable
case in which coefficients are the largest. The impact of social capital is di-
vided by two if one considers alternative specifications, for instance the regular
probit model without instruments. Nevertheless, they remain large enough to
deserve more attention than what has usually been the case. A final remark
concerns the facts that high social capital individuals may be individuals en-
dowed with better skills to make new connections. In this case, to the extent
that our IV regressions have not sufficiently taken care of such an endogeneity
problem, we can argue that this leads to an underestimation of the magnitude
of the negative effects of social capital on mobility: individuals with better skills
at making friends, if anything, should be more, not less mobile. The effect on
unemployment might also be larger than what we measure, since such individ-
uals are presumably also more able to obtain jobs. Our claim, based on these
regressions, is not to measure any structural coefficient: it is actually much more
modest, to argue that social capital and notably its local component deserves
the full consideration of labor economists.16
4.3.3 Long-Run Mobility
As already argued in introduction, the link between social capital and mobil-
ity potentially goes both ways. In the short-run, social capital is predetermined
to a large extent, hence the regressions in the previous sub-Section are a good
first investigation. However, in the long run, it might be that individuals fore-
cast future mobility episodes and so, endogenously determine their level of social
capital. Thus we need to dissociate short-run mobility from long-run mobility
and we now explore how social capital may depend on long-run mobility. Now,
the mobility variable P i,tm takes value 0 if “the individual was born in the coun-
try of current residence and has lived in the same region since birth” and 1 in
the opposite case. We regress our measures of local social capital on this long-
run mobility variable, which is now predetermined. Table 5 shows that indeed,
having experienced a geographical mobility episode in the past leads to a huge
discount in social capital, giving some sense to the concept of localness of social
capital. The full table is in Table 17 in Appendix.
4.3.4 Additional regressions
The ECHP contains a few additional variables which can be used to com-
plement the previous analysis. In particular, we explore the impact of social
capital on unemployment and its duration. In order to simplify the exposition
of results, we limit tables to a few coefficients (that of social capital and of
very few additional variables when relevant, such as whether individuals receive
unemployment benefits. The sample and the specification are kept as close as
possible from the previous set of regressions: sex, house tenure, age categories,
education measured in years, an unemployment dummy that control the ac-
tual status of workers when relevant, household size, marital status and time
dummies. For each dependent variable, we present in general three different
16...as many of them have recently started to recognize (e.g. Calvo and Jackson (2006),
Calvo and Zenou (2005), Cahuc and Fontaine (2002).
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specifications: the first is without geographical control, the second adds coun-
try dummies and the third one has regional dummies. Table 18 in Appendix
present these regressions.
In the first part of Table 18, we analyze the effect of social capital on the
experience of unemployment. The sample is restricted to people looking for a
job, not working or working less than 15 hours a week. We find that social
capital has a negative impact on having been unemployed at a time, while
the neighboor variable has a marginally positive impact of the “unemployment
before current job” variable.
In the second part of Table 18, we regress the number of months of unem-
ployment before the current job on our social capital variables and the usual
controls.17. To these usual controls, we add a set of time controls, not at the
time of the survey, but at the time of entrance in the previous job. That is,
if an individual is interviewed in 1996 and has been employed in the current
job for six years, that individual is attributed a time dummy (y90=1), in order
to control for the economic cycle at the time of job search.18 Columns (1) to
(3) only consider the length of unemployment of those having experienced some
unemployment (log specification) while Columns (4) to (6) also include those
having faced no unemployment. We find that belonging to a club is generally
associated with shorter unemployment spells, and that the neighboor variable
is marginally positively significant.
Finally, we also tried similar regressions with a measure of the reservation
wage but found them disappointing, probably due to measurement error and do
not report them here.
4.4 Model
4.4.1 Motivation for a model
The empirical analysis has established a few stable relations in the data,
notably
1. Individuals endowed with more local social capital as described by the
variables “friend”, “neighbor” or “club” are less likely to move to another
region in the short-run.
2. Individuals endowed with more local social capital such as described by
the variables friends or neighbors are more likely to become unemployed
in the short-run.
3. In contrast, individuals who are members of a club are less likely to become
unemployed in the short-run.
17Note that here, we do not have any right-censoring problem since we know the exact
number of months of unemployment prior to re-employment, contrary to a classical duration
analysis where we would observe transitions between different stats instead. In addition, the
sample is restricted to persons that are ”normally working” at the time of the survey, i.e.
working more than 15 hours per week, and that started their current job at the earliest 2
years before they joined the survey.
18Note an obvious limitation of this specification, as well as the next specifications: we in-
vestigate the relationship between past unemployment experience of an individual and current
social capital. We see the results presented in those tables as correlations between variables
rather than deterministic relationship.
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4. Workers in a region different from their birth region have a lower stock of
social capital in all three dimensions measured (“friend”, “neighbor” and
“club”).
Given 1 and 4, causality between mobility and social capital goes both ways:
we may have a theory of multiple individual optima and also, in aggregate,
of multiple equilibria. These are two possibilities that we need to formally
explore. Further, their impact of social capital on unemployment is potentially
positive or negative. We need to rationalize what determines a positive and
what determines a negative impact.
We first derive a simple setup where 1 to 3 are fairly easily accounted for.
Next, we introduce the endogeneity of social capital, along the lines of Glaeser
et al. (2002). This leads to a discussion of whether individuals may face two
optima: low social capital and high mobility or vice-versa. Finally, we introduce
a typical social capital externality giving rise to multiple equilibria and finally
develop extensions.
4.4.2 Setup
To simplify the setup, we will first think of social capital in a reduced form
approach as simply raising utility of individuals. Indeed, there are several chan-
nels through which more social capital raises ex-ante utility, such as insurance,
information flows or complementarity with the consumption of leisure. Having
a fully developed model along these dimensions is beyond the task of the theory
part here, since we are already focussing on other dimensions, like the localness
of social capital and mobility decisions.
We consider a typical worker living two periods. There are two regions.
Without loss of generality, we assume the worker is born in region A, lives there
in period 1, and ends up period 1 with a job. Eventually, he may leave region
A to go to region B in second period or stay in region A. Period 2 is discounted
with a factor β < 1.
At the end of period 1, workers are endowed with S units of social capital.
S will be made endogenous later on but at this stage, it is useful to consider
it as given. Social capital is partly local, in the sense that a mover to region
B would enjoy only a fraction (1 − δλ)S of social capital. Similarly, a fraction
0 ≤ 1− δpi ≤ 1 of social capital is retained if the worker is laid off. We assume
that social capital increases utility only in second period, as a reduced form. Let
Ω2 be the income of the individual in second period. To simplify, we assume
that utility in second period U2 is
U2 =

Ω2 + S if the worker is employed in region A
Ω2 + (1− δpi)S if the worker is non-employed in region A
Ω2 + (1− δλ)S if the worker is employed in region B
Ω2 + (1− δλ)(1− δpi)S if the worker is non-employed in region B
.
The labor market is a standard partial equilibrium search set-up. All jobs
last only one period, so that all individuals start period 2 in having to prospect
for a job. Section 3.6 relaxes this assumption and will investigate the role of more
stable employment relationships (lasting more than one period) and notably the
role of employment protection.
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In the beginning of the second period, workers receive one job offer with a
wage w from a cumulated distribution F in region A and one job offer with a
wage w∗ from a cumulated distribution G in region B (f and g are the associated
densities). The random draws are uncorrelated. We denote by w the upper
support of those distributions.19 In a world where all regions are symmetric
and have the same labor market conditions, one may think that G > F (first
order stochastic dominance) to reflect that workers have more local contacts
and thus receive better local offers. For instance, an interesting rationalization
is that workers receive multiple independent offers in quantity n and p with
n > p from a common distribution F0: one can easily show, in such a case, that
the expected value of the wage is for instance
∫ w
0
wd(Fn0 (w)) or alternatively
that F = Fn0 and G = F
p
0 .
20 However, we have also in mind to reproduce the
intuition that some regions are depressed and other regions are booming, in
which case we expect the opposite: many good offers in region B, hence G small
for a large part of the support of the wage distribution, and few good offers in
region A, hence F large on the main part of the support.
Finally, if non-employed, we assume that workers receive an income Ω2 = b
interpreted as unemployment benefits or leisure independent of social capital.
4.4.3 Workers’ program
In second period, there are four possible choices: staying in the home region
and remaining unemployed ; moving and remaining unemployed ; staying and
accepting the local wage offer ; moving and accepting the foreign job offer. We
can discard the second possibility, given that U2 = b + (1 − δλ)(1 − δpi)S is
always lower than b + (1 − δpi)S if the individual remains unemployed in the
home region. The decision set is thus summarized by
U2(S) =Max {b+ (1− δpi)S,w + S,w∗ + (1− δλ)S} , (4.1)
where the max operator reflects the optimal mobility/job acceptance decisions,
which are the joint decision explored next Section. Offers in and out the region
occur simultaneously and so are decisions by the agent to move or to stay and to
accept a job or remain unemployed. See notably the Appendix for the decision
tree of the agent: the worker compares his (best) local offer w, his best foreign
offer w∗ and his outside option b, as indicated in equation (4.1).
At this stage, there are two useful notations we can introduce: the reservation
wage for an offer in region A is defined as
wr = b− δpiS. (4.2)
This is the local wage making the agent indifferent between accepting a job or
rejecting the offer. This is increasing in b and decreasing in social capital, unless
social capital is totally non-professional (δpi = 0): the worker has more to loose
in rejecting a job offer if this reduces its utility by the loss of social capital δpiS.
A higher S raises the acceptance rate in region A except in the singular case
δpi = 0. This offers the possibility of a positive impact of S on employment.
19If they are different, we simply extend the c.d.f beyond its support. We also assume that
the lower bound of the support is 0 in both case.
20See Lemma A1, Theorem A2 and Corollary A3 in Appendix.
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Symmetrically, the reservation wage for an offer in region B would be
w∗r = b+ (δλ − δpi)S. (4.3)
One can notably see that when social capital is local (recall that it was defined as
local if δλ > δpi), more social capital raises w∗r and thus reduces the acceptance
rate of offers and consequently it reduces geographical mobility. Again the idea
is simple, in accepting a job in region B and living one’s friends, the individual
faces a depreciation δλS, compensated by the no-depreciation of δpiS. Hence,
the trade-off. We have here a mechanism for either a positive or a negative
impact of S on unemployment, depending on localness of social capital.
In words, to the extent that social capital is local, workers are potentially
marginally more immobile. To the extent that most offers comes from other
regions than where workers currently live, as has been the case in several high
unemployment regions (Bertola and Ichino, 1996), we have here a channel for
the persistence of high unemployment.
Note here, that the decisions to accept and to move are simultaneous, these
intuitions, albeit correct, must be studied in the more complex setup where all
offers arrive simultaneously. This is defined in the next few lines, where the
notations wr and wr∗ remain useful.
4.4.4 Geographical mobility and social capital
The ex-ante probability of moving is denoted by Pm. It depends on the value
of w∗ but also on the value of w. Remember that the draws in F and G are not
correlated. Formally, the Appendix determines that
Pm =
∫ w
wr∗
F (z − δλS)g (z) dz. (4.4)
It is informative to examine how this probability varies with S. We obtain:
dPm
dS
= (δpi − δλ)F (wr)g(w∗r)− δλ
∫ w
w∗r
f(z − δλS)g(z)dz. (4.5)
The interpretation is easy, and is the sum of two effects conveniently corre-
sponding to the two terms in equation (4.5). The second term is the easiest to
interpret. Except in the extreme case δλ = 0 where social capital has no local
dimension, it is always negative: a higher S means a higher loss of social capi-
tal in case of geographical mobility and thus reduces the number of acceptable
offers in region B.
The first effect is more subtle. To understand it, imagine a marginal worker
receiving a local offer below wr in region A and a marginal offer w∗rin region B.
He is indifferent between different options (moving or remaining unemployed.
We know that he looses δpi of social capital if he rejects both offers, and δλ of
social capital if he accepts the offer in region B. So, giving him one more unit
of social capital makes him more likely at the margin to remain in region A if
the loss δλ is larger than the loss δpi, e.g. δpi − δλ < 0.
Proposition 1. Effect of social capital on the mobility rate.
i) A sufficient condition for mobility to decline with S is that δλ > δpi i.e. in
the case of (relatively more) local social capital; ii) When δλ > δpi, w∗r increases
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to w (possibly equal to +∞) as S → +∞ and thus the mobility rate goes to zero
; iii) A sufficient condition for mobility to increase with S is that δλ = 0 and
δpi > 0 (non local but professional social capital).
The first part of the proposition corresponds to the case where social capital
is more depreciated when the worker moves than when he is non-employed,
which we believe characterizes social capital such as friendship or neighborhood
relations. As social capital becomes larger, incentives to move disappear. The
last part of the proposition corresponds to the case when social capital is not
local and is to some extent a professional one.
4.4.5 Employment, unemployment and social capital
The model also suggests various other relations between the employment
status and social capital. We have, notably the probability of being unemployed
is
Pu = F (wr)G(w∗r). (4.6)
The interpretation of (4.6) is easy: workers are unemployed if they receive
two offers below their reservation wage. The impact of social capital is thus
straightforward: we have (see also Appendix)
dPu
dS
= −δpif(wr)G(w∗r) + F (wr)g(w∗r)(δλ − δpi). (4.7)
We thus have:
Proposition 2. Effect of S on unemployment.
i) A sufficient condition for social capital to raise unemployment is δpi = 0
; ii) Another condition is that G is small and F is large at the thresholds w∗r
and wr and that social capital is local δλ > δpi ; iii) When δpi > 0, wr → 0
when S → +∞ and thus the unemployment rate goes to zero ; iv) A sufficient
condition for social capital to reduce unemployment instead is δpi > δλ, i.e.
when social capital is more professional than local; v) In the general case, the
effect is ambiguous.
The first part states that, as argued above, social capital moderates wage
claims if it depreciates upon unemployment. When δpi = 0, the only impact
of social capital is that it reduces mobility due to localness. When G is large
and F is small around the thresholds, this means that there are few good offers
in region B and many good offers in region A: conditions are gathered for the
localness effect to dominate over the effect of professional depreciation of social
capital. The other parts of the proposition are derived from the same logic.
Finally, the probability of finding a job in the local region is
Pw =
∫ w
wr
G(z + δλS)f (z) dz. (4.8)
In addition, we have:
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Proposition 3. The local employment probability is always increased by
social capital except if δλ = δpi = 0 in which case the probability is unaffected
by S.
Indeed,
dPw
dS
= δpiG(w∗r)f(wr) + δλ
∫ w
wr
g(w + δλS)f(w)dw.
As before, the interpretation is easy: the first term represents the effect of one
additional unit of social capital for a worker receiving an offer wr and with an
offer w∗ below w∗r: he accepts the local offer all the more than his social capital
is depreciated. The second term is zero if δλ = 0 and positive otherwise: it
reflects the supplementary gain from accepting a local offer when being away
in region B depreciates social capital. When δpi = δλ = 0, S is just scaling up
utility but does not affect the arbitrage of worker between the different options.
4.4.6 Partial conclusion
We have provided a relatively simple and flexible model leading to the pre-
dictions summarized in Table 6. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the case of
local social capital. In that case, social capital reduces mobility with either
ambiguous or positive effects on unemployment. Local employment is raised in
each case, as workers accept fewer outside offers. One would thus expect, ceteris
paribus, that, when social capital is exogenous, the unemployment rate is higher
in regions with more ”local social capital”, and that the marginal effect of social
capital is larger if there are few good offers locally. It is also interesting, in line
with the empirical results (notably 2 and 3) to note that the effect of social
capital on unemployment is potentially both positive or negative: when social
capital is mostly professional, unemployment probability is decreased: the effect
works through a reduction in the reservation wage, as individuals have more to
loose to turn down a job offer.
Let us now make S endogenous and explore its determinants.
4.5 Optimal social capital
Thanks to the assumption that jobs last one period, the decision to invest in
social capital in first period is independent from the activity status (employed,
non-employed) in first period. We can thus describe the decisions recursively,
in two steps. In the second period, workers take S as predetermined and, after
collecting offers, decide whether to accept local offers or foreign offers. In first
period, they anticipate their decisions in second period and decide accordingly
how much to invest in social capital. Before period 1, workers are assumed to
be attached to region A and thus immobile: the decisions at this stage are not
relevant for the next steps and we ignore them.
In first period, workers maximize U1 defined as ex-ante first period utility,
which is given by:
U1 = max
S
{Ω1 − C(S) + βEU2(S)} , (4.9)
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where β is a discount factor and the cost of investing in social capital S has
cost C(S) with C ′(S) > 0, C ′′(S) > 0. The key issue is thus to determine the
quantity
EU2 =
∫ w¯
0
∫ w¯
0
max {b+ 1− δpiS,w + S,w∗ + (1− δλ)S} dF (w)dG(w∗).
(4.10)
It is a relatively complex derivation but it can be simplified after a few variable
changes and integration by parts. We have:
Proposition 4. The expected utility of agents given optimal choices is
EU2 = w¯ + S −
∫ w¯
wr
G(z + δλS)F (z)dz. (4.11)
The proof is in Appendix. The impact of social capital on the expected
utility is threefold. There is a positive direct effect on utility. The second and
third effects, through the integral term, are actually negative (recall that wr is
decreasing in S whenever δpi > 0). As we are going to show, they come from
the fact that social capital reduces mobility and job acceptance: we can link the
marginal effect of S to the various probabilities calculated above.
4.5.1 Choice of the level of S
Let us first make the assumption that social capital is mostly local, i.e.
depreciates more after a regional move than after job loss. This is from now on
the benchmark case. In equations:
Assumption 1. δλ > δpi > 0.
This yields some useful properties of dEU2dS .
Lemma 1. Properties of dEU2/dS.
i) dEU2dS = 1−δpiPu−δλPm> 0 ; ii) under Assumption 1, we have dEU2/dS →
1 when S → +∞ ; iii) d2EU2/dS2 is strictly positive so that dEU2/dS strictly
increases, except if either δpi = δλ = 0 or f = g = 0. In these two cases, the
second derivative is zero.
From equation (4.11), we have the marginal effect of S which can conve-
niently be rewritten, using (4.8) and (4.6). The return to social capital is always
strictly positive. A marginal increase in S raise utility by 1, minus the proba-
bility of moving Pm (in which case δλ is depreciated) minus the probability of
remaining unemployed locally (in which case a fraction δpi of social capital is
depreciated). In the ”neutral case” δpi = δλ = 0, the marginal return to social
capital is constant, equal to 1.
The second point comes from the limits of Pm and Pu in Propositions 1 and
2. The last point is shown in Appendix. The interpretation is simple: except
in the case of ”neutral” social capital or with degenerate distribution of wage
offers, utility is convex in social capital. Convexity arises when distributions are
not degenerate because, by raising social capital, the agent can afford to reject
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more offers and thus optimize its mobility/acceptance strategy (in other words,
he is better off because he has greater outside options).21
Denote by Ŝ a level of S satisfying the first-order condition. We have
C ′(Ŝ) = β(1 − δpiPu−δλPm), (4.12)
where Pu and Pm depend on Ŝ too. Equation (4.12) may not need to be satisfied
for only one value of Ŝ. To see this, one can draw the left hand side of equation
(4.12) which is an increasing function of S and the right hand side which is
convex. The two curves can intersect several times - or not at all. We only
know that for large values of S, the right-hand side converges to 1, while, with
a quadratic cost function, the left hand side, the marginal cost, goes to infinity,
so that utility decreases after the last intersection which is thus a minimum. We
represent utility in Figure 5.33 in one of the “multiple intersections” case.
In such a case, there is usually a well defined global maximum (either the
first or the second maximum) and the agent optimally chooses one or the other.
The point we want to make is that a small deviation between two individuals,
say, because they marginally differ in their cost functions, may lead them to
behave observationally very differently. In Figure 5.33, the agent would choose
a low degree of local social capital and hence would be ex-ante relatively mobile.
Imagine now that the marginal cost of investing is decreased by a tiny amount:
then, the bimodal curve changes, it is like a counter-clockwise rotation (due to
C(S) being relatively more reduced for larger values of S) and thus the second
local maximum becomes a global maximum. This individual is thus more likely
to be immobile and invest a lot more in social capital.
Hence, we have a first complementarity between local social capital and
mobility.
Complementarity property 1. When the localness of social capital is
exogenous to workers choice (that is, δpi and δλ are given), local social capital
is associated, in the cross section of workers, with low mobility rate, with large
differences across individuals even though they have similar preferences.
Now, in a maximum of utility, we have an additional property: the convexity
of costs C with respect to S implies that the investment in social capital will
be larger when the right hand side of (4.12) is higher, i.e. when both risks of
depreciation Pu and Pm (i.e. unemployment and mobility) are lower and when
the rates of depreciation is lower (that is, δpi and δλ are lower). Again, if δpi = 0,
the risk of unemployment plays no role on the choice of S, while the closer δλ
to 0, the lower the impact of Pm on the choice of S.
Complementarity property 2. For a given optimal choice of S and under
assumption that δλ > δpi, if social capital is higher, the expected mobility rate
is lower. In turn, any exogenous decrease in expected mobility increases the
optimal level of social capital.
21The quantity d3EU2/dS3 is calculated in Appendix. As a special case, when both f ′ and
g′ are uniformally negative on their support, which is a widely used property in contract theory
and known as the CRDC (concavity of the distribution function condition), it is possible to
sign the four terms summing up to d3EU2/dS3 but three are positive and one is negative, so
we cannot sign this quantity in general.
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Figure 4.1: Net utility as a function of social capital: case of multiple extrema
4.5.2 Choice of the composition of S
A natural extension is to consider how agents could choose their type of
social capital: local or professional or a combination of both. We will see that
this reinforces, if anything, the complementarity property 1. Indeed, assume
now that agents can trade-off the two types of social capital in choosing δpi and
δλ given a constraint, say
δpi + δλ ≥ 1 + a, (4.13)
where 0 < a < 1 is a technologically-constrained parameter. They could for
instance choose δpi = a and δλ = 1 (mostly local social capital) or δpi = 1 and
δλ = a (mostly professional capital), or any interior combination. Simultane-
ously, they chose the total amount of S. In other words, they have a control,
albeit limited by equation (4.13), on the type of social capital. The constraint of
equation (4.13) reflects the fact that there is no free-lunch: social capital must
depreciate in one dimension or the other.22 In this case, the program of the
agents rewrites:
max
S, δpi,δλ
{Ω1 − C(S, δpi, δλ) + βEU2(S, δpi, δλ)}
s.t. equation (4.13).
where the cost function now explicitly depends on the chosen depreciation rates:
a lower depreciation rate comes at a positive marginal cost, or
∂C/∂δi < 0 for i = λ, pi.
22An alternative modelling choice would be to fix δλ > 0 and δpi > 0 as exogenous pa-
rameters, i.e. technologically given, but dissociate two types of social capital Sl (local social
capital) and Sp (professional social capital) and let the agent invest optimally in these two
dimensions. The program of the agent would then be Max
Sl,Sp
{Ω1 − C(Sl, Sp) + βEU2(Sl, Sp)}.
We don’t learn much more from this exercise compared to the current modelling choice so we
do not push this possibility any further.
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Using equations (4.11), (4.2) and substituting δpi by 1+a−δλ, we then have
the following program:
max
S, δλ
{
−C(S, 1 + b− δλ, δλ) + β
(
S −
∫ w¯
b−(1+a−δλ)S
G(z + δλS)F (z)dz
)}
.
The first order condition on S is the same as in (4.12), while now, the optimal
choice of δλ implies, after a variable change:
dC
dδλ
=
∂C
∂δpi
∂δpi
∂δλ
+
∂C
∂δλ
= βS(Pu − Pm).
where ∂δpi∂δλ = −1 along the constraint (4.13). A simple cost function would
be C(S, δpi + δλ) with therefore perfect substituability between the choice of
depreciation rates. Thus, the left-hand side −∂C∂δλ +
∂C
∂δpi
≡ 0. This leads to
particularly simple solutions: an interior solution and two corner solutions:
• in an interior solution, the agent chooses δλ at an optimal point where
Pm = Pu
• if there is no interior solution, i.e. for instance Pm > Pu, the agents
chooses δλ = a and δpi = 1
• if there is no interior solution, i.e. for instance Pu > Pm, the agents
chooses δλ = 1 and δpi = a
Let us first discuss the interior solution. The interpretation is as follows:
the probability to be unemployed is the probability to loose a marginal unit of
professional (pi) social capital ; it has to be equal to the probability to move,
that is to loose a marginal unit of local (λ) social capital. Note however that the
agent may not always be able to implement such a solution, because it depends
in large part on the external distributions of offers. If for instance, there are
excellent offers in region B, the agent will move with high probability and remain
unemployed with low probability. In other words, the agent has only a limited
control on Pu and Pm.
When the agent selects one of the two corner solutions, the intuition is clear
too. For instance, the second corner solution occurs in a low mobility/high
unemployment world where Pu > Pm: since expected mobility is low, the agents
will maximize the localness of their social capital (δλ = 1) in order to reduce
the depreciation of professional social capital. This will thus further reinforce
immobility. Hence, we uncover a new complementarity property:
Complementarity property 3. When agents can partly control the local-
ness of social capital, they choose preferentially local capital when they expect a
low mobility rate compared to the unemployment rate ; the opposite occurs when
agents anticipate high mobility compared to the unemployment rate: they try to
minimize the depreciation of local social capital.
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4.6 Extensions
4.6.1 Social externalities
So far, we have exhibited a tendency in the model towards multiple local
optima in social capital choices of individuals, which is different from multiple
equibria, in the sense that observationally close workers may differ dramatically
in their choices. However, each individual has a clear global optimum, and thus
except in a degenerate case, there is no multiplicity of equilibria. We can now
offer a discussion of the existence of multiple equilibria based on social exter-
nalities. For that, as we noted in the introduction, there is a straightforward
rationalization: in a word of mobility, it may be even more difficult, at an in-
dividual level, to leaves one’s friends to move to another region: if none of my
friends have moved to the city, I won’t find any “old friends” there. The oppo-
site occurs in a high mobility world: I am more likely to find these old friends
in the new place.23
The introduction of social externalities will, quite expectedly, reinforce the
complementarity between immobility and localness of social capital discussed
above. Here, this will act through a standard mechanism: the fact that the
choice of an individual is affected by others’ choices.
There are several modelling choices here, because both the costs and the
benefits of investing in local social capital and maintaining local connections
depend heavily on other’s mobility rates: if everyone leaves a neighborhood
every other year, the returns to investing in local social capital is clearly lower.
In a reduced form, this type of externality can be modelled either through the
returns to social capital or through its cost, both depending on aggregate social
capital.
We find it slightly more convenient analytically to introduce that externality
on the cost side, without deep consequences. This development is coherent with
the work of Glaeser et al. (2002) even if they take the externality into account
through the returns to social capital instead of the cost. Assume that the level
of social capital in the economy, S, decreases the cost of acquiring social capital
for an individual.
For simplicity, we assume again that 1 − δpi and 1 − δλ are technologically
given, and now that C(S) becomes C(S, S) and multiplicative separability prop-
erty such that: C(S, S) = C0(S)σ(S). We still assume that C0(S) is increasing
and convex and adds that σ(S) is decreasing and convex:
dC(S, S)/dS = C
′
0(S)σ(S) > 0 and d
2C(S, S)/dS2 = C
′′
0 (S)σ(S) > 0,
dC(S, S)/dS = C0(S)σ
′
(S) < 0; and d2C(S, S)/dS
2
= C0(S)σ
′′
(S) > 0,
d2C(S, S)/dSdS = d2C(S, S)/dSdS = C
′
0(S)σ
′
(S) < 0.
We will also assume that: lim
s→+∞C
′′
0 (S) > 0, lim
s→+∞
σ
′
(S) = 0. Furthermore, it is
useful to note that lim
s→+∞
d2EU2
dS2 = 0 and lims→+∞
d3EU2
dS3 < 0.
23One could also discuss the evolution of social norms with mobility. The idea is that, if
mobility is low, “old friends” may be more important for individuals than new friends, and
vice-versa in a high mobility world.
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As for individuals, S is given. The first order condition for their investment
in human capital becomes:
dC(S, S)
dS
= C ′0(S)σ(S) = β
dEU2
dS
. (4.14)
This allows to rewrite a relationship between Ŝ∗, the privately optimal level
of social capital in presence of externalities and S:
Ŝ∗ = Ŝ∗(S).
Assuming that S is the average level of social capital and a symmetric equi-
librium (all agents are identical and choose the same level of social capital at
their optimum), the equilibrium value of S is obtained by the intersection of
the 45 degree line in the (S, S) − locus with the curve Ŝ∗(S). To characterize
Ŝ∗(S), let rewrite equation (4.14) as:
F(S, S) = C ′0(S)σ(S)− β
dEU2
dS
= 0.
Using the implicit function theorem for dFdS 6= 0, we have:
dŜ∗(S)
dS
= −
dF(Ŝ∗,S)
dS
dF(Ŝ∗,S)
dS
= − C
′
0(S)σ
′(S)
C
′′
0 (S)σ(S)− d
2EU2
dS2
> 0, (4.15)
i.e. Ŝ∗(S) has a positive slope.
Remark that the first order condition implies the equality between C ′0(S)σ(S),
the marginal cost of investing in social capital and β dEU2dS , its time-discounted
marginal return. For this first order condition to be a maximum, the necessary
condition is: C
′′
0 (S)σ(S) > β
d2EU2
dS2 . Otherwise, this intersection would repre-
sent a minimum rather than a maximum. This implies that the denominator
of equation (4.15) is necessarily positive for any optimal choice of an individual
excepted if the marginal cost is tangent to the marginal return. We do not treat
this particular point as it is not our main concern.
To ease the analysis, we will assume again a quadratic functional form for
C0(S) such that C
′
0(S) = S and σ(S) = S
−γ
where γ > 0. In this case, it is
then possible to show that lim
s→+∞
dŜ∗(S)
dS
= 0. This suggests that (at least for
a minimal value of S) Ŝ∗(S) is concave (since it has a positive slope and an
horizontal asymptote).
Since Ŝ∗(S) is an increasing function in S and has an horizontal asymptote,
there is necessarily one intersection at least between Ŝ∗(S) and the 45◦ line
in the (S, S) − locus. Unfortunately, it is difficult (without additional strong
assumptions on the distribution function of the model) to determine the con-
vexity of Ŝ∗(S) (the expression of the implicit second order derivative is given
in Appendix). Therefore, we prefer to present several possible shapes for Ŝ∗(S)
as represented in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
Proposition 5. There exists, at least, one stable equilibrium value of S in
presence of externalities.
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Figure 4.2: Case when Ŝ∗(S) is a continuous function (unique extremum for S).
Unique vs. multiple equilibria.
Figure 4.3: Case when Ŝ∗(S) is a correspondence (multiple extrema for individ-
ual S). Unique vs. multiple equilibria.
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Proof. See Appendix.
This reinforces the type of complementarity already discussed in the bench-
mark model: indeed, we had multiple maxima for individuals agents: one with
low mobility & high local social capital vs. another one with high mobility &
low local social capital.24
Complementarity property 4. There are multiple aggregate equilibria:
an equilibrium with low aggregate local social capital implies a higher individual
cost of investing in social capital, inducing higher aggregate mobility ; and an
equilibrium with a high aggregate local social capital reducing the individual cost
of investing in social capital, inducing aggregate immobility instead.
4.6.2 Employment protection
An interesting extension, in the European context, is the effect of employ-
ment protection legislation. By raising the expected duration of jobs, it induces
investments in all sort of specific capital, such as job specific skills, sector spe-
cific skills, housing and in our more specific case, local social capital. We will
thus explore this mechanism here.
Assume that workers in first period may remain employed at the end of
period 1 with probability τ . The previous analysis was thus simply the case
τ = 0. Here, τ can be thought as an index of employment protection. How does
the previous analysis carry through? Well, the employment status of employees
now matter, and there are two cases to consider.
Unemployed workers in period 1 are not affected, and make the same opti-
mal choice Ŝ as the one determined before in the first order condition (4.12).
Consider now an employee with wage w1 in first period. In the beginning of the
second period, he may loose his job with probability 1 − τ and then face the
same choice as before: draw a set of wage offers w,w∗ and then maximize over
the mobility/job acceptance decisions:
U2(S) = max {b+ (1− δpi)S,w + S,w∗ + (1− δλ)S} . (4.16)
Alternatively, he may have the option to keep his initial job with wage w1, and
face the following alternative with probability τ :
U2(S) = max {w1 + S,w + S,w∗ + (1− δλ)S} . (4.17)
In other words, denoting by U2(S, b, δpi, δλ) the utility in case of a layoff, and
U2(S,w1, 0, δλ) the utility in case of no-layoff (b is replaced by w1 and δpi by 0),
the program in first period is now:
max
S
− C(S) + (1− τ)U2(S, b, δpi, δλ) + τU2(S,w1, 0, δλ).
24This multiplicity of equilibria was also investigated by Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004a) in
a study of migration and social environment.
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The first order condition will be, using (4.12):
C ′(S) = τ [1− δλPm(b, δpi, δλ)− δpiPu(b, δpi, δλ)] + (1− τ) [1− Pm(w1, 0, δλ)](4.18)
= (1− τ)
[
1− δλ
∫ w¯
wr
g(z + S)F (z)dz − δpiG(w∗r)F (wr)
]
+τ
[
1−
∫ w¯
w1
g(z + S)F (z)dz
]
.
It is easy to verify that the quantity in the right hand side increases with
τ , featuring that the returns to local social capital are higher, the higher the
likelihood to remain employed in the same local job. As a consequence, as τ
increases, C ′(S) increases, meaning that the optimal level of social capital Ŝ
invested is higher. In the same vein, the expression above is increasing in w1:
the higher the initial wage, the higher Ŝ. Finally, the interaction between the
two is also positive: d2Ŝ/Sw1dτ > 0.
We thus have the following implications.
Proposition 6: Employment protection raises the investment in local so-
cial capital. The same is true of higher local wages. Finally, the two interact
complementarily: the marginal effect of employment protection of social capital
is higher, the higher local wages.
4.7 Tentative implications for the European dis-
ease and conclusion
To conclude, we now present a few remarks summarizing our work and sug-
gesting interpretations and extensions of our results.
First remark. Our regressions suggested unambiguous effects of social
capital on individual mobility and adverse effects on individual employment
probabilities too. The magnitude of the effects was even quite striking. We have
then discussed here how low mobility could be the outcome of self-reinforcing
factors. In the present case, investments in local social capital are induced by
low mobility and are in turn themselves a factor of immobility. We have found
several examples of complementarity between high local social capital and low
mobility rate.
Let us now discuss implications of the paper on the debate on unemployment.
In fact, unemployment in Europe is usually thought of as the result of various
market imperfections impeding mobility. In the labor market, too generous
unemployment compensation raises the relative returns to staying in a local
depressed area. Strong employment protection raises incentives to invest in
local skills as job duration is anticipated to be much higher and thus reduces
mobility ; it raises the incentives to invest in job-specific skills and thus reduces
job-to-job mobility ; good market imperfections and notably obstacles to job
creations in booming regions/sectors reduce the returns to mobility from the
depressed regions ; and wage compression reduces the returns to moving in
the booming regions. These alternative or complementary explanations can be
found in Hassler et al. (2000, 2005), Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002), Bertola
and Ichino (1996), Wasmer (2006) and Bertola and Rogerson (1997).
Second remark. The role of institutions was explored in our work (e.g.
Proposition 6 above) and reinforces immobility and unemployment. In our
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Figure 4.4: Social capital in Europe: frequency of contacts with neighbors.
Figure 4.5: Social capital in Europe: frequency of contacts with friends and
relatives.
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Figure 4.6: Social capital in Europe: club membership.
work, investments in local social capital tend to be reinforced by the same fac-
tors causing unemployment as those discussed by the literature described right
above. It is thus natural to reinterpret tentatively the European unemployment
experience in light of its interactions with local social capital. Our theory is
not necessarily a new tentative explanation for high unemployment: local so-
cial capital is simply complements to other explanations. However, we have a
potential theory for its high persistence. Local social capital may indeed be a
bottleneck that prevents mobility.
Third remark. Pushing the logic further, a natural implication is that
attempts to treat unemployment by changing the exogenous factors raising mo-
bility may fail if there is the type of vicious circle between immobility and high
local social capital. If local social capital is a bottleneck to higher mobility,
deregulating labor markets may simply raise inequality and the share of the
informal economy, but will not ncessarily raise mobility much. Said otherwise,
if mobility is self-reinforced, it may not be enough to remove the immobility-
friendly institutions. An efficient reform of the labor markets should instead
combine traditional reforms and develop incentives towards mobility. To return
on the example of the introduction about the emergence of the Rotary Clubs
in the US, we may suggest that encouraging mobility through social channels
may be an interesting policy for local authorities to attract migrants from other
regions.
Forth remark. Achieving this goal requires the understanding of what
made the success of reforms in some European countries and not others, which
is a recently discussed puzzle. We may suggest a partial answer here: differences
in unemployment across European countries can be related to intra-European
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differences in attitudes towards social capital. Inspection of Figures 4.7 to 4.7
show that there is a clear North-South divide in the nature of social capital: in
the South of Europe, social capital seems to be more local, explaining the lower
geographical mobility rates and difficulty to reduce unemployment. In the North
of Europe, being part of clubs is instead much more frequent. To the extent that
being a member of a club (such as a Scrabble or a chess league) helps to cope
with mobility—this is indeed a very good way to re-establish a social network
when moving to a new city—, we may have an interesting characterization of
the way labor markets work in Europe.
Fifth remark. Can we really explain country-differences in aggregate un-
employment? Consider Tables 7-9 which represent an approach inspired by
Layard-Nickell (1999). Table 7 regresses the log of unemployment on country-
averages of local social capital. Table 8 adds conventional covariates capturing
labor market institutions, Table 9 uses lagged employment protection measures
for the period before 1990 as instruments, as well as owner occupation rates.
The main finding is that the ”friend” variable is significant and raises unem-
ployment. The ”neighbor” variable also raises unemployment but only when it
is alone. Multicollinearity with friends” leads however to instability when both
are added. These regressions are only to be thought as preliminary steps. They
indicate that the social organization of populations may matter much more than
what is commonly believed.
However, beyond these last three summary regressions based on macro data,
the empirical analysis based on microdata suggests that, to understand better
European unemployment, more is to be learnt from non-standard factors. No-
tably, social capital may be an interesting avenue to explore, confirming the
fruitfulness of the concept.
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4.8 Theory Appendix
4.8.1 Distribution of a Max
Lemma A1. Let be two random variable X and Y such that X ∼ F and
Y ∼ G, with F and G two cumulative distribution functions defined over the
support [0 B]. Let be Z = max {X,Y }. Then Z ∼ FG.
Proof. Let be H the cumulative distribution function of Z.
H (z) =
∫ z
0
∫ z
0
{I [x > y] + I [y > x]} dF (x) dG (y) ,
H (z) =
∫ z
0
∫ z
0
I [x > y] dF (x) dG (y) +
∫ z
0
∫ z
0
I [y > x] dF (x) dG (y) ,
H (z) =
∫ z
0
∫ z
y
f (x) dF (y) +
∫ z
0
∫ z
x
g (y) dF (x) ,
H (z) =
∫ z
0
[F (z)− F (y)] g(y)dy +
∫ z
0
[G(z)−G(x)] f(x)dx,
H (z) =
∫ z
0
F (z)g(y)dy −
∫ z
0
F (y)g(y)dy +
∫ z
0
G(z)f(x)dx−
∫ z
0
G(x)f(x)dx,
H (z) = 2F (z)G(z)−
∫ z
0
{F (w)g(w) +G(w)f(w)} dw,
H (z) = 2F (z)G(z)− F (z)G(z),
H (z) = F (z)G(z).
Theorem A2: Let be N random variables X1, X2, ..., XN such that X1 ∼
F1, X2 ∼ F2, ..., XN ∼ FN , with F1, F2, ..., FN N cumulative distribution
functions defined over the support [0 B]. Let be Z = max {X1, X2, ..., XN}.
Then Z ∼ F1F2...FN .
Proof. The proof is recursive. For the special case where N = 2 the proof has
been showed in the previous lemma. Suppose now the theorem is true for any
N = p and show it is true for N = p + 1. Let be Y = max {X1, X2, ..., Xp}
and Z = max {X1, X2, ..., Xp+1} . If the theorem is true for N = p, then Y ∼
F1F2...Fp.Moreover, Z = max {X1, X2, ..., Xp+1} = max {max (X1, X2, ..., Xp) , Xp+1} =
max {Y,Xp+1} .The previous lemma tell us then: Z ∼ (F1F2...Fp)Fp+1 ⇔ Z ∼
F1F2...FpFp+1.Then if the theorem is true for N = p, it is true for N = p + 1.
Since according to the previous it is true for N = 2, then, recursively, it is true
for any N .
Corollary A3: Let be N random variables X1, X2, ..., XN such that X1 ∼
F , X2 ∼ F , ..., XN ∼ F , with F a cumulative distribution function defined
over the support [0 B]. Let be Z = max {X1, X2, ..., XN}. Then Z ∼ FN .
Proof. The previous theorem shows that Z ∼ FF...F︸ ︷︷ ︸
N terms
⇔ Z ∼ FN .
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4.8.2 Decisions of the agent at a given S and determina-
tion of Pm, Pu, Pw.
Decision tree
There are three main possible cases for an agent, in order: remaining non-
employed, accepting a local offer, and finally accepting an offer in region B: we
have thus
U2 = b+ (1− δpi)S if b+ (1− δpi)S > w + S > w∗ + (1− δλ)S or b+ (1− δpi)S > w∗ + (1− δλ)S > w + S
= w + S if w + S > b+ (1− δpi)S > w∗ + (1− δλ)S or w + S > w∗ + (1− δλ)S > b+ (1− δpi)S
= w∗ + (1− δλ)S if w∗ + (1− δλ)S > w + S > b+ (1− δpi)S or w∗ + (1− δλ)S > b+ (1− δpi)S > w + S.
Determination of Pm
The probability of moving is formally
Pm = P [{w∗ + (1− δλ)S > w + S} ∩ {w∗ + (1− δλ)S > b+ (1− δpi)S}] ,
(4.81)
and can be shown to be equal to
Pm =
∫ w
0
∫ w
0
I [w∗ + (1− δλ)S > w + S] I [w∗ + (1− δλ)S > b+ (1− δpi)S] dG (w∗) dF (w) ,
or
Pm =
∫ w
wr∗
F (z − δλS)g (z) dz.
which gives equation (4.4).
Determination of Pu
Pu writes formally as
Pu = P [{b+ (1− δpi)S > w + S} ∩ {b+ (1− δpi)S > w∗ + (1− δλ)S}] .
(4.82)
We have
Pu =
∫ w
0
∫ w
0
I [b+ (1− δpi)S > w + S] I [b+ (1− δpi)S > w∗ + (1− δλ)S] dG (w∗) dF (w) ,
or
Pu=
∫ w
0
I [wr > w]G(w∗r)dF (w) = F (wr)G(w∗r).
Deriving, we have:
dPu
dS
= f(wr)G(w∗r)
∂wr
∂S
+ F (wr)g(w∗r)
∂w∗r
∂S
,
which leads to equation (4.7) and thus to Proposition 2.
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Determination of Pw
The local employment probability is formally
Pw = P [{w + S > b+ (1− δpi)S} ∩ {w + S > w∗ + (1− δλ)S}] , (4.83)
and can be shown to be equal to
Pw =
∫ w
0
∫ w
0
I [w + S > b+ (1− δpi)S] I [w + S > w∗ + (1− δλ)S] dG (w∗) dF (w) ,
or
Pw =
∫ w
0
I [w > wr]G(w + δλS)dF (w) ,
which gives equation (4.8).
4.8.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. One derives now the value of EU2 in detailing the different cases:
EU2 =
∫ w¯
0
∫ w¯
0
 (b+ (1− δpi)S) I [b− δpiS > w] I [b+ (1− δpi)S > w
∗ + (1− δλ)S] +
(w + S)I [w + δpiS) > b] I [w + S > w∗ + (1− δλ)S] +
(w∗ + (1− δλ)S)I [w∗ + (1− δλ)S > b+ (1− δpi)S] I [w∗ + (1− δλ)S > w + S]
 dF (w)dG(w∗).
Extending the cumulative distribution function above its support, i.e. ∀w,w∗ >
w ⇒ F (w) = G(w∗) = 1 and f(w) = g(w∗) = 0, this expression rewrites as
EU2 = (b+ (1− δpi)S)F (wr)G(w∗r)
+
∫ w¯
wr
(w + S)G(w + δλS)dF (w)
+
∫ w¯
w∗r
[w∗ + (1− δλ)S]F (w∗ − δλS)dG(w∗).
Pose S′ = δλS and note that w∗r = wr + S′, we can rewrite it as
EU2 = (b+ (1− δpi)S)F (wr)G(w∗r)
+
∫ w¯
wr
(w + S)G(w + S′)dF (w)
+
∫ w¯
w∗r
[w∗ + (1− δλ)S]F (w∗ − S′)dG(w∗).
A variable change is useful: pose z = w∗ − S′, we have
EU2 = (b+ (1− δpi)S)F (wr)G(w∗r)
+
∫ w¯
wr
(w + S)G(w + S′)f(w)dw
+
∫ w¯−S′
wr
(z + S)F (z)g(z + S′)dz. (4.84)
Note that∫ w¯−S′
wr
(z+S)F (z)g(z+S′)dz =
∫ w¯
wr
(z+S)F (z)g(z+S′)dz−
∫ w¯
w¯−S′
(z+S)F (z)g(z+S′)dz,
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and, in the second term, z+S′ > w¯ thus, g(z+S′) ≡ 0. The integrals in (4.84)
can thus be simplified as
EU2 = (b+ (1− δpi)S)F (wr)G(w∗r)
+
∫ w¯
wr
(w + S)d[G(w + S′)F (w)]dw. (4.85)
Note also that wr + S = b+ (1− δpi)S, hence there is a simplification here.
Let us integrate (4.85) by part. We have∫ w¯
wr
(w+S)d[G(w+S′)F (w)]dw = w¯+S−(wr+S)G(w∗r)F (wr)−
∫ w¯
wr
F (w)G(w+S′)dw,
which immediately implies
EU2 = w¯ + S −
∫ w¯
wr
F (w)G(w + S′)dw,
or
EU2 = w¯ + S −
∫ w¯
b−δpiS
G(z + δλS)F (z)dz. (4.86)
Deriving with respect to S leads to
∂EU2
∂S
= 1− δpiG(w∗r)F (wr)− δλ
∫ w¯
wr
g(z + δλS)F (z)dz.
4.8.4 Properties of EU2
First order derivative
Deriving equation (4.11), we have
dEU2
dS
= 1− δpiG(w∗r)F (wr)− δλ
∫ w¯
wr
g(z + δλS)F (z)dz. (4.87)
Then, we can rewrite Pm after a change of variable:
Pm =
∫ w
wr∗
F (z − δλS)g(z)dz
=
∫ w−δλS
w∗r−δλS
F (z′)g(z′ + δλS)dz′,
with z′ = z−δλS. Since w∗r−δλS = wr and g(z′+δλS) ≡ 0 for all z′ > gw−δλS,
the last term of equation (4.87) precisely corresponds to δλPm. Hence, equation
(4.12).
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Second order derivative
Replacing dPm/dS and dPu/dS as calculated in Section 4.3 into (4.87), we
have:
d2EU2/dS
2 = −δλ(δpi − δλ)F (wr)g(w∗r) + δλ2
∫ w
w∗r
f(z − δλS)g(z)dz
−δpi[−δpif(wr)G(w∗r) + F (wr)g(w∗r)(δλ − δpi)].
Rearranging terms, we obtain
d2EU2/dS
2 = F (wr)g(w∗r)(δpi−δλ)2+δ2pif(wr)G(w∗r)+δλ2
∫ w
w∗r
f(z−δλS)g(z)dz,
(4.88)
which is strictly positive unless δpi = δλ = 0.
Third order derivative
Deriving (4.88), we have then, after rearranging terms,
d3EU2/dS
3 = g′(w∗r)F (wr)(δλ − δpi)3 + (δpi − δλ)2δλf(wr)g(w∗r)
−δλ3
∫ w
w∗r
f ′(z − δλS)g(z)dz − δpi3f ′(wr)G(w∗r).
Again, this is equal to zero when δpi = δλ = 0. The sign is ambiguous.
4.8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The proof has to be made taking several cases into account:
• Let start by assuming that d3EU2dS3 < 0 ∀S ∈ IR+0 . i.e. dEU2dS is strictly
concave. In this case, Ŝ∗(S) is a function ∀S ∈ IR+0 . Two cases have
to be analyzed: First, suppose that C ′0(S)σ(S) >
dEU2
dS for S → 0. In
this case, we necessarily have a corner solution (corresponding to a local
maximum) and we may have other interior solution(s). Note that the
corner solution is unstable. Second, suppose that C ′0(S)σ(S) >
dEU2
dS for
S → 0. We do not have corner solution, but we must have an interior
solution: Since lim
s→0
Ŝ∗(S) > 0 and lim
s→+∞
dŜ∗(S)
dS
= 0, we must have, at
least, one intersection between Ŝ∗(S) and the 45 degree line.
• Suppose now that dEU2dS is not strictly concave. In this case, Ŝ∗(S) may be
a correspondence rather than a function. As before, as long as C ′0(S)σ(S) >
dEU2
dS for S → 0, we have (at least) a corner solution (unstable). We
should also have another interior solution (stable) but we may have more.
To better understand how this correspondence is shaped, it is instructive
to look at Figure (4.2) and (4.3). The end of this proof is presented for
C ′0(S)σ(S) <
dEU2
dS when S → 0. In this situation, Ŝ∗(S) may be a cor-
respondence, but with a positive slope. Let S1 be the tangency point
between C ′0(S)σ(S) and
dEU2
dS . When S ∈ (0, S1), if the correspondence
crosses the 45 degree line, we have a stable equilibrium. If it does not
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cross it, let us consider the second part of this correspondence, that is for
S ∈ (0, S2), S2 being the tangency point between C ′0(S)σ(S) and dEU2dS ,
for the highest level of S. This second part is necessarily higher (in terms
of the level of S) and S2 < S1. Since Ŝ∗(S) has an horizontal asymptote,
we necessarily have an intersection between with the 45 degree line when
the first part of the correspondence does not have intersection.
4.9 Data Appendix
4.9.1 Description of the explicative variables
• House tenure: in the survey, this variable refers to the following question:
Does your household own this dwelling or do you rent it? The possible
answers are (1) owner, (2) tenant / subtenant, paying rent (including when
rent recovered from housing benefit) and (3) accommodation is provided
rent-free.
• Age category: we grouped individuals into four categories: 16-24, 16-34,
35-54, and 55-64.
• Education: in the survey, this variable refers to the following question:
Age when the Highest Level of General or Higher Education was Com-
pleted. The possible answers are numbers between 9 and 75. To correct
for potential bias we followed the procedure proposed in Wasmer et al.
(2005).
• Household size: in the survey, this variable refers to the following question:
Household Size (Total Number of Household Members at Present). The
possible answers are numbers between 1 and 96. We grouped the answers
into five categories: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5+.
• Marital status: in the survey, this variable refers to the following ques-
tion: Present Marital Status. The possible answers are (1) Married, (2)
Separated, (3) Divorced, (4) Widowed, (5) Never married.
• Regional dummies: in the survey, this variable refers to the following ques-
tion: Region in which the Household is Presently Situated. The classifi-
cation followed for this question is the NUTS2 AGGREGATES from the
European Commission, which considers comparable regions with a popula-
tion comprised between 800 000 and 3 millions inhabitants. For more infor-
mation, please refer to the following web site: http : //ec.europa.eu/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts.
Note also that some countries like the Netherlands have not filled this
question.
4.9.2 Description of the instruments
As explained in the text, we tried several intruments. The one we found
most convincing is the average level of social capital in the region where the
individual lives: it is clearly exogenous to the individuals and fairly correlated
to individual’s social capital. We have however made several other attempts.
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A first set of additional instrument relates to the regional vote and turnout
in elections. In particular, we considered regional turnout at parliamentary
elections. The intuition is that higher turnout is the sign of higher social co-
hesion, hence more social capital. Exogeneity in the unemployment/mobility
equation is insured by the fact that we choose lagged turnout, that is, the last
election before year 1990 in each available country. The data are missing for
Austria, Greece and France. Unfortunately, correlation with our measures of
social capital was poor, resulting in important loss of efficiency.
A second set of additional instruments can be found in the anthropological
analysis of family structures. Todd (1990), a well known demographer and
anthropologist, has argued that such structures are extremely stable over the
pace of centuries, and can be categorized in four or five groups, based on the
balance of authority (nuclear vs. “souche”, that is, patriarcal) and of the type
transmission of land and wealth (equalitarian, each offspring getting an equal
share, or inequalitarian, the elder getting the largest share). Combining these
two criteria leads, according to Todd, to a map of regions in Europe where in
each region, one type of the four possible family structure is dominant, with
sometimes several types coexisting. Note that we discovered after doing this
that Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004b) had used similar instruments for their US
study. In attributing a number for each category of structure, we build an
instrument for social capital which is used in individual regressions. It appears
to be very correlated with our measures of social capital. With this set of
instruments, the results are robust for the mobility equation. However, for the
unemployment equation results were not consistent across specifications.
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4.10 Tables
Table 4.1: Mobility rates, 15-64 population, head of households
Mobility rate outside the area within three years
Country Any Job related
Denmark 0.054 0.020
Netherlands 0.029 0.010
Belgium 0.013 0.003
France 0.042 0.025
Ireland 0.010 0.003
Greece 0.011 0.006
Spain 0.009 0.005
Portugal 0.007 0.001
Austria 0.015 0.006
Finland 0.058 0.024
Germany 0.021 0.008
UK 0.072 0.027
Total 0.025 0.011
Notes: EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001,
survey weight.
Source: ECHP and Wasmer et al. (2005)
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Table 4.6: Summary of the Theoretical Results on the Impact of Social Capital
on Mobility and Unemployment
Effect of various types S is more local S is local and S is not local, S is fully
of social capital on than not professional but professional general
professional (friends, neighb.) (profess. membership) (chess assoc.)
↓ δλ > δpi δλ > 0 δλ = 0 δλ = 0
δpi = 0 δpi > 0 δpi = 0
Mobility - - + 0
Unemployment ? + - 0
Local Employment + + + 0
Table 4.7: Log Unemployment Rate Regressed on our Measures of Social Capi-
tal.
Friends 1.176 1.746
(4.10)*** (3.32)***
Neighbors 1.729 0.388
(4.52)*** (0.72)
Constant 1.434 1.085 0.879
(8.87)*** (4.84)*** (4.00)***
Observations 95 80 80
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.2 0.29
Note: The estimation is by OLS using 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data and the unemployment rates are the standardized OECD rates.
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4.8: Log Unemployment Rate Regressed on Measures of Social Capital
and Labor Market Institutions.
Friends 0.92 7.239
(2.44)** (6.69)**
Neighbors 2.518 -2.672
(6.83)** (3.25)**
Total Tax Wedge 0.03 0.026 0.041 0.03
(6.71)** (5.74)** (10.41)** (8.80)**
Union Density 0.003 0.000 0.004 -0.021
(1.38) (0.06) (1.46) (4.88)**
Union Coverage Index 0.527 0.39 0.042 -0.765
(3.49)** (2.49)* (0.27) (4.58)**
Co-ordination (Union+Employer) -0.274 -0.124 -0.145 -0.495
(5.52)** (1.59) (2.70)** (4.77)**
Replacement Rate 0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.004
(0.96) (0.16) (1.78) (1.94)
Benefit Duration 0.095 0.126 0.197 0.236
(2.59)** (3.35)** (4.33)** (6.82)**
Active Labor Market Policies -0.000 -0.000 0.024 0.127
(0.1) (0.02) (2.33)* (7.37)**
Observations 87 87 72 72
Number of countries 12 12 10 10
R2 0.6219 0.6516 0.8142 0.8976
Note: The estimation is by Random Effect GLS using 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data, data on labor market institutions is taken from Nickell and Layard (1999)
and the unemployment rates are the standardized OECD rates. Some ECHP data was not available for Germany and Sweden.
Constant and time dummies not reported. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.9: Log Unemployment Rate Regressed on Measures of Social Capi-
tal and Labor Market Institutions, Where Social Capital Measures are Instru-
mented.
Friends 3.712 13.436
(4.09)** (6.12)*
Neighbors 2.632 -7.112
(7.00)** (4.36)**
Total Tax Wedge 0.015 0.042 0.02
(2.21)* (10.46)** (4.00)**
Union Density -0.011 0.004 -0.043
(2.31)* (1.51) (5.25)**
Union Coverage Index -0.027 0.025 -1.456
(0.11) (0.16) (5.15)**
Co-ordination (Union+Employer) 0.332 -0.14 1.044
(2.06)* (2.60)** (5.22)**
Replacement Rate -0.006 0.004 -0.011
(1.5) (1.82) (3.35)**
Benefit Duration 0.219 0.199 0.269
(3.90)** (4.37)** (6.03)**
Active Labor Market Policies 0.001 0.024 0.215
(0.16) (2.29)* (6.57)**
Observations 87 72 72
Number of Countries 12 10 10
R2 0.4976 0.8140 0.8525
Note: The estimation is by Instrumental Variable Random Effect GLS using 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Social capital is instrumented by the employment protection index and owner occupation rate before 1994 from Nickell and Layard (1999).
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data, data on labor market institutions is taken from Nickell and Layard (1999)
and the unemployment rates are the standardized OECD rates. Some ECHP data was not available for Germany and Sweden.
Constant and time dummies not reported. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.10: Probit Regression Explaining Inter-Area Mobility at Time t+1
Friends at t -0.139 -0.104 -0.115 -0.079
(5.06)** (3.54)** (3.94)** (2.51)*
Neighbors at t -0.149 -0.125 -0.159 -0.141
(5.48)** (4.29)** (5.44)** (4.46)**
Club at t -0.063 -0.059 -0.059 -0.055
(3.08)** (2.85)** (2.59)** (2.40)*
Male ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Female -0.014 -0.012 -0.02 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.022 -0.018
(0.66) (0.58) (0.9) (0.69) (0.66) (0.57) (0.94) (0.75)
Rent-free accommodation at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Owner at t -0.516 -0.52 -0.499 -0.504 -0.5 -0.506 -0.491 -0.497
(10.21)** (10.29)** (9.48)** (9.54)** (9.47)** (9.58)** (8.93)** (9.01)**
Tenant with rent at t -0.095 -0.099 -0.087 -0.09 -0.088 -0.093 -0.085 -0.089
(1.83) (1.9) (1.6) (1.66) (1.6) (1.69) (1.47) (1.55)
Age category 16-25 at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Age category 26-35 at t -0.039 -0.023 -0.042 -0.053 -0.028 -0.012 -0.04 -0.046
(1.29) (0.76) (1.31) (1.67) (0.85) (0.38) (1.15) (1.32)
Age category 36-45 at t -0.309 -0.283 -0.305 -0.322 -0.298 -0.273 -0.304 -0.313
(8.69)** (8.00)** (8.27)** (8.63)** (7.67)** (7.08)** (7.47)** (7.64)**
Age category 46-55 at t -0.434 -0.405 -0.437 -0.453 -0.435 -0.406 -0.445 -0.453
(10.62)** (10.02)** (10.41)** (10.64)** (9.75)** (9.25)** (9.69)** (9.73)**
Age category 56-65 at t -0.536 -0.502 -0.525 -0.539 -0.568 -0.536 -0.571 -0.576
(9.48)** (8.90)** (8.92)** (9.11)** (9.46)** (8.97)** (9.13)** (9.17)**
Years of education at t 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012
(7.07)** (7.15)** (7.04)** (6.71)** (5.66)** (5.65)** (5.56)** (5.28)**
Employed at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Unemployed at t -0.009 -0.002 -0.018 -0.006 0 0.007 -0.008 0.003
(0.26) (0.05) (0.54) (0.17) (0.01) (0.2) (0.22) (0.09)
Living alone at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Two members -0.16 -0.152 -0.149 -0.156 -0.133 -0.126 -0.119 -0.123
in household at t (4.53)** (4.31)** (4.01)** (4.21)** (3.40)** (3.24)** (2.89)** (2.97)**
Three members -0.31 -0.3 -0.298 -0.299 -0.281 -0.271 -0.266 -0.264
in household at t (8.56)** (8.29)** (7.86)** (7.87)** (7.15)** (6.92)** (6.43)** (6.37)**
Four members -0.442 -0.43 -0.435 -0.433 -0.406 -0.395 -0.391 -0.387
in household at t (11.86)** (11.55)** (11.05)** (10.99)** (9.98)** (9.71)** (9.01)** (8.91)**
Five members -0.497 -0.485 -0.482 -0.48 -0.477 -0.465 -0.459 -0.454
in household at t (11.47)** (11.20)** (10.61)** (10.57)** (10.33)** (10.10)** (9.45)** (9.35)**
Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Separated at t 0.141 0.132 0.12 0.121 0.131 0.123 0.106 0.106
(1.56) (1.46) (1.2) (1.2) (1.53) (1.43) (1.11) (1.11)
Divorced at t 0.011 0.006 0.023 0.023 0.018 0.014 0.035 0.037
(0.27) (0.16) (0.54) (0.54) (0.41) (0.32) (0.77) (0.8)
Widowed at t 0.004 0.006 0.025 0.035 -0.002 0.001 0.014 0.022
(0.05) (0.07) (0.27) (0.37) (0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.22)
Never married at t -0.14 -0.15 -0.153 -0.151 -0.186 -0.195 -0.206 -0.205
(5.11)** (5.45)** (5.32)** (5.26)** (6.16)** (6.42)** (6.43)** (6.38)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Region dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 403568 403568 385403 385403 357122 357122 339086 339086
Pseudo R2 0.1610 0.1584 0.1587 0.1592 0.1818 0.1774 0.1782 0.1800
Note: The estimation is by Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.)
The reference for the interpretation of the dummy variables is an employed male with rent-free accommodation, married
aged 16-24, living alone.
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.11: Instrumental Variable Probit Regression Explaining Inter-Area Mo-
bility at Time t+1
Friends at t -0.454 -0.378 -0.413 -0.330
(5.08)** (3.65)** (4.39)** (2.99)**
Neighbors at t -0.146 -0.001 -0.145 -0.007
(2.27)* (0.01) (2.07)* (0.08)
Club at t -0.040 -0.010 -0.021 0.006
(0.86) (0.21) (0.41) (0.12)
Male ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Female -0.006 -0.003 -0.009 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.011 -0.008
(0.24) (0.11) (0.33) (0.20) (0.32) (0.21) (0.41) (0.28)
Rent-free accommodation at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Owner at t -0.475 -0.474 -0.455 -0.459 -0.454 -0.454 -0.442 -0.445
(8.64)** (8.63)** (7.91)** (7.95)** (8.05)** (8.04)** (7.45)** (7.48)**
Tenant with rent at t -0.053 -0.055 -0.038 -0.038 -0.045 -0.048 -0.036 -0.036
(0.94) (0.97) (0.64) (0.63) (0.78) (0.82) (0.58) (0.58)
Age category 16-25 at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Age category 26-35 at t -0.048 -0.005 -0.029 -0.063 -0.024 0.016 -0.017 -0.046
(1.25) (0.13) (0.72) (1.55) (0.56) (0.39) (0.38) (1.01)
Age category 36-45 at t -0.348 -0.278 -0.310 -0.368 -0.324 -0.260 -0.302 -0.351
(7.81)** (6.63)** (6.98)** (7.63)** (6.65)** (5.69)** (6.16)** (6.62)**
Age category 46-55 at t -0.450 -0.371 -0.409 -0.472 -0.434 -0.361 -0.407 -0.461
(8.90)** (7.80)** (8.12)** (8.69)** (7.89)** (7.01)** (7.40)** (7.76)**
Age category 56-65 at t -0.557 -0.476 -0.508 -0.570 -0.582 -0.508 -0.554 -0.607
(8.51)** (7.44)** (7.43)** (8.05)** (8.37)** (7.49)** (7.65)** (8.06)**
Years of education at t 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009
(4.97)** (5.42)** (5.13)** (4.41)** (3.67)** (3.99)** (3.71)** (3.13)**
Employed at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Unemployed at t 0.019 0.015 -0.004 0.010 0.045 0.042 0.028 0.040
(0.48) (0.36) (0.10) (0.25) (1.07) (0.98) (0.62) (0.90)
Living alone at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Two members -0.198 -0.174 -0.167 -0.188 -0.166 -0.146 -0.134 -0.150
in household at t (4.83)** (4.26)** (3.82)** (4.29)** (3.70)** (3.27)** (2.78)** (3.10)**
Three members -0.325 -0.303 -0.298 -0.313 -0.294 -0.274 -0.266 -0.278
in household at t (8.06)** (7.54)** (6.99)** (7.30)** (6.81)** (6.40)** (5.77)** (5.99)**
Four members -0.421 -0.394 -0.392 -0.410 -0.380 -0.355 -0.344 -0.358
in household at t (9.97)** (9.37)** (8.68)** (8.95)** (8.32)** (7.84)** (6.96)** (7.16)**
Five members -0.491 -0.464 -0.456 -0.474 -0.474 -0.450 -0.438 -0.452
in household at t (9.86)** (9.36)** (8.66)** (8.89)** (9.00)** (8.60)** (7.81)** (7.97)**
Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Separated at t 0.065 0.051 0.036 0.043 0.053 0.040 0.022 0.029
(0.64) (0.51) (0.32) (0.38) (0.57) (0.43) (0.21) (0.28)
Divorced at t -0.014 -0.022 -0.005 -0.001 -0.007 -0.015 0.011 0.016
(0.30) (0.46) (0.09) (0.01) (0.13) (0.29) (0.20) (0.29)
Widowed at t 0.023 0.013 0.042 0.053 0.024 0.016 0.037 0.046
(0.22) (0.12) (0.39) (0.49) (0.22) (0.14) (0.31) (0.39)
Never married at t -0.120 -0.145 -0.148 -0.130 -0.169 -0.193 -0.204 -0.187
(3.76)** (4.54)** (4.32)** (3.78)** (4.88)** (5.55)** (5.40)** (4.96)**
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Region Dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 316463 316463 299625 299625 279365 279365 262824 262824
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Note: The estimation is by IV Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.)
Here, social capital is instrumented with its lag and the lag of the other explicative variables.
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.12: Instrumental Variable Probit Regression Explaining Inter-Area Mo-
bility at Time t+1
Friends at t -0.253 0.260
(0.99) (0.69)
Neighbors at t -0.876 -0.866
(2.99)** (2.01)*
Club at t -0.605 -0.415
(1.40) (0.91)
Male ref ref ref ref
Female -0.019 0.007 -0.084 -0.037
(0.78) (0.28) (1.55) (0.61)
Rent-free accommodation at t ref ref ref ref
Owner at t -0.489 -0.510 -0.452 -0.481
(8.76)** (9.03)** (7.36)** (7.59)**
Tenant with rent at t -0.090 -0.121 -0.099 -0.124
(1.57) (2.07)* (1.61) (1.99)*
Age category 16-25 at t ref ref ref ref
Age category 26-35 at t 0.022 0.046 0.015 0.039
(0.53) (1.15) (0.36) (0.83)
Age category 36-45 at t -0.263 -0.219 -0.245 -0.206
(5.05)** (4.93)** (5.06)** (3.26)**
Age category 46-55 at t -0.369 -0.315 -0.349 -0.301
(6.29)** (6.24)** (6.20)** (4.10)**
Age category 56-65 at t -0.503 -0.422 -0.483 -0.406
(6.81)** (6.02)** (6.44)** (4.39)**
Years of education at t 0.010 0.006 0.018 0.011
(3.91)** (1.95) (3.07)** (1.63)
Employed at t ref ref ref ref
Unemployed at t 0.047 0.095 -0.007 0.054
(1.09) (2.05)* (0.15) (0.91)
Living alone at t ref ref ref ref
Two members -0.160 -0.158 -0.151 -0.146
in household at t (3.60)** (3.52)** (3.10)** (3.06)**
Three members -0.306 -0.287 -0.301 -0.279
in household at t (7.13)** (6.71)** (6.44)** (5.93)**
Four members -0.396 -0.369 -0.382 -0.354
in household at t (8.71)** (8.24)** (7.80)** (7.16)**
Five members -0.465 -0.433 -0.445 -0.412
in household at t (8.89)** (8.40)** (7.92)** (7.47)**
Married at t ref ref ref ref
Separated at t 0.057 0.010 -0.002 -0.038
(0.60) (0.11) (0.02) (0.35)
Divorced at t -0.005 -0.029 -0.014 -0.030
(0.10) (0.57) (0.25) (0.52)
Widowed at t -0.018 -0.010 -0.002 0.009
(0.17) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08)
Never married at t -0.160 -0.196 -0.196 -0.228
(4.31)** (5.60)** (5.40)** (4.68)**
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummies No No No No
Observations 286362 286362 269339 269339
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17
Note: The estimation is by IV Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.)
Here, social capital is instrumented by the regional average of social capital measures and their lag.
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.13: Fixed-Effect Logit Regression Explaining Inter-Area Mobility at
Time t+1
Friends at t 0.048 0.106
(0.63) (1.23)
Neighbors at t -0.291 -0.345
(3.57)** (3.84)**
Club at t -0.082 -0.077
(1.12) (1.05)
Rent-free accommodation at t ref ref ref ref
Owner at t -0.407 -0.416 -0.271 -0.281
(2.42)* (2.47)* (1.46) (1.52)
Tenant with rent at t 0.464 0.458 0.561 0.56
(2.80)** (2.77)** (3.09)** (3.08)**
Age category 16-25 at t ref ref ref ref
Age category 26-35 at t -0.351 -0.351 -0.335 -0.33
(2.87)** (2.87)** (2.52)* (2.47)*
Age category 36-45 at t -0.426 -0.424 -0.36 -0.361
(2.25)* (2.24)* (1.73) (1.73)
Age category 46-55 at t -0.307 -0.31 -0.208 -0.215
(1.15) (1.17) (0.71) (0.73)
Age category 56-65 at t 0.006 0.012 0.067 0.076
(0.02) (0.03) (0.16) (0.18)
Years of education at t 0.019 0.02 0.018 0.018
(2.22)* (2.27)* (1.91) (1.9)
Employed at t ref ref ref ref
Unemployed at t 0.314 0.325 0.28 0.294
(2.96)** (3.05)** (2.48)* (2.59)**
Living alone at t ref ref ref ref
Two members 0.018 0.015 -0.08 -0.069
in household at t (0.17) (0.15) (0.72) (0.63)
Three members 0.043 0.047 -0.023 0.001
in household at t (0.35) (0.39) (0.17) (0.01)
Four members 0.228 0.24 0.146 0.173
in household at t (1.67) (1.77) (1.00) (1.18)
Five members 0.406 0.413 0.361 0.386
in household at t (2.26)* (2.29)* (1.85) (1.97)*
Married at t ref ref ref ref
Separated at t 0.003 -0.012 -0.094 -0.11
(0.02) (0.06) (0.4) (0.47)
Divorced at t 0.031 0.035 0.011 0.009
(0.19) (0.21) (0.06) (0.05)
Widowed at t 0.835 0.846 0.707 0.709
(1.64) (1.66) (1.3) (1.32)
Never married at t 0.108 0.104 -0.05 -0.052
(0.87) (0.84) (0.37) (0.39)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12013 12013 9717 9717
Number of individuals 2306 2306 2062 2062
Note: The estimation is by Fixed-Effect Logit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European
economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was missing for Germany and Sweden.)
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.14: Probit Regression Explaining Individual Unemployment at Time
t+1
Friends at t 0.005 0.005 -0.004 -0.003
(0.39) (0.38) (0.27) (0.18)
Neighbors at t 0.052 0.061 0.045 0.058
(4.04)** (4.53)** (3.23)** (3.90)**
Club at t -0.131 -0.133 -0.135 -0.137
(11.74)** (11.87)** (10.57)** (10.67)**
Male ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Female 0.12 0.118 0.115 0.113 0.113 0.112 0.109 0.107
(12.42)** (12.24)** (11.63)** (11.42)** (10.70)** (10.57)** (9.92)** (9.74)**
Rent-free accommodation at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Owner at t -0.123 -0.122 -0.122 -0.121 -0.115 -0.115 -0.116 -0.115
(5.00)** (4.97)** (4.87)** (4.83)** (4.56)** (4.54)** (4.48)** (4.45)**
Tenant with rent at t 0.078 0.08 0.065 0.067 0.108 0.109 0.096 0.097
(3.01)** (3.07)** (2.44)* (2.51)* (4.04)** (4.08)** (3.50)** (3.55)**
Age category 16-25 at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Age category 26-35 at t -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.051 -0.079 -0.079 -0.08 -0.08
(3.50)** (3.52)** (3.42)** (3.39)** (4.97)** (4.94)** (4.87)** (4.88)**
Age category 36-45 at t -0.101 -0.102 -0.092 -0.091 -0.149 -0.149 -0.14 -0.14
(5.79)** (5.85)** (5.17)** (5.09)** (7.81)** (7.81)** (7.14)** (7.15)**
Age category 46-55 at t 0.005 0.003 0.014 0.015 -0.05 -0.05 -0.041 -0.042
(0.24) (0.18) (0.74) (0.76) (2.41)* (2.43)* (1.94) (2.00)*
Age category 56-65 at t 0.18 0.177 0.176 0.174 0.15 0.148 0.145 0.142
(7.49)** (7.39)** (7.48)** (7.39)** (5.78)** (5.71)** (5.73)** (5.58)**
Years of education at t -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019
(19.52)** (19.28)** (17.32)** (16.92)** (19.55)** (19.33)** (17.22)** (16.94)**
Employed at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Unemployed at t 1.931 1.928 1.926 1.922 1.904 1.902 1.901 1.897
(149.89)** (149.47)** (148.08)** (147.44)** (133.96)** (133.49)** (132.39)** (131.71)**
Living alone at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Two members 0.098 0.099 0.093 0.095 0.068 0.069 0.064 0.065
in household at t (4.43)** (4.46)** (4.09)** (4.15)** (2.69)** (2.72)** (2.41)* (2.44)*
Three members 0.128 0.127 0.118 0.118 0.073 0.073 0.061 0.06
in household at t (5.75)** (5.72)** (5.14)** (5.12)** (2.91)** (2.90)** (2.33)* (2.30)*
Four members 0.15 0.149 0.139 0.138 0.081 0.08 0.066 0.065
in household at t (6.60)** (6.56)** (5.97)** (5.94)** (3.13)** (3.11)** (2.47)* (2.44)*
Five members 0.204 0.203 0.192 0.191 0.123 0.122 0.107 0.106
in household at t (8.64)** (8.60)** (7.89)** (7.85)** (4.60)** (4.58)** (3.84)** (3.81)**
Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Separated at t 0.202 0.205 0.171 0.175 0.224 0.227 0.191 0.194
(5.72)** (5.80)** (4.64)** (4.73)** (6.08)** (6.16)** (4.94)** (5.03)**
Divorced at t 0.211 0.212 0.196 0.197 0.264 0.265 0.251 0.252
(8.85)** (8.92)** (7.91)** (7.98)** (9.72)** (9.75)** (8.79)** (8.84)**
Widowed at t 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.011 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008
(0.36) (0.36) (0.27) (0.26) (0.08) (0.1) (0.15) (0.17)
Never married at t 0.205 0.207 0.202 0.204 0.224 0.225 0.222 0.224
(14.53)** (14.67)** (14.03)** (14.12)** (14.64)** (14.71)** (14.13)** (14.20)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Region dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 413599 413599 381493 381493 360291 360291 328309 328309
Pseudo R2 0.3439 0.3438 0.3439 0.3437 0.3646 0.3642 0.3643 0.3644
Note: The estimation is by Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.)
The reference for the interpretation of the dummy variables is an employed male with rent-free accommodation, married
aged 16-24, living alone.
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.15: Instrumental Variable Probit Regression Explaining Individual Un-
employment at Time t+1
Friends at t 0.116 0.096 0.090 0.068
(2.86)** (2.00)* (2.02)* (1.29)
Neighbors at t 0.163 0.165 0.145 0.160
(5.36)** (4.59)** (4.27)** (3.96)**
Club at t -0.254 -0.271 -0.244 -0.260
(10.72)** (11.24)** (9.06)** (9.47)**
Male
Female 0.113 0.107 0.094 0.087 0.106 0.101 0.087 0.081
(10.20)** (9.60)** (8.10)** (7.51)** (8.65)** (8.17)** (6.75)** (6.24)**
Rent-free accommodation at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Owner at t -0.141 -0.138 -0.133 -0.129 -0.129 -0.127 -0.123 -0.119
(4.93)** (4.83)** (4.64)** (4.47)** (4.43)** (4.33)** (4.17)** (4.03)**
Tenant with rent at t 0.071 0.076 0.056 0.062 0.100 0.104 0.086 0.092
(2.37)* (2.53)* (1.83) (2.03)* (3.22)** (3.36)** (2.74)** (2.91)**
Age category 16-25 at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Age category 26-35 at t -0.043 -0.052 -0.056 -0.050 -0.076 -0.084 -0.088 -0.084
(2.40)* (2.99)** (3.17)** (2.75)** (3.94)** (4.41)** (4.60)** (4.28)**
Age category 36-45 at t -0.086 -0.103 -0.096 -0.083 -0.140 -0.153 -0.146 -0.137
(4.05)** (5.03)** (4.57)** (3.76)** (6.00)** (6.82)** (6.36)** (5.67)**
Age category 46-55 at t 0.033 0.014 0.023 0.036 -0.027 -0.043 -0.035 -0.027
(1.44) (0.61) (1.03) (1.51) (1.06) (1.80) (1.44) (1.04)
Age category 56-65 at t 0.217 0.193 0.190 0.197 0.180 0.159 0.154 0.156
(7.62)** (6.88)** (7.00)** (7.00)** (5.83)** (5.26)** (5.26)** (5.15)**
Years of education at t -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 -0.020 -0.019 -0.017 -0.016
(15.35)** (14.86)** (12.91)** (11.32)** (15.66)** (15.19)** (13.20)** (11.90)**
Employed at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Unemployed at t 1.974 1.969 1.965 1.951 1.932 1.926 1.923 1.910
(132.17)** (131.75)** (131.03)** (128.49)** (116.99)** (116.55)** (116.37)** (113.99)**
Living alone at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Two members 0.114 0.111 0.101 0.108 0.079 0.077 0.069 0.074
in household at t (4.46)** (4.35)** (3.85)** (4.10)** (2.70)** (2.62)** (2.28)* (2.45)*
Three members 0.140 0.134 0.122 0.123 0.086 0.080 0.068 0.068
in household at t (5.42)** (5.19)** (4.60)** (4.62)** (2.94)** (2.76)** (2.25)* (2.25)*
Four members 0.161 0.152 0.140 0.141 0.087 0.080 0.066 0.067
in household at t (6.07)** (5.77)** (5.23)** (5.23)** (2.90)** (2.67)** (2.16)* (2.15)*
Five members 0.206 0.197 0.186 0.186 0.119 0.111 0.098 0.098
in household at t (7.45)** (7.15)** (6.60)** (6.56)** (3.79)** (3.56)** (3.05)** (3.02)**
Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Separated at t 0.231 0.240 0.195 0.203 0.244 0.253 0.206 0.215
(5.66)** (5.89)** (4.61)** (4.79)** (5.75)** (5.94)** (4.67)** (4.86)**
Divorced at t 0.214 0.220 0.199 0.203 0.261 0.265 0.250 0.253
(7.99)** (8.20)** (7.18)** (7.33)** (8.56)** (8.70)** (7.85)** (7.96)**
Widowed at t -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.017 -0.018 -0.013 -0.018
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.08) (0.32) (0.33) (0.24) (0.33)
Never married at t 0.210 0.221 0.210 0.210 0.230 0.238 0.229 0.230
(12.78)** (13.43)** (12.61)** (12.48)** (12.85)** (13.31)** (12.63)** (12.57)**
Time Dummies 0.164 0.166 0.160 0.161 0.144 0.146 0.139 0.140
Country Dummies (8.65)** (8.78)** (8.40)** (8.43)** (6.84)** (6.93)** (6.57)** (6.61)**
Region Dummies 0.104 0.108 0.103 0.103 0.085 0.089 0.083 0.083
Observations 312270 312270 295933 295933 271545 271545 255280 255280
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Note: The estimation is by IV Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.)
Here, social capital is instrumented with its lag and the lag of the other explicative variables.
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.16: Instrumental Variable Probit Regression Explaining Individual Un-
employment at Time t+1
Friends at t 0.572 0.329
(5.88)** (2.11)*
Neighbors at t 0.231 0.308
(2.23)* (1.84)
Club at t -2.153 -2.245
(14.16)** (13.45)**
Male
Female 0.099 0.089 -0.136 -0.153
(8.27)** (7.22)** (6.58)** (6.17)**
Rent-free accommodation at t
Owner at t -0.134 -0.132 -0.059 -0.044
(4.64)** (4.59)** (1.97)* (1.44)
Tenant with rent at t 0.103 0.105 0.010 0.026
(3.36)** (3.42)** (0.32) (0.80)
Age category 16-25 at t
Age category 26-35 at t -0.031 -0.072 -0.075 -0.055
(1.57) (3.97)** (3.97)** (2.40)*
Age category 36-45 at t -0.078 -0.150 -0.074 -0.037
(3.12)** (6.92)** (3.21)** (1.21)
Age category 46-55 at t 0.044 -0.038 0.057 0.097
(1.67) (1.64) (2.30)* (2.91)**
Age category 56-65 at t 0.248 0.162 0.221 0.247
(7.77)** (5.37)** (7.64)** (6.32)**
Years of education at t -0.019 -0.019 0.005 0.009
(14.75)** (14.12)** (2.22)* (3.52)**
Employed at t
Unemployed at t 1.956 1.961 1.821 1.784
(120.46)** (115.58)** (90.34)** (76.80)**
Living alone at t
Two members 0.112 0.099 0.064 0.074
in household at t (3.97)** (3.50)** (2.16)* (2.46)*
Three members 0.119 0.105 0.063 0.063
in household at t (4.23)** (3.76)** (2.12)* (2.09)*
Four members 0.136 0.116 0.089 0.091
in household at t (4.69)** (4.02)** (2.97)** (2.95)**
Five members 0.180 0.163 0.142 0.138
in household at t (5.99)** (5.40)** (4.53)** (4.26)**
Married at t
Separated at t 0.231 0.253 0.110 0.116
(5.75)** (6.23)** (2.53)* (2.62)**
Divorced at t 0.256 0.273 0.177 0.174
(8.82)** (9.36)** (5.68)** (5.54)**
Widowed at t -0.006 0.005 -0.040 -0.053
(0.13) (0.11) (0.77) (1.00)
Never married at t 0.207 0.242 0.200 0.190
(11.61)** (13.80)** (11.04)** (9.16)**
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummies No No No No
Observations 289026 289026 261298 261298
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Note: The estimation is by IV Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.)
Here, social capital is instrumented by the regional average of social capital measures and their lag.
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.17: Regressions Explaining Social Capital
Social Capital: Friends Neighbors Club
Estimation Method: OLS OLS Probit
Born in another region -0.04 -0.04 -0.039 -0.034 -0.116 -0.09
(13.43)** (13.25)** (10.93)** (9.40)** (9.25)** (6.89)**
Male ref ref ref ref ref ref
Female -0.009 -0.009 0.034 0.034 -0.369 -0.384
(3.92)** (3.85)** (12.31)** (12.27)** (36.47)** (36.58)**
Rent-free accommodation ref ref ref ref ref ref
Owner -0.006 -0.005 -0.027 -0.025 0.116 0.117
(0.98) (0.81) (3.83)** (3.54)** (4.87)** (4.86)**
Tenant with rent -0.014 -0.005 -0.049 -0.038 -0.083 -0.066
(2.08)* (0.79) (6.50)** (4.96)** (3.20)** (2.52)*
Age category 16-25 ref ref ref ref ref ref
Age category 26-35 -0.077 -0.078 0.006 0.006 0.01 0.017
(21.11)** (21.13)** (1.33) (1.43) (0.7) (1.1)
Age category 36-45 -0.132 -0.133 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.123
(31.61)** (31.56)** (4.14)** (4.20)** (6.38)** (6.89)**
Age category 46-55 -0.146 -0.148 0.03 0.032 0.129 0.139
(32.54)** (32.51)** (5.92)** (6.24)** (6.96)** (7.21)**
Age category 56-65 -0.136 -0.139 0.074 0.073 0.086 0.099
(24.93)** (25.22)** (12.52)** (12.22)** (3.89)** (4.35)**
Years of education -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 0.039 0.041
(18.52)** (14.70)** (28.95)** (25.15)** (39.82)** (40.22)**
Employed ref ref ref ref ref ref
Unemployed 0.035 0.029 0.076 0.075 -0.268 -0.246
(10.64)** (8.48)** (21.16)** (20.24)** (19.77)** (17.52)**
Living alone ref ref ref ref ref ref
Two members -0.044 -0.038 -0.007 -0.006 -0.043 -0.036
in household (8.13)** (6.86)** (1.05) (0.89) (1.85) (1.49)
Three members -0.033 -0.03 0.022 0.022 -0.071 -0.064
in household (6.11)** (5.36)** (3.42)** (3.37)** (3.03)** (2.65)**
Four members -0.042 -0.038 0.03 0.031 -0.045 -0.031
in household (7.61)** (6.77)** (4.62)** (4.70)** (1.88) (1.25)
Five members -0.038 -0.032 0.038 0.038 -0.057 -0.037
in household (6.54)** (5.46)** (5.56)** (5.46)** (2.27)* (1.43)
Married ref ref ref ref ref ref
Separated 0.019 0.019 -0.057 -0.06 -0.153 -0.157
(2.18)* (2.12)* (5.51)** (5.68)** (4.11)** (4.08)**
Divorced 0.019 0.019 -0.032 -0.027 -0.098 -0.095
(3.17)** (3.16)** (4.61)** (3.85)** (3.94)** (3.66)**
Widowed 0.024 0.026 0.012 0.014 -0.133 -0.123
(2.27)* (2.47)* (1.08) (1.21) (3.06)** (2.76)**
Never married 0.054 0.056 -0.033 -0.029 -0.06 -0.057
(15.82)** (16.29)** (8.49)** (7.44)** (4.22)** (3.85)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No
Region dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 390662 373813 390662 373813 376326 359660
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.14
Note: The estimation is by Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK.
Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.)
The reference for the interpretation of the dummy variables is an employed male, renting his accommodation,
aged 16-24, living alone and separated.
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.19: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max
Friends 566281 0.488 0.41 0 1
Neighbors 566281 0.438 0.43 0 1
Club 500053 37.4% 0.48 0 1
Geographic Mobility 441024 0.7% 0.08 0 1
Male 566281 57.1% 0.49 0 1
Female 566281 42.9% 0.49 0 1
Rent-free accommodation 560878 3.4% 0.18 0 1
Owner 560878 71.6% 0.45 0 1
Tenant with rent 560878 25.1% 0.43 0 1
Age category 16-25 566281 15.4% 0.36 0 1
Age category 26-35 566281 28.4% 0.45 0 1
Age category 36-45 566281 26.0% 0.44 0 1
Age category 46-55 566281 21.0% 0.41 0 1
Age category 56-65 566281 9.3% 0.29 0 1
Years of education 566281 10.5 5.53 0 25
Employed 566281 90.1% 0.30 0 1
Unemployed 566281 9.9% 0.30 0 1
Living alone 566281 8.9% 0.29 0 1
Two members in household 566281 19.9% 0.40 0 1
Three members in household 566281 22.3% 0.42 0 1
Four members in household 566281 28.2% 0.45 0 1
Five members in household 566281 20.7% 0.41 0 1
Separated 552771 1.4% 0.12 0 1
Divorced 552771 4.7% 0.21 0 1
Widowed 552771 1.4% 0.12 0 1
Never married 552771 33.8% 0.47 0 1
Notes: The summary statistics are calculated from the ECHP data over the period 1994-2001. 14 EU countries are considered:
Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Germany, UK.
The sample is restricted to the active population.
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Chapter 5
The impact of TFP growth
on skill mismatch
Abstract. While some recent studies have suggested that the capacity of
creative destruction to explain the link between growth and unemployment is
limited, I show that it does a better job in reproducing the relation between
growth and skill mismatch. With ECHP data, I illustrate that the correlation
between growth and skill mismatch is negative. I then introduce three mod-
els of growth and mismatch, which differ along the following dimensions: (i)
the presence (or absence) of on-the-job search, (ii) the incorporation (or not)
of technology renovation. My results suggest that a combination of both the
creative destruction and capitalization effects best explains the link between
growth and mismatch. While the first effect implies high destruction of bad
jobs, the second effect generates high worker mobility from bad to good jobs.
5.1 Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the literature on growth and labor markets.
The literature has typically identified two different effects of growth on labor
demand1. The so-called capitalization effect states that when growth is faster
firms anticipate higher future income and job creation is higher. On the other
hand, the so-called creative destruction effect implies that an acceleration in the
rate of growth leads to faster technology obsolescence and higher job destruction.
Obviously both effects have different consequences on unemployment. Some
studies have tried to analyze the importance of the two mechanisms by observing
the evolution of job flows or the level of unemployment. My paper fits in this
framework, but I focus on another labor market characteristic : skill mismatch.
A recent study by Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) has empirically assessed
the effect of total factor productivity (TFP) growth on the rate of unemploy-
ment. They find a strong negative impact and assert that creative destruction
plays no role in the steady-state dynamics of unemployment. They suggest that
future research should consider other classes of growth models to account for
1See Aghion and Howitt (1994, 1998), Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) and Pissarides
(2000).
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this difference between theory and empirics. This has for example led to new
contributions such as Michelacci and Lopez Salido (2007).
In contrast, studies with firm-level data, which have evaluated the link be-
tween job reallocation and aggregate productivity growth, seem to contradict
the result of Pissarides and Vallanti (2007). See for instance, Foster et al. (2001),
Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) and Campbell (1998). They illustrate that pe-
riods of fast technological change are characterized by high firm exit and job
destruction. In particular, the death of the least productive firms enables real-
location of resources to the most productive ones, which leads to improvement
in aggregate productivity2.
Likewise, other studies such as Bartel and Sicherman (1993, 1998) have
shown that industries characterized with higher rates of technological change
are associated with more training on the job. This suggests that human capital
obsolesces more quickly in those industries, which may lead to a larger propor-
tion of mismatched workers. All these results suggest that creative destruction
is an important factor influencing labor markets.
In this paper, I will present some empirical facts that suggest that, by inves-
tigating other labor market features such as skill mismatch, creative destruction
still matters in shaping labor market outcomes. My work does not aim at show-
ing that the capitalization effect does not play any role in the determination of
skill mismatch whereas creative destruction does. It stresses that both mecha-
nisms have explanatory power and skill mismatch can be best explained by a
combination of the two effects. Thus creative destruction should not be com-
pletely discarded from the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. I first have a look at the data in Sec-
tion 5.2 in order to underline the macroeconomic variables with which skill
mismatch is correlated. I also determine the sign of the correlations. Specifi-
cally, I show that mismatch is negatively correlated with total factor produc-
tivity growth and positively with employment protection legislation stringency.
The correlation between unemployment and mismatch is positive, but poor.
The Section is aimed at illustrating the stylized facts of skill mismatch, which
constitutes a basis for the subsequent Sections, where several versions of mod-
els of skill mismatch and growth are presented. The ability of the models to
reproduce the stylized facts will determine their validity.
In Section 5.3, I present a first model of growth and skill mismatch, which
I call the “pure creative-destruction” model because no capitalization effect
is present. I consider a framework along the lines of Pissarides (2000) and
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) where technological progress is embodied in
new firms and the labor market is characterized by search frictions. The differ-
ence with Pissarides (2000) is the introduction of skill mismatch. Undirected
search implies that workers can be either mis- or well-matched and on-the-job
search allows employed workers to find a better job. In spirits, this part of
the model is close to Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Dolado et al. (2004).
These papers consider a framework where skilled workers can accept jobs with
unskilled requirement. While waiting for a good offer, skilled workers are willing
to accept bad offers because of imperfect information and random matching on
the labor market leading to temporary mismatch.
2This phenomenon has also been highlighted in the context of the impact of market dereg-
ulation (see Olley and Pakes (1996)) or trade liberalization (see Pavcnik (2002)) on aggregate
productivity.
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The model clearly fails at reproducing the facts displayed in Section 5.2.
First, the influence of TFP growth on skill mismatch is ambiguous. It is char-
acterized by two effects with opposite sign on mismatch. The first one implies
that growth increases mismatch because it leads to shorter job lifetime. The
length of job lifetimes influences mismatch as it leaves more (or less) time to the
worker to find a suitable job and, if he gets it, it is for a longer (smaller) period3.
On the other hand, an acceleration in the rate of growth destroys proportionally
more bad jobs than good jobs because bad matches are less productive, implying
the ambiguity. Second, TFP growth has a positive impact on unemployment,
which is rejected by Pissarides and Vallanti (2007).
In Section 5.4, I introduce the possibility of technology updating, which
adds a capitalization effect to the model of Section 5.3. I depart from a first
version where no search on the job is considered. This extension greatly im-
proves the ability of the model at reproducing the stylized facts presented in
Section 5.2. For some range of parameters, technology updating results in be-
ing profitable for well-matched firms, while mismatched firms never consider
this option because productivity is too low in bad matches and technology up-
dating cost is consequently too high. This mechanism allows us to shut down
the first effect of growth on mismatch that is emphasized in Section 5.3 and
only leaves the destruction margin to influence the outcome. In this case, mis-
match is only determined by destruction of bad matches while the labor market
tightness does not have any impact. This implies that creative destruction is
the only channel that can influence mismatch, while the capitalization effect
influences unemployment through technology updating.
In Section 5.5, I extend the model of Section 5.4 to incorporate on-the-
job search. This is a natural extension as on-the-job search allows mismatched
workers to find a suitable job. In this context, the labor market tightness has
an effect on mismatch as it affects worker mobility from bad to good jobs. This
is not the case in the model of Section 5.4 and this suggests that the capitaliza-
tion effect alone can explain the positive correlation between growth and skill
mismatch. So why should we mind about the creative destruction effect? The
answer is a quantitative one. The facts presented in Section 5.2 show that mis-
match is strongly correlated with TFP growth, while the correlation between
unemployment and mismatch is poor. Creative destruction can then reconcile
this observation : by strengthening the destruction margin, one can increase
the response of mismatch to TFP growth, while it reduces the correlation with
unemployment.
I consider the introduction of a firing tax in Section 5.6. The results
suggest again that one can best reproduce the positive correlation between EPL
and skill mismatch by playing with both the job creation and destruction rates.
Employment protection then implies skill mismatch because it reduces both the
destruction rate of bad jobs and worker mobility from bad to good jobs. Of
3The fact that long periods of time allow workers to find a suitable job has been emphasized
for instance by Burdett (1978) and led Manning (2003) to reconsider human capital expla-
nation of the positive correlation between job tenure (or age) and wages. They emphasize
that because of random matching, a worker may not find a high-wage job immediately. She
then switches from job to job until she eventually finds a suitable offer. This implies that the
correlation between age (or job tenure) and the paid wage is positive. The work by Sicherman
(1991) supports this view in the particular skill-mismatch case of overeducation. He finds that
overeducated workers are younger and have higher rates of firm and occupational mobility. In
this context, the quality of the match has the same interpretation as the wage.
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course, these results were already known from the literature4, they are anyway
a useful robust check to assess of the quality of the models.
Finally Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Facts
Skill mismatch in the short run. The European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) database provides a measure of skill mismatch that is made comparable
across EU 15 countries. In this survey, individuals are asked whether they have
had formal training or education that has given them skills needed for their
present type of work. Figure 5.1 depicts the evolution of the share of workers
who disagree with this statement over the period 1994-2001. This graph shows
that business cycles influence the value taken by this measure: macroeconomic
improvements in 1997 led to a decrease in the share of mismatched workers in
most of the EU 15 countries.
This observation is confirmed by Figures 5.2 and 5.3, which show the evo-
lution of the decrease in unemployment rate in the EU 15 together with the
evolution of occupational and industry mobility respectively. In these graphs,
the unemployment measure is the standardized OECD unemployment rate and
gross and net mobility rates are defined as in Kambourov and Manovskii (2006a);
they are based on ECHP data. These Figures show an increase in mobility
in 1997, whichever measure of mobility is considered, followed by a persistent
decrease in unemployment. This decoupled pattern in the evolution of unem-
ployment variation and mobility is well known by macro labor economists5 and
reflects the impact of an economic expansion at business cycle frequencies. The
increase in labor demand makes search on the job more attractive leading to an
increase in job-to-job transition, but congestion on the labor market prevents
unemployed workers from immediately finding a job, which implies the observed
persistence in the decrease in unemployment.
Hence, positive shocks lead to a decrease in the share of mismatched workers
through economic restructuring and increased worker mobility. However, the
effect is clearly a small one. While we see important variations in unemployment,
the accompanied decrease in mismatch is marginal:
FACT 1. Reductions in unemployment are accompanied by a limited improve-
ment in the quality of matches.
Skill mismatch in the long run. Much of the variation in skill mismatch
cannot be explained by short-run shocks. Figure 5.1 shows that the share of
mismatched workers is quite persistent over time. In addition, this graph also
suggests a large heterogeneity between countries. If one decomposes the variance
of the data presented in Figure 5.1, one would remark that only 1% is explained
by the variance within a country, while about 99% is due to structural differences
between countries.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 depict the share of mismatched workers against total
factor productivity growth and employment protection legislation stringency
4See Bertola (1999) and Wasmer et al. (2005).
5See Burgess (1993) for instance.
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respectively6. In these graphs, the share of mismatched workers is an average
for each country of the data reported in Figure 5.1 over the whole sample pe-
riod 1994-2001, TFP growth comes from the Groningen Total Economy Growth
Accounting Database7 and the EPL index is the version 2 of the OECD EPL
strictness index8. The Figures show that skill mismatch is positively correlated
with TFP growth and negatively with employment protection. As summarized
in Table 5.1, the correlation coefficient between growth and mismatch is -0.58,
while it is 0.77 between EPL and mismatch.
Table 5.1: Skill mismatch, TFP growth, EPL and unemployment: Correlation
coefficients
Skill mismatch TFP growth EPL Unemp.
Skill mismatch 1 -0.58 0.77 0.08
TFP growth -0.58 1 -0.34 -0.35
EPL 0.77 -0.34 1 0.31
Unemp. 0.08 -0.35 0.31 1
Notes: the sample regroups the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, the UK. Skill mismatch is the 1994-2001 average of the share of workers who answered
negatively to the question “Have you had formal training or education that has given you skills needed for your
present type of work?” (ECHP data), TFP growth comes from the Groningen Total Economy Growth Database, the
EPL stringency index is the version 2 OECD index of the late 90s, the education variable (ECHP data) is constructed
following the procedure given in Wasmer et al. (2005) and unemployment is the average of the standardized OECD
rate over the period 1994-2001.
Thus I can characterize the following facts on the evolution of skill mismatch
in the long run:
FACT 2. TFP growth is negatively correlated with skill mismatch.
FACT 3. Employment protection legislation stringency is positively correlated
with skill mismatch.
Robustness. Table 5.2 shows that this pattern also holds after controlling
for unemployment and education9. Skill mismatch again decreases with growth
and increases with EPL stringency; the associated t-stat are respectively -2.21
and 3.60. However, labor markets characterized by high unemployment may
be thought as associated with high skill mismatch because of low job-to-job
mobility. This is not the case in the results presented in Table 5.2. While
the correlation between TFP growth and unemployment is negative (-0.35),
6In these Figures, Ireland has been removed because it clearly is an outlier. A possible
reason for the atypical pattern of the Irish economy is because high growth is recent in Ireland,
suggesting that the economy may be on a transition path, away from balanced growth. Postel-
Vinay (2002) illustrates how growth through creative destruction can have a different impact
depending on the time horizon, i.e. whether one focuses on the short or the long run.
7See Timmer et al. (2003).
8See OECD (1999).
9Behavioral economists may argue that the reason why the workers in my sample think
they have skills that differ from their job requirement is a psychological one. Studies such as
Kruger and Dunning (1999) have shown that individuals typically tend to over estimate their
own skill level. As long as this bias is uncorrelated with TFP growth, EPL and the other
controls, my results remain valid.
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the association between unemployment and mismatch is not significant at all10.
Likewise higher education may provide workers with a larger range of skills,
which may reduce mismatch. This control appears not to be significant either.
From the results of Table 5.1 and 5.2, I can establish an additional Fact on
the link between unemployment and skill mismatch. This observation will be
useful in the next Sections when I will try to assess the importance of creative
destruction in the evolution of labor markets:
FACT 4. While the correlation between TFP growth and unemployment is
negative, the correlation between mismatch and unemployment is poor.
Table 5.2: Skill mismatch: OLS regression results
TFP growth EPL Unemp. Education Constant Adj. R2
Coef. -0.152* 0.135*** -0.012 0.321* 0.6297
(0.069) (0.037) (0.008) (0.151)
Coef. -0.125* 0.96* -0.011 -0.030 0.736** 0.7367
(0.064) (0.041) (0.007) (0.019) (0.291)
Obs. 11
Notes: the sample regroups the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, the UK. Skill mismatch is the 1994-2001 average of the share of workers who answered
negatively to the question “Have you had formal training or education that has given you skills needed for your
present type of work?” (ECHP data), TFP growth comes from the Groningen Total Economy Growth Database, the
EPL stringency index is the version 2 OECD index of the late 90s, the education variable (ECHP data) is constructed
following the procedure given in Wasmer et al. (2005) and unemployment is the average of the standardized OECD
rate over the period 1994-2001. Standard errors are in parentheses. * refers to the 10% significativity level, ** to
5% and *** to 1%
Table 5.3 presents some results at the industry level as a robustness check of
the correlation between TFP growth and skill mismatch. Data at the industry
level can be encountered in the EUKLEMS database11, which uses NACE, the
same classification as in the ECHP database12. It is interesting to see that
even after controlling for country fixed effects, Table 5.3 displays a significant
negative correlation between growth and skill mismatch. Indeed, the associated
t-stat is -2.08 when we control for average education in the sector.
Finally, to assess the robustness of the results on employment protection leg-
islation, I also augmented the regression in Table 5.2 with other policy variables
such as unemployment insurance and the minimum wage, which may have a
10Even if one introduces unemployment as the unique regressor, the correlation between
unemployment and mismatch is close to zero (0.08).
11See Timmer et al. (2007). Unfortunately, as compared to the Total Economy Growth
Accounting Database, no data is available for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, nor for the sectors
G, I and K.
12There is nevertheless a small difference between the two databases. In ECHP, some sectors
have been aggregated and this requires some aggregation work with the EUKLEMS data in
order to make both datasets comparable. This concerns the following ECHP NACE sectors:
C+E, DD+DE, DF-DI, DJ+DK and DL-DN. I tried to aggregate TFP growth across those
sectors with employment as a weight in the calculation of the geometric averages. In this case,
the t-stat in Table 5.3 is -2.44.
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Table 5.3: Skill mismatch at the industry level: OLS regression results
TFP growth Education Constant Country Adj. R2 Obs.
Dummies
Coef. -0.018** -0.071*** 1.25*** Yes 0.8302 110
(0.008) (0.005) (0.071)
Notes: the sample regroups the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain, the UK. The following NACE sectors are also concerned: A+B, DA, DB+DC, F, H, J, L,
M, N, O-Q. Skill mismatch is the 1994-2001 average of the share of workers who answered negatively to the question
“Have you had formal training or education that has given you skills needed for your present type of work?” (ECHP
data), TFP growth comes from the EUKLEMS database and the education variable (ECHP data) is constructed
following the procedure given in Wasmer et al. (2005). Standard errors are in parentheses. * refers to the 10%
significativity level, ** to 5% and *** to 1%
similar effect on mismatch. The introduction of unemployment benefits as an
additional regressor is motivated by the works of Marimon and Zilibotti (1999),
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000) and Acemoglu (2001), which acts as a device
to help workers to find a suitable job. In Acemoglu (2001), the minimum wage
makes bad jobs unprofitable and improves the quality of the match.
Thus I ran four additional regressions. In the first one, I added to the list
of regressors the initial replacement rate as a percentage of net earnings in
work. In another regression, I used the average of net replacement rates over 60
months of unemployment as a percentage of net earnings in work. I also included
unemployment insurance benefit duration in months13. Finally, I considered
the ratio of the minimum wage to median wages of full-time workers14. Those
variables were never significant, while the significance of EPL did not change.
The Facts 1-4 will now serve as a basis for the evaluation of several models
of growth and skill mismatch.
5.3 The pure creative-destruction model
In this Section, I consider a first case, which I call “economy A”, where no
capitalization effect is present. This will allow us to assess the ability of creative
destruction alone explain skill mismatch.
5.3.1 The framework
Time is continuous. The economy A is characterized by two sectors (or
occupations15) and is populated by a continuum mass of workers normalized to
one. Each sector produces one good and the relative price is one. Production
13Unemployment benefits data comes from OECD (2006).
14The source is OECD.
15There is a debate in the literature on the specificity of human capital. While some authors
argue that human capital is sector specific - see Neal (1995) and Parent (2000) - others stress
its occupational aspect, see Kambourov and Manovskii (2006b).
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requires one unit of labor and the adoption of a technology. Sectors are identical
in the sense that they are characterized by a similar production function, but
they diverge in the nature of their human capital requirement. This generates
mismatch in the economy when coupled with random matching. In addition
technology is also heterogeneous because new vintages are more productive.
Firms enter freely each sector and in steady state each sector represents
a share 12 of total production. To start the production process a firm has to
follow a number of steps. First, as the labor market is characterized with search
frictions a` la Pissarides (2000) a firm needs to engage in a search process to
find a worker. To this end, vacancies have to be posted by firms at a flow cost
cp(t), where p(t) = egt and t is a time index. Once a vacancy is posted, the
rate at which a firm finds a worker is h = mv . This rate is equal to the ratio of
matches m to the mass of posted vacancies v in the economy. m = m(y, v) is an
increasing function of the mass of job applicants y and v, it is homogeneous of
degree one and concave. This implies that h = m(θ−1, 1) = h(θ), where θ = vy
is the labor market tightness.
Once the worker is hired, the firm adopts the frontier technology. If a match
is created at time τ , then productivity at time t ≥ τ is equal to lp(τ), where
l depends on worker’s human capital and is defined below. Firm’s profits are
equal to productivity net of the paid wage. Matches break both because of
exogenous separations (at a rate δ) or because jobs are destroyed (when profits
are driven down to zero).
Apart from their labor market state, the only source of heterogeneity among
workers is human capital, which can be of two sorts. Human capital is partly
sector specific in that the worker’s productivity is lower if she is not assigned
to the right sector16. If properly matched, l = 1, if not, l = α, with α ∈ (0, 1).
The share of workers endowed with a specific type of human capital is 12 .
As labor markets are frictional, workers can be either employed or unem-
ployed. When unemployed they search for a job and derive flow utility bp(t)
from leisure/home production, with 0 < b < α. When employed, they also
search on the job and derive flow utility equal to their wage. On-the-job search
for all workers implies that y = 1 and v = θ. Undirected search is assumed and,
due to the symmetry assumption for sectors, the rate at which a job applicant
is well matched is 12θh(θ). In the same manner, workers receive bad offers at
the same rate 12θh(θ). They may choose to reject an offer. I denote by n
g and
nb the mass of workers who are respectively well- and mis-matched and λ is the
(endogenous) share of well-matched workers willing to accept a bad offer.
From the description above, the present-discounted value of being unem-
ployed at time t is
rU(t) = bp(t) + θh(θ)
[
W g(t, t) +W b(t, t)
2
− U(t)
]
+ U˙(t), (5.31)
where dots refer to time derivatives, r is the rate at which future is discounted,
W g(τ, t) is the present-discounted value of employment in a good job at time t
which was created at time τ and W b(τ, t) its mismatched equivalent. They are
16This specification is also assumed in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). Instead of lower-
ing productivity, I could have considered that mismatch leads to a fixed cost which reduces
worker’s utility. There is no difference under this alternative as the Nash bargaining rule
assumed for the determination of wages implies that both specifications are equivalent.
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defined as follows:
rW b(τ, t) = max
{
wb(τ, t)− δ[W b(τ, t)− U(t)]
(5.32)
+θh(θ)
[
W g(t, t) +W b(t, t)
2
−W b(τ, t)
]
+ W˙ b(τ, t), U(t)
}
,
where wb(τ, t) is the wage rate at time t of a worker mismatched at time τ , and
rW g(τ, t) = max{rW g1 (τ, t) + W˙ g(τ, t), rW g2 (τ, t) + W˙ g(τ, t), U(t)}, (5.33)
where
rW g1 (τ, t) = w
g
1(τ, t) +
1
2
θh(θ)[W g(t, t)−W g(τ, t)]− δ[W g(τ, t)− U(t)] (5.34)
and
rW g2 (τ, t) = w
g
2(τ, t)−δ[W g(τ, t)−U(t)]+θh(θ)
[
W g(t, t) +W b(t, t)
2
−W g(τ, t)
]
.
(5.35)
W g2 (τ, t) and W
g
1 (τ, t) respectively refer to situations under which a properly
matched worker is willing to accept an offer from a bad match or not. The
indexes 1 and 2 actually refer to the sequencing of the search process. Newly
matched workers do not accept bad offers because current utility is high enough,
but because productivity depreciates with time, those offers turn to be interest-
ing after a while. wg2(τ, t) and w
g
1(τ, t) respectively refer to the wage rate in the
two situations. I denote by a∗ the age of a firm whose (well-matched) worker is
indifferent between her current state and accepting a bad offer.
Bellman equations for a firm can be derived in a similar way. I denote
by V (t) the present-discounted value of a posted vacancy, Jg(τ, t) and Jb(τ, t)
respectively are the values of a good and a bad job for the firm. The associated
Bellman equations are defined below and use similar notations17:
rV (t) = −cp(t) + h(θ)
(
Jg(t, t) + Jb(t, t)
2
− V (t)
)
. (5.36)
rJg(τ, t) = max{rJg1 (τ, t) + J˙g(τ, t), rJg2 (τ, t) + J˙g(τ, t), V (t)}, (5.37)
where
rJg1 (τ, t) = p(τ)− wg1(τ, t)−
(
δ +
1
2
θh(θ)
)
[Jg1 (τ, t)− V (t)] (5.38)
and
rJg2 (τ, t) = p(τ)− wg2(τ, t)− (δ + θh(θ))[Jg2 (τ, t)− V (t)]. (5.39)
17The decision of accepting bad offers when well-matched belongs to the worker, suggesting
that the max operator should not appear in (5.37). However, the Nash bargaining rule assumed
for wages implies that, if it is optimal for the worker to switch her search attitude, then the
firm is also made better off. What matters for worker’s decision is only the size of the joint
surplus.
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rJb(τ, t) = max
{
αp(τ)− wb(τ, t)− (δ + θh(θ))[Jb(τ, t)− V ] + J˙b(τ, t), V (t)
}
.
(5.310)
Free entry of firms implies that V (t) = 0, ∀t, and Nash bargaining between
firms and workers leads to the rent-sharing rule ∀i ∈ {g, b}
β[J i(τ, t)− V (t)] = (1− β)[W i(τ, t)− U(t)] (5.311)
which also implies efficient job destruction. I respectively denote by Dg and Db
job destruction of good matches and job destruction from bad matches and a¯g
and a¯b the respective age of the firm at destruction time. Figure 5.6 describes
flows between the different labor markets states. In this Figure, arrows refer to
worker flows, U refers to the unemployment state, W g to good matches and W b
to mismatches.
5.3.2 Equilibrium
How large is mismatch in the economy?
I analyze in this Section how macroeconomic variables can affect the degree
of mismatch in the economy. Call η = n
b
ng the ratio of bad to good matches. In
the Appendix, it is shown that this mismatch index takes the following value in
steady-state:
η =
1
2θh(θ) (2λ+ (1− λ)µg) + δ
θh(θ) + δ
1− µb
1− µg (5.312)
where
µg =
[
1− e−(δ+ 12 θh(θ))a∗
]
e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a
∗),
µb = e−(δ+θh(θ))a¯b
are related to destruction of good and bad jobs respectively. To compute this
index, I assume that flows in and out of each labor-market state are equal in
steady-state, i.e. n˙b = n˙g = 0.
The degree of mismatch in the economy can be affected through different
channels. Though λ is an endogenous variable it is informative to consider
two ranges of values taken by this variable. Remark that if λ = 1, i.e. any
well-matched worker is willing to accept a bad offer, then the first ratio on the
right-hand side collapses and the mismatch index merely writes as η = 1−µb1−µg .
In this case, the mismatch index is only affected by the relative outflows from
employment. But, when well-matched workers have the opportunity to reject
such offers, i.e. λ ≤ 1, this index can be influenced through other channels and
not only through λ. First, it amplifies the impact of job destruction of good
matches (through µg). The reason is that, when λ < 1, flows from good to bad
jobs are lower and the economy accumulates more good than bad jobs. As the
stock of good jobs is larger, destruction of good jobs is also larger. Second, it
leaves room for the state of the labor market θ to influence the outcome: for a
given value of λ, a bad labor market state reduces mobility from bad to good
matches. All this information is summarized in the following Lemma:
LEMMA 8. The degree of mismatch η in the economy A is
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• higher, the higher is job destruction of good matches (through an increase
in µg),
• higher, the lower is job destruction of bad matches (through an increase
in µb),
• higher, the higher is the share λ of well-matched workers willing to accept
a bad offer and
• higher, the more sclerotic is the labor market (through a decrease in θ).
• In addition, the impact of µg on η is higher the lower is λ.
Having identified the different mechanisms through which macroeconomic
variables can affect mismatch, I can now look separately at these different chan-
nels.
Wages, job destruction and switch in search attitude
Wages are continuously bargained under a Nash-sharing rule. In the ap-
pendix, I present the detailed solution for wages. For each state of the labor
market, they take on the following values:
wg1(τ, t) = βp(τ) + (1− β)bp(t) +
1− β
2
θh(θ)βSb(a¯b, θ; t, t), (5.313)
where
Sb(a¯b, θ; τ, t) =
∫ τ+a¯b
t
[αp(τ)− bp(s)]e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(s−t)ds (5.314)
is the surplus of a bad match,
wg2(τ, t) = βp(τ) + (1− β)bp(t), (5.315)
wb(τ, t) = αβp(τ) + (1− β)bp(t). (5.316)
When a worker is well matched and is not willing to accept bad offers, the wage
she receives is a weighted average of the flow utility of being unemployed and
the output the worker produces, plus an additional term, which is increasing
in the surplus of a bad match Sb(a¯b, θ; t, t) and the labor market tightness θ.
This last term is absent in equations (5.315) and (5.316) because under these
two regimes workers are willing to accept bad offers. The decision of accepting
or not some offers matters for the size of the surplus. Indeed, the values (5.32)
and (5.35) are increasing in W b(t, t), while (5.34) is not, i.e. the utility of these
workers is increased because they have more employment opportunities. As the
surplus is shared under a Nash-bargaining rule, the firm is able to extract part
of the utility derived from these additional employment opportunities during
the bargaining process18. This is why this last term appears in (5.313) and not
in (5.315) and (5.316).
From equations (5.313), (5.315) and (5.316), one can notice that, whichever
the associated labor market state is, wages always increase over time, while
output is constant. This is because the flow utility of being unemployed grows
18Put differenty, the cost of search is borne by the worker as in Pissarides (1994).
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at the same rate as technology, while a particular technology remains fixed after
a new job is created. This implies that wages can exceed output after a period
of time and jobs may be destroyed.
In the Appendix, I show how to solve for the lifetime of both good and bad
jobs. This occurs when the joint surplus is driven down to zero. The age of a
job when destroyed is independent of the time τ when the job is created and
takes the value
ga¯g = ln
(
1
b
)
, (5.317)
in the case of a good match, and
ga¯b = ln
(α
b
)
(5.318)
for a bad match. Equations (5.317) and (5.318) show that jobs last longer
the lower b, the relative opportunity cost of employment for workers, is. Those
equations also imply that bad jobs are destroyed before good jobs because output
is lower when mismatched. Finally, a higher growth rate g leads to shorter
lifetimes, increasing the pace of job destruction.
The age a∗ of a firm, whose (well-matched) worker is indifferent between her
current state and accepting a bad offer is
a∗ = argmax
a
Sg(a, a¯g, a¯b, θ; τ, t), (5.319)
where
Sg(a, z, u, θ; τ, t) =
∫ τ+a
t
[
p(τ)− bp(s)− 1
2
θh(θ)βSb(u, θ; s, s)
]
e−(r+δ+
1
2 θh(θ))(s−t)ds
(5.320)
+e−(r+δ+
1
2 θh(θ))(τ+a−t)
∫ τ+z
τ+a
[p(τ)− bp(s)] e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(s−τ−a)ds
is the joint surplus at time t < τ + a∗ of a good match which started at time
τ . The first term in equation (5.320) refers to the part of the surplus that
corresponds to the period during which the worker only accepts good offers; the
second term refers to the part when she is willing to accept bad offers, which
is discounted by the appropriate factor. Notice the following properties of the
surpluses (5.314) and (5.320), which imply that the lifetimes a¯g, a¯b and a∗ are
independent of the vintage τ :
Sb(a¯b, θ; τ, t) = p(x)Sb(a¯b, θ; τ − x, t− x) ∀τ , t and x
(5.321)
Sg(a, a¯g, a¯b, θ; τ, t) = p(x)Sg(a, a¯g, a¯b, θ; τ − x, t− x) ∀τ , t and x
Equation (5.320) illustrates a trade-off that influences the value of a∗. On
the one hand, when a∗ is high it means a longer period with a lower utility
flow because the worker misses employment opportunities from bad jobs. On
the other hand, this longer period is characterized by a lower discount rate, i.e.
since the worker does not accept bad offers, it is less likely that she quits the job.
As equations (5.321) imply that the value of Sb(a¯b, θ; t, t) increases over time,
184
this explains why a well-matched worker switches her search strategy after a
while and start accepting bad offers. This change in the search strategy occurs
when
1
2
θh(θ)p(a∗)βSb(a¯b, θ; 0, 0) =
1
2
θh(θ)
∫ a¯g
a∗
(1− bp(s)) e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(s−a∗)ds.
(5.322)
Equation (5.322) gives the first-order condition of the maximization program
(5.319). The left-hand side of (5.322) represents the gain of the switch in the
search strategy, while the right-hand side is the present-discounted value of the
loss due to the higher depreciation rate. This equation can be rewritten as
βSb(a¯b, θ; 0, 0) = Sg(a∗, a¯g, a¯b, θ;−a∗, 0), (5.323)
where the left-hand side does not depend on a∗, while the right-hand side is a
decreasing function of a∗. Figure 5.7 represents the solution to (5.323), which
is unique.
Unfortunately, no close-form solution is available for a∗. However, from
(5.322), remark that, when β = 1, a∗ = ln(1/α)g and, when β = 0, a
∗ = ln(1/b)g .
As a∗ is decreasing in β, one can establish that
ln
(
1
α
)
≤ ga∗ ≤ ln
(
1
b
)
and
a¯g − a∗ ≤ a¯b.
Finally, some comparative statics on a∗ are useful for the analysis in Sec-
tion 5.3.3. First, the derivative of a∗ with respect to θ is negative. The reason
is because of the trade-off between flow utility and discount rate, which is il-
lustrated in the first-order condition (5.322). When θ increases, workers leave
their job at a higher rate, the loss in (5.322) due to the higher depreciation rate
so gets larger, which implies a lower a∗. Graphically, this can be represented in
Figure 5.7 by a downward movement of the DD curve19. Second, the derivative
of a∗ with respect to g is negative. The reasons are the same as for the impact
of g on a¯g and a¯b. In addition, an effect similar to the impact of θ acts, implying
that g has a more pronounced effect on a∗ than a¯g and a¯b. Hence,
LEMMA 9. Lifetimes in the economy A. For a given labor market tightness
θ,
• the growth of the lifetimes a¯g, a¯b and a∗ with respect to g is negative. In
particular, the negative growth is more pronounced in the case of a∗:
– the growth rate of a¯g and a¯b is equal to − 1g , while
– the growth rate of a∗ is − 1+Cg , where C ≥ 0 is defined in the Ap-
pendix.
• the derivative of a¯g and a¯b with respect to θ is zero, while the derivative
of a∗ is negative.
19Actually, the EE curve also moves downward because the surplus of a bad match also
decreases. I show in the appendix that the net effect is anyway negative for a∗. The reason
is because of the presence of β ∈ (0, 1) in the equation characterizing the EE curve.
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Job creation
The labor market tightness θ is determined by the free entry condition,
according to which V (t) = 0 ∀t. Together with (5.36), (5.311), (5.314) and
(5.320), it implies the following job creation equation:
c
h(θ)
=
1− β
2
(
Sb(a¯b, θ; 0, 0) + Sg(a∗, a¯g, a¯b, θ; 0, 0)
)
(5.324)
The free-entry condition states that the expected cost of hiring a worker has to
be equal to the expected firm’s surplus in equilibrium. The left-hand side of
(5.324) is increasing in θ, while the right-and side is a decreasing function of θ.
As the surpluses Sb(a¯b, θ; 0, 0) and Sg(a∗, a¯g, a¯b, θ; 0, 0) are decreasing in g, one
can establish that
LEMMA 10. An increase in the growth rate g reduces the labor market tight-
ness θ in the economy A.
The result derived in Lemma 10 is common in the literature (see Pissarides
(2000)). It is a consequence of the particular structure of the model, where
the so-called capitalization effect, which states that a higher growth rate leads
to a lower discount rate of future income, is always dominated by the creative
destruction effect20.
Lemma 13 stated that for a given labor market tightness θ an increase in g
leads to a lower value of a∗. On the other hand, it also implies a lower tightness
according to Lemma 10, suggesting that the effect is ambiguous. The overall
effect of g on a∗ is actually unambiguous.
Bad job acceptance
In the Appendix, I show that the share of well-matched workers willing to
accept bad offers is
λ−1 = 1 +
δ + θh(θ)
δ + 12θh(θ)
e(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))a
∗ − 1
1− e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗) . (5.325)
This share is calculated by assuming that in- and out-flows are equal in steady-
state. The following Lemma gives the comparative statics on λ:
LEMMA 11. The share λ of well-matched workers willing to accept bad offers
in the economy A is higher
• the lower is a∗,
• the higher is a¯g and
• the lower is the labor market tightness θ.
• In addition, λ increases with an acceleration in the rate of growth g.
20Some have illustrated situations in which the effect of growth on the labor market tightness
is ambiguous. See for instance Aghion and Howitt (1994, 1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998).
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λ is decreasing in a∗ for two reasons. First, because well-matched workers
(who are not willing to accept bad offers) quit their job at a rate δ+ 12θh(θ), this
implies that the mass of those accepting bad offers is larger the earlier they start
accepting these offers. Second, when a∗ is low, the period during which they
accept bad offers is longer. This last reasoning also explains why λ is increasing
in a¯g.
Moreover, as well-matched workers willing to accept bad offers quit their job
at a higher rate (δ + θh(θ)), an increase in the job finding rate θh(θ) reduces
their mass by more than the mass of those who do not accept bad offers. Hence,
λ decreases with θ.
Finally, the effect of g on λ through a∗ dominates the impact through a¯g.
5.3.3 Growth and mismatch
I now analyze how an acceleration in the rate of growth g affects the degree
of mismatch η in the economy. Interestingly, I will illustrate that the impact
is ambiguous. For this reason, I will proceed along the following way. First,
I will depart from the situation under which workers accept any offer, that is
when λ = 1. In this case, the impact of an increase in g unambiguously reduces
mismatch. Second, by allowing well-matched workers to reject bad offers, I will
open another channel with opposite effect on the degree of mismatch.
The case where λ = 1 and exogenous tightness. Call χ = 1−µb1−µg , an index of
the relative job destruction of good to bad matches. χ increases when the rate
of destruction of good jobs increases proportionally more than bad jobs. When
λ = 1, the mismatch index writes as
η = χ =
1− e−(δ+θh(θ))a¯b
1− e−(δ+θh(θ))a¯g+ 12 θh(θ)a∗ ,
meaning that it is only affected by the destruction margin.
Lemma 13 showed that a higher g is associated with lower lifetimes a¯g, a¯b
and a∗, implying that both the numerator and the denominator of χ diminish
with g. I show in the Appendix that under the restriction λ = 1 an increase
in the rate of growth g has a negative effect on the degree of mismatch in the
economy. The reason is, because productivity is lower when mismatched, an ac-
celeration in the growth rate g increases the job destruction rate of bad matches
by proportionally more than bad matches.
Endogenous λ. Lemma 8 showed that when λ < 1 an increase in g can affect
mismatch through other channels. First, it increases the share of well-matched
workers willing to accept bad offers as stated in Lemma 11. Second, it ampli-
fies the impact of the destruction of good jobs since the economy accumulates
relatively more good jobs when λ < 1. Finally, it reduces mobility from bad to
good jobs through a decrease in the job finding rate (see Lemma 10).
Hence, an increase in the growth rate g has an ambiguous influence on the
degree of mismatch in the economy. Nevertheless, it is worth understanding
when this ambiguity is solved. The reason why mismatch diminishes under λ = 1
is because the productivity of a worker is lower when mismatched, implying that
an increase in g destroys proportionally more bad than good jobs under this
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restriction. Consequently, when α is low, this channel is likely to be dominant,
while, when α is high, a higher rate of growth likely increases mismatch:
PROPOSITION 5. An acceleration in the rate of growth g has an ambiguous
impact on the degree of mismatch η in the economy A. Indeed,
• when α is low, higher g is associated with lower η;
• when α is high, higher g is associated with higher η.
Figure 5.8 illustrates this ambiguity with two examples. In the first one,
α takes a low value, while in the second example, α is higher. Under both
specifications, an increase in g increases λ and decreases χ. However, the net
impact on η differs: in the fist case, it is negative, while it is positive in the
second case.
5.3.4 Discussion
To conclude, the ability of a purely creative destruction model to reproduce
the labor market Facts of Section 5.2 is not satisfactory.
First, the impact of an increase in the rate of growth on skill mismatch is
ambiguous, while the data in Section 5.2 suggests it is negative (see Fact 2).
In the model, it is driven by two opposite effects. The first one, which implies
that growth increases with mismatch, states that higher growth is associated
with shorter job tenure at destruction time. This in turn increases the share
of well-matched workers willing to accept bad offers because job obsolescence
is faster. The second effect implies that an acceleration in the rate of growth
increases job destruction of bad jobs by proportionally more than good jobs,
which reduces mismatch.
Second, in the purely creative destruction model, growth unambiguously
increases unemployment. Indeed, because of faster technological obsolescence,
destruction of all kinds of jobs is increased and job creation is reduced. This is
counterfactual as Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) and Fact 4 illustrate that the
impact on unemployment is negative.
Does this mean we should stop the analysis now and conclude creative de-
struction fails at explaining skill mismatch? The answer is no. As the next
Sections will show, one can solve the ambiguity of the effect of growth on mis-
match by introducing a capitalization effect into the model through technology
updating. By proceeding along this way, the creative-destruction and capitaliza-
tion effects will play complementary roles in the explanation of the labor market
facts. While capitalization can replicate the dependence of unemployment on
growth, skill mismatch can be explained thank to creative destruction.
5.4 Technology updating with no search on the
job
5.4.1 The extended framework
Now consider the case of the economy B where firms can update their tech-
nology to the frontier at time t by paying a fixed cost I(t) = ip(t). This
introduces a capitalization effect into the model as some firms are willing to
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pay the cost of updating their technology in order to get higher returns in the
future, which in turn increases job creation. I assume the cost is sufficiently low
so that well-matched firms are willing to afford it, but α is sufficiently low so
that firms in bad matches always choose not to update and prefer to dismiss
their worker. In addition, the economy is characterized by no search on the job.
The next Section will explore this possibility.
This extension has some consequences on worker flows. First, since no search
on the job takes place, no worker movement between good and bad jobs is
observed. Second, since firms in good matches are always willing to update
their technology, no destruction of good job occurs anymore. Good jobs are
only affected by exogenous separations. I introduce the notation ϕ which is the
steady-state share of good matches for which the technology is updated at any
time and is defined according to ϕ = e−δa˜, where a˜ is the period of time during
which a firm adopts a particular technology.
Figure 5.9 illustrates how flows are modified under this extension. From this
chart, one can establish that the mismatch index writes as
η = 1− µb (5.426)
Equation (5.426) is an extremely simplified version of (5.312), where the de-
struction of good jobs and on-the-job search are absent. Under (5.426), skill
mismatch is only affected by the destruction of bad matches. The labor market
tightness does not have any impact on mismatch but through µb (see below).
Bad job destruction is so a sufficient statistic of skill mismatch. Hence:
LEMMA 12. In the economy B, skill mismatch is only affected by the rate
of destruction of bad jobs. In particular, the larger this rate is, the lower is
mismatch.
The preceding Section has shown that growth could affect mismatch through
two channels. On the one hand, higher growth reduces job tenure, which in
turn increases mismatch because of random matching, i.e. workers do not have
time to find a suitable job and if they find it they quickly come back to the
pool if job seekers. On the other hand, when the pace of creative destruction
increases, bad jobs are destroyed at a proportionally higher rate than good jobs.
Equation (5.426) shows that the option of technology updating allows to shut
down the first channel, which will result in an unambiguous impact of growth
on mismatch. I will now show this statement by introducing first the modified
Bellman equations.
5.4.2 The Bellman equations
The Bellman equations for unemployment and posting a vacancy still write
as in (5.31) and (5.36), while the others are now defined as
rW b(τ, t) = max
{
wb(τ, t)− δ[W b(τ, t)− U(t)] + W˙ b(τ, t), U(t)
}
, (5.427)
rW g(τ, t) = wg(τ, t)− δ[W g(τ, t)− U(t)] + W˙ g(τ, t), (5.428)
rJb(τ, t) = max
{
αp(τ)− wb(τ, t)− δ[Jb(τ, t)− V ] + J˙b(τ, t), V (t)
}
. (5.429)
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and
rJg(τ, t) = max{p(τ)− wg(τ, t)− δ[Jg1 (τ, t)− V (t)] + J˙g(τ, t), Jg(t, t)− I(t)}.
(5.430)
The Nash bargaining rule (5.311) and the free entry condition (5.324) still apply
too.
5.4.3 Equilibrium
Wages and destruction of bad jobs
With on-the-job search, more employment opportunities may be offered to
the worker, which increases the size of her surplus. In turn, because of Nash
bargaining, firms are able to extract part of this larger surplus. This was the
case in the model of Section 5.3.
Because now I consider that the economy is not characterized by any job-
to-job transition, this affects the value of wages:
wb(τ, t) = βp(τ) + (1− β)bp(t) + βθcp(t) (5.431)
Indeed, the wage now depends positively on the labor market tightness, while
this was not the case under (5.316). It is increasing in θ, because when the labor
market tightness is high, jobs arrive to workers at a higher rate than workers
do to vacant jobs. The worker’s bargaining strength is then greater the higher
the labor market tightness is.
Following Pissarides (2000), a bad job is destroyed when the wage gets
greater than productivity, leading to the following rule:
ga¯b = ln
(
α
b+ θ β1−β c
)
. (5.432)
The presence of the labor market tightness in the above equation as opposed to
(5.318) also comes from the absence of search on the job21. Because wages in
bad jobs now increases with tightness, the lifetime of a bad job decreases with
it. Hence,
LEMMA 13. In the economy B, the lifetime of a bad job a¯b decreases
• with the rate of growth g and
• the labor market tightness θ.
Renovation
Call a˜ the age of a job when technology updating occurs. It is determined
according to
a˜ = argmax
a
Jg(τ, t)
where
Jg(τ, t) = (1− β)
∫ τ+a
t
[
p(τ)− bp(s)− β
1− β θcp(s)
]
e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds
+e−(r+δ)(τ+a−t) [Jg(τ + a, τ + a)− ip(τ + a)]
21See Pissarides (2000).
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Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), the solution to the maximization
program above is
i = (1− β)
∫ a˜
0
{1− p(s− a˜)}e−(r+δ)sds (5.433)
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998),
LEMMA 14. Renovation in good jobs occurs more frequently when
• the rate of growth g is higher and
• the cost i of updating is lower.
The intuition behind the first statement is because when the rate of techno-
logical change is faster, jobs become obsolete more quickly. Firms then need to
update their technology more frequently.
Job creation
The job creation condition (5.324) still holds in the economy B. However,
the value of the surpluses in (5.324) are changed. The firm surplus for a bad
match is
Jb(t, t) = αp(t)(1− β)
∫ a¯b
0
(1− p(s− a¯b))e−(r+δ)sds (5.434)
while the value of a well-matched firm is
Jg(t, t) =
p(t)
1− e−(r+δ)a˜
(
(1− β)
∫ a˜
0
{1− bp(s)− θβcp(s)}e−(r+δ)sds− e−(r+δ)a˜i
)
(5.435)
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), the effect of growth on the labor market
tightness is ambiguous and it depends on parameter values such as the cost
of updating technology i. If the capitalization effect is strong enough, then the
labor market tightness increases, while it decreases when the creative destruction
effect dominates.
5.4.4 Discussion
The introduction of technology updating into the model of Section 5.3 greatly
improves its ability to reproduce the labor market facts of Section 5.2. In ad-
dition, it has shown that creative destruction is an important determinant of
the average quality of jobs. First, under this extension, skill mismatch is only
determined by destruction of bad jobs. This means that creative destruction
is the only determinant of mismatch in the economy. Absent this mechanism,
a model (without search on the job) only characterized by a capitalization ef-
fect would fail at reproducing the negative correlation between mismatch and
growth. Actually if one considers such a model with endogenous job destruc-
tion as in Mortensen and Pisarides (1994), the model would predict the opposite
since job destruction would be reduced in this case.
Second, if the capitalization effect through technology updating is strong
enough, the model is also able to replicate the negative correlation between
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unemployment and growth. Indeed, the unemployment rate in the economy B
writes as22
u =
δ
δ + 12θh(θ)(2− µb)
,
implying that, if capitalization is strong enough so as to provoke an increase
in the labor market tightness which can counterbalance the effect through the
destruction of bad jobs, then growth reduces unemployment.
The following Proposition summarizes the impact of growth on both mis-
match and unemployment in the economy B:
PROPOSITION 6. In the economy B, an acceleration in the rate of growth
g
• decreases the degree of mismatch η and
• has an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate.
To conclude, capitalization and creative destruction act as complementary
effects in the economy B. While creative destruction is able to reproduce the
negative correlation between growth and mismatch in Fact 2, capitalization
can explain why growth decreases with unemployment (see Fact 4). However,
one may think of this result as not robust. Indeed, if one extends the model
by allowing for on-the-job search, then the labor market tightness may affect
mismatch too. In this case, if capitalization implies that growth increases job
creation, then a growth-induced increase in worker mobility from bad to good
jobs reduces mismatch and this decrease would not be due to creative destruction
but capitalization. The next Section explores this possibility.
5.5 Robustness: technology updating with search
on the job
5.5.1 The modified setup
I now introduce on-the-job search into the model of the preceding Section
and I call C this new economy. As the chart in Figure 5.10 suggests, this
implies that workers can now move from bad to good jobs and also between
jobs of similar quality.
For simplification, the cost i for a firm to update its technology is assumed
as low enough23 so as a˜ < a∗. In this context, the Bellman equations are as in
(5.31), (5.32), (5.36), (5.310), while the value of a good job for a worker and a
firm are respectively
rW g(τ, t) = max{wg(τ, t)+1
2
θh(θ)[W g(t, t)−W g(τ, t)]−δ[W g(τ, t)−U(t)]+W˙ g(τ, t), U(t)}
and
rJg(τ, t) = max{p(τ)−wg(τ, t)−
(
δ +
1
2
θh(θ)
)
[Jg1 (τ, t)−V (t)]+J˙g(τ, t), Jg(t, t)−I(t), V (t)}.
22The unemployment rate is calculated by assuming that flows in and out of unemployment
are equal in steady state.
23A possible way to obtain a˜ < a∗ is to set β = 0 as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998).
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Most of the equilibrium relations can be encountered in the preceding Sections.
The lifetime of a bad job is as in (5.318), the optimal age at which to update to
the new technology is as in (5.641) with r + δ + 12θh(θ) as the discount factor
and the job creation equation is (5.324) where the discount rate has also to be
modified. Thus an increase in g is accompanied by a decrease in a¯b and a˜ and
the effect on the labor market tightness is ambiguous.
5.5.2 Discussion
From the description of the model, the resulting mismatch index is
η =
δ
θh(θ) + δ
(1− µb) (5.536)
which corresponds to the case where λ = µg = 0 in (5.312), while the unem-
ployment rate is
u =
δ
δ + θh(θ)
δ + 12θh(θ)(1 + µb)
δ + 12θh(θ)
. (5.537)
As opposed to (5.426), equation (5.536) contains an expression which negatively
depends on the labor market tightness θ. Likewise the unemployment rate in
(5.537) decreases with θ and increases with µb, the variable related to destruction
of bad jobs.
(5.536) and (5.537) suggest that creative destruction is not required anymore
to explain Facts 2 and 4 in Section 5.2. Indeed, in a context where the capital-
ization effect is strong enough, a growth-induced increase in the labor market
tightness leads to a decrease in both the mismatch index and the unemployment
rate according to (5.536) and (5.537). This implies that capitalization alone is
enough to generate negative correlations between (i) growth and mismatch and
(ii) growth and unemployment, suggesting that creative destruction is useless.
However, capitalization alone would fail at reproducing the absence of cor-
relation between unemployment and mismatch in Fact 1 and 4. To reestablish
this lack of correlation, one would need to play with the destruction margin
too, which requires creative destruction. For example, consider two economies
which are characterized by the same unemployment rate. These two economies
may display important differences in their mismatch index if for instance the
first one is characterized by high θ and µb, while the second economy has low θ
and µb.
Figure 5.11 illustrates this property of the model. The y-axis of the graph
gives the share of well-matched workers, which is equal to 11+η . On this graph,
as we move to the right, we increase the job finding rate by also keeping the
unemployment rate constant, i.e. the variable µb increases as well so as to
maintain the share of unemployed constant. In this sense, the x-axis actually
gives a measure of job reallocation in the economy. The parameter δ is set to .01
and three cases are considered where the unemployment rate takes the values
.07, .08 and .09. Finally, to compute the values reported on this graph, I have
only considered equations (5.536) and (5.537) independently of the rest of the
structure of the model.
Two remarks come out of this Figure. First, job reallocation is indeed an
important determinant of the average quality of jobs in an economy. One can
maintain the unemployment rate constant and change the degree of mismatch by
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changing the job reallocation rate. Second, it is interesting to notice that as the
unemployment increases, the share of well-matched workers actually increases
too. The reason behind this observation is because when the unemployment
rate is high, the variable µb that is related to destruction of bad jobs is high
too, which lowers the degree of mismatch in the economy. This implies that in a
calibration exercise of the model, creative destruction may be an excellent tool
to lower the correlation between mismatch and unemployment. Future research
will determine the importance of this mechanism.
5.6 Employment protection
5.6.1 The extended framework
In this Section, I consider that firms are subject to a firing tax, which is
proportional to firm’s output24. If a separation occurs at time t, a firm has to
pay an amount equal to
F =
{
p(τ)f if well matched
αp(τ)f if mismatched
were f is a parameter that determines the stringency of the firing tax. In the
same manner, a worker has to pay the same amount if he gets a new job while
searching on the job. The Appendix introduces the Bellman equations resulting
from employment protection.
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), the wage profile has a two-tier struc-
ture under employment protection. When a firm and a worker first meet, the
wage is determined according to (5.311). The resulting wage is called the ‘out-
side’ wage. However, once the worker is hired, the firm’s threat point drops
because of the presence of firing costs. The so-called ‘inside’ wage is then de-
termined according to
(1− β) [W i(τ, t)− U(t)] = β [J i(τ, t)− V (t) + F ] ,
∀i ∈ {g, b}. This renegotiation of the wage leads to the following job tenures at
destruction time:
ga¯fg = ga¯g + ln (1 + rf) (5.638)
and
ga¯fb = ga¯b + ln (1 + rf) (5.639)
where a¯g and a¯b denote lifetimes of good an bad jobs without employment pro-
tection, while the upperscript f refers to the context of employment protection.
The tenure a∗ of the model in Section 5.3 is now determined according to
β
∫ a¯b
0
[α−bp(s)+rfα]e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds−f =
∫ a¯g−a∗
0
[p(−a∗)− bp(s) + rf ] e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds,
(5.640)
24This assumption is made for convenience, but it can be seen as a realistic one. For
instance, severance payments are often expressed in terms of the hitherto wage earned by the
worker. In Hornstein et al. (2006), they also consider that the firing tax is proportional to
output.
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implying that
ln
(
1
α
)
≤ ga∗ ≤ ln
(
1 + rf
b
)
,
while the optimal age of the models in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 at which to update
to the new technology follows
i = (1− β)
∫ a˜
0
{1 + rf − p(s− a˜)}e−Rsds (5.641)
where R = (r + δ) when on-the-job search is not allowed, while R = (r + δ +
1
2θh(θ)) under the alternative.
Finally, the job creation relation writes as
c
h(θ)
=
1
2
(
Jb(0, 0) + Jg(0, 0)
)− f
From the description of the model with employment protection, we can es-
tablish that
LEMMA 15. Higher firing tax f leads to
• higher job lifetimes a¯g, a¯b, a˜ and a∗ and
• lower labor market tightness θ.
Employment protection increases the lifetimes of jobs because it decreases
the threat point during wage negotiation (a tax would have to be paid if the
match ends). It also has a similar effect on a˜: when employment protection is
strong, technology obsolescence becomes less stringent and a well-matched firm
updates its technology less frequently. Finally a∗ increases when f increases:
because the surplus of a match increases (when the ’inside’ wage is paid), the
depreciation effect in (5.322) becomes less important. Graphically, it means
that the DD locus in Figure 5.7 shifts upward by more than the EE locus.
But, a∗ is also affected by another channel which does not influence a¯g and
a¯b. Indeed, the joint surplus after a match is created increases, but it is lower
at creation time as the firm anticipates it eventually have to pay a firing tax.
The lower value at entry means that alternative employment opportunities in
(5.322) become less attractive, which is graphically represented by a downward
movement of the EE curve in Figure 5.7. This second effect implies that a∗
increases by more than a¯g when the firing tax increases25.
5.6.2 Discussion: technology updating
Fact 3 in Section 5.2 presented a positive correlation between employment
protection stringency and skill mismatch. Together with Lemma 15, equations
(5.426) and (5.536) suggest that the models in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 with tech-
nology updating are able to reproduce this correlation. First, when the firing
tax is strong, the economy cannot get rid of its bad jobs easily, i.e. dµbdf < 0.
Second, low job creation is an impediment to worker mobility from bad to good
jobs, i.e. dθdf < 0. These two effects again show the complementarity between
job creation and destruction in explaining the level of skill mismatch in the
economy. Hence, the following Proposition consistent with Fact 3:
25See the Appendix for the proof.
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PROPOSITION 7. In the economies B and C, high employment protection
is associated with high skill mismatch because
• it reduces worker mobility from bad to good jobs and
• it decreases destruction of bad jobs.
5.6.3 Discussion: the pure creative-destruction model
The pure creative-destruction model is not satisfactory either in reproduc-
ing the positive correlation between employment protection stringency and mis-
match in Fact 3. Of course, the ambiguity illustrated in Proposition 5 also
influences the effect of a stronger firing tax on mismatch. But, the quantitative
importance of the destruction margin described in Proposition 5 is lower. The
reason is because an increase in the firing tax has an effect on both alternative
employment opportunities and the discount rate in (5.322), while only the dis-
count rate is affected in the case of an acceleration in the rate of growth. This
implies that for a sufficiently high value of α or f , an increase in the firing tax
leads to a lower share of well-matched workers willing to accept bad offers. This
in turn has a negative effect on skill mismatch.
Moreover, in the presence of a firing tax, the inability to reproduce Fact 2
worsens. Indeed, in Section 5.3.3, I showed that the effect of a more rapid growth
on mismatch depends on the value of α. When it is high, growth increases
mismatch, while it decreases when α is low. As (5.638) and (5.639) suggest,
employment protection plays a similar role in the model. When the firing tax is
stringent, the effect of growth on mismatch is positive. Intuitively, employment
protection reduces the strength of the destruction margin26.
5.7 Conclusion
Job reallocation is a dominant factor explaining the quality of jobs and skill
mismatch. High job creation allows worker mobility from bad to good jobs,
while high job destruction allows an economy to get rid of low-quality jobs.
Hence, skill mismatch is important when reallocation is low.
This paper has illustrated that technological change affects skill mismatch
through such a channel. First, high technology change implies capitalization.
Firms create many jobs because they anticipate high output in the future. This
in turn increases worker mobility from bad to good jobs. Second, high tech-
nology change implies high obsolescence. This generates high job destruction
because jobs get old quickly. But, when firms have the option to update their
technology, this latter may only affect bad jobs because well-matched firms
may find this option profitable. Likewise employment protection increases skill
mismatch because it reduces job reallocation. Thus capitalization and creative
destruction have complementary effects on the level of mismatch in an economy.
This complementarity implies that the concept of creative destruction should
not be completely discarded from the literature on growth and labor markets.
26Such interaction between technology and labor market institutions and its impact on
labor market outcomes can be encountered in the creative destruction literature. For example,
Hornstein et al. (2006) show in a calibration exercise that it can be an explanation of the
divergence in unemployment between Europe and the US.
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While some studies like Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) have suggested that this
concept is useless to explain the link between growth and unemployment, my
paper has shown that it still matters for skill mismatch. As a matter of fact, skill
mismatch and unemployment are poorly correlated. While a model that only
encompasses the capitalization effect would imply a strong correlation between
unemployment and mismatch, the introduction of creative destruction is an
excellent way for this correlation to die out.
5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 The pure creative-destruction model
Mismatch index η
From Figure 5.6, the law of motion of ng and nb are
n˙g =
1
2
θh(θ)(1− µg)−
[
δ +
1
2
θh(θ)(1 + λ)
]
ng,
n˙b =
1
2
θh(θ) [1− (1− λ)ng] (1− µb)− (δ + θh(θ))nb.
In steady state, the mass of well and mis-matched workers are
ng =
1
2θh(θ)(1− µg)[
δ + 12θh(θ)(1 + λ)
] ,
nb =
1
2θh(θ)(1− µb)
δ + θh(θ)
[1− (1− λ)ng] .
This implies that
1− (1− λ)ng =
1
2θh(θ) (λ(2− µg) + µg) + δ
δ + 12θh(θ)(1 + λ)
and
nb =
1
2θh(θ)(1− µb)
δ + θh(θ)
1
2θh(θ) (λ(2− µg) + µg) + δ
δ + 12θh(θ)(1 + λ)
,
leading to (5.312).
Wages
When mismatched From (5.31), (5.32), (5.310), and the free entry condi-
tion, the worker and firm surplus when mismatched are respectively
(r + δ + θh(θ))
[
W b(τ, t)− U(t)] = max{wb(τ, t)− bp(t) + W˙ b(τ, t)− U˙(t), 0}
(5.842)
and
(r + δ + θh(θ))Jb(τ, t) = max
{
αp(τ)− wb(τ, t) + J˙b(τ, t), 0
}
. (5.843)
Those two equations combined with the rent-sharing rule (5.311) imply (5.316).
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Call Sb(a¯b, θ; τ, t) = Jg(τ, t) +W b(τ, t) − U(t). Remark that from (5.842),
(5.843) and (5.316), we have
Sb(a¯b, θ; τ, t) =
∫ τ+a¯b
t
[αp(τ)− bp(s)]e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(s−t)ds. (5.844)
When well-matched and rejecting bad offers
From (5.31), (5.33), (5.37), and the free entry condition, the worker and firm
surplus when a worker is well-matched and not willing to accept bad offers are
respectively(
r + δ +
1
2
θh(θ)
)
[W g(τ, t)− U(t)] =
w1(τ, t)− bp(t)− 12θh(θ)
[
W b(t, t)− U(t)]+ W˙ g(τ, t)− U˙(t)
and (
r + δ +
1
2
θh(θ)
)
Jg(τ, t) = p(τ)− w1(τ, t) + J˙g(τ, t)
for t ≤ τ + a∗.
Those two equations combined with (5.844) and the rent-sharing rule (5.311)
imply (5.313).
When well-matched and accepting bad offers
From (5.31), (5.33), (5.37), and the free entry condition, the worker and
firm surplus when a worker is well-matched and willing to accept bad offers are
respectively
(r + δ + θh(θ)) [W g(τ, t)− U(t)] = w2(τ, t)− bp(t) + W˙ g(τ, t)− U˙(t)
and
(r + δ + θh(θ))Jg(τ, t) = p(τ)− w2(τ, t) + J˙g(τ, t)
for a∗ < t− τ ≤ a¯g.
Those two equations combined with the rent-sharing rule (5.311) imply
(5.315).
Lifetime of a job
As in Pissarides (2000), the lifetime a¯g and a¯b of a good and a bad job are
determined such that
p(τ) = wg2(τ, τ + a¯g)
αp(τ) = wb(τ, τ + a¯b)
for any given τ .
Replacing wg2(τ, τ + a¯g) and w
b(τ, τ + a¯b) in the above equations by (5.315)
and (5.316) respectively leads to (5.317) and (5.318).
198
Comparative statics on the surpluses
The following equations are derivatives of the surpluses in equations (5.314)
and (5.320):
dSb(a¯b(g), θ; 0, 0)
dg
= −b
∫ a¯b
0
se−(r+δ+θh(θ)−g)sds < 0
dSg(a∗, a¯g(g), a¯b(g), θ;−a∗, 0)
dg
= −
∫ a¯g−a∗
0
[a∗p(−a∗)+bsp(s)]e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds < 0
dSg(a∗, a¯g, a¯b, θ;−a∗, 0)
da∗
= −
∫ a¯g−a∗
0
gp(−a∗)e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds < 0
dSb(a¯b, θ; 0, 0)
dθ
= −
∫ a¯b
0
[α− bp(s)]se−(r+δ+θh(θ))sdsdθh(θ)
dθ
< 0
dSg(a∗, a¯g, a¯b, θ;−a∗, 0)
dθ
= −
∫ a¯g−a∗
0
[p(−a∗)−bp(s)]se−(r+δ+θh(θ))sdsdθh(θ)
dθ
< 0
dSb(a¯b, θ; 0, 0)
dα
=
∫ a¯b
0
e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds > 0
Knowing the expression of these derivatives is useful to understand the compar-
ative statics on a∗, which I present in the next Section.
Switch in search strategy
Comparative statics of a∗ with respect to β. From (5.322), one can
establish that
da∗
dβ
=
Sb(a¯b, θ; 0, 0)
dSg(a∗,a¯g,a¯b,θ;−a∗,0)
da∗
da∗
dβ
= −p(a
∗)
g
∫ a¯b
0
[1− bp(s)] e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds∫ a¯g−a∗
0
e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds
< 0
Comparative statics of a∗ with respect to α. From (5.322), notice that if
α = 1 then βa¯b = a¯g − a∗. Further, one can establish that
da∗
dα
=
β dS
b(a¯b,θ;0,0)
dα
dSg(a∗,a¯g,a¯b,θ;−a∗,0)
da∗
da∗
dα
= −β p(a
∗)
g
∫ a¯b
0
e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds∫ a¯g−a∗
0
e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds
≤ 0 (5.845)
The following Lemma will be useful for future proofs:
LEMMA 16. The following inequality always holds: αβ
∫ a¯b
0
e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds ≤
p(−a∗) ∫ a¯g−a∗
0
e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds.
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Proof. For the proof, I consider the case of employment protection to avoid
repetition below. Of course, the case without without employment protection
corresponds to f = 0.
Call Ω = αβ
∫ a¯b
0
e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds − p(−a∗) ∫ a¯g−a∗
0
e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds. Notice
Lemma 16 is true if α = 1 and α = b1+rf , the two extreme cases. Indeed, when
α = 1, (5.322) can be rewritten as
βα
∫ a¯b
0
[1+rf−bp(s)]e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds = p(−a∗)
∫ a¯g−a∗
0
[1+rf−bp(s)p(a∗)]e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds.
Since p(a∗) > 1, the Lemma holds in this particular case.
Moreover, when α = b1+rf , from (5.639), βαa¯b = 0 and from (5.638) and
(5.322) p(−a∗) (a¯g − a∗) = 0, implying that Lemma 16 also holds in this situa-
tion.
Let us now check whether Ω′ monotonically decreases with α:
dΩ′
dα
= β
[
1− e−(r+δ+θh(θ))a¯b
]
+ βαe−(r+δ+θh(θ))a¯b
da¯b
dα
+p(−a∗){g [1− e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)]+ e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)} da∗dα
From (5.845), which still holds under employment protection, we have
dΩ′
dα
=
β
g
{
g
[
1− e−(r+δ+θh(θ))a¯b
]
+ e−(r+δ+θh(θ))a¯b
− (g [1− e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)]+ e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)) 1−e−(r+δ+θh(θ))a¯b
1−e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)
}
The sign of this derivative is negative as a¯b ≥ (a¯g − a∗). 
Notice that one can show in the same manner that β
∫ a¯b
0
se−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds ≤∫ a¯g−a∗
0
se−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds.
Comparative statics of a∗ with respect to g. From (5.322), one can estab-
lish that
da∗
dg
=
β dS
b(a¯b(g),θ;0,0)
dg − dS
g(a∗,a¯g(g),a¯b(g),θ;−a∗,0)
dg
dSg(a∗,a¯g(g),a¯b(g),θ;−a∗,0)
da∗
,
which can be rewritten as
da∗
dg
= −a
∗
g
− bp(a
∗)
g
∫ a¯g−a∗
0
se−(r+δ+θh(θ)−g)sds− β ∫ a¯b
0
se−(r+δ+θh(θ)−g)sds∫ a¯g−a∗
0
se−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds
.
(5.846)
Lemma 16 implies that the derivative in (5.846) is negative. (5.846) too gives
the value of C in Lemma 13, which is positive or null.
Comparative statics of a∗ with respect to θ. From (5.322), one can estab-
lish that
da∗
dθ
=
β dS
b(a¯b,θ;0,0)
dθ − dS
g(a∗,a¯g,a¯b,θ;−a∗,0)
dθ
dSg(a∗,a¯g,a¯b,θ;−a∗,0)
da∗
,
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which can be rewritten as
da∗
dθ
= −
∫ a¯g−a∗
0
s[p(−a∗)− bp(s)]e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds− β ∫ a¯b
0
s[α− bp(s)]e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds
gp(−a∗) ∫ a¯g−a∗
0
e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds
.
Because of Lemma 16, one can establish that da
∗
dθ ≥ 0.
Share λ of well-matched workers willing to accept a bad offer
From the flows formulation, one can show that
ng ∝
∫ a∗
0
e−(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))ada+ e−(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))a∗
∫ a¯g−a∗
0
e−(δ+θh(θ))ada,
where the first term on the right-hand side refers to the mass of well-matched
workers rejecting any bad offer and the second term to those willing to accept
such an offer.
The above equation can be rewritten as
ng ∝ 1− e
−(δ+ 12 θh(θ))a∗
δ + 12θh(θ)
+ e−(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))a∗ 1− e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a
∗)
δ + θh(θ)
Hence, the share of well-matched workers willing to accept a bad offer is
λ =
e−(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))a∗ 1−e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a
∗)
δ+θh(θ)
1−e−(δ+12 θh(θ))a∗
δ+ 12 θh(θ)
+ e−(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))a∗ 1−e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a
∗)
δ+θh(θ)
.
Dividing both the denominator and the numerator by the numerator leads to
(5.325).
Comparative statics of λ with respect to g. Here, I only consider the case
where θ is exogenous. The case where it is endogenous will then be straight-
forward. The share of well-matched workers willing to accept bad offers writes
as
λ−1 = 1 +
δ + θh(θ)
δ + 12θh(θ)
X,
where X = e
(δ+12 θh(θ))a
∗−1
1−e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗) . The derivative of X with respect to g is
dX
dg
∝ (δ + 1
2
θh(θ))e(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))a
∗ [
1− e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)
] da∗
dg
−(δ + θh(θ))e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)
[
e(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))a
∗ − 1
]
d(a¯g−a∗)
dg .
This can be rewritten as
dX
dg
∝ (δ + θh(θ))
[
1− e−(δ+ 12 θh(θ))a∗
]
(a¯g − a∗(1 + C))
−(δ + 12θh(θ))
[
e(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a
∗) − 1] a∗(1 + C)
This derivative is negative if (δ + 12θh(θ))a
∗ > (δ + θh(θ))(a¯g − a∗), which can
be verified from (5.317) and ln
(
1
α
) ≤ ga∗ ≤ ln ( 1b ).
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Growth and mismatch
The case where λ = 1 and exogenous tightness. Under this restriction,
the mismatch index writes as
η = χ =
1− e−(δ+θh(θ))a¯b
1−
[
1− e−(δ+ 12 θh(θ))a∗
]
e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)
.
From (5.317) and (5.318), we know that da¯gdg = − a¯gg and da¯bdg = − a¯bg , with
da¯b
dg >
da¯g
dg . Hence, the derivative of η with respect to g is
dη
dg
∝ [δ + θh(θ)]e−(δ+θh(θ))a¯b
(
1− e−(δ+θh(θ))a¯g+ 12 θh(θ)a∗
) da¯b
dg
+
[
1
2θh(θ)
da∗
dg − (δ + θh(θ))da¯gdg
]
e−(δ+θh(θ))a¯g+
1
2 θh(θ)a
∗ (
1− e−(δ+θh(θ))a¯b)
which can be rewritten as
dη
dg
∝ −[δ + θh(θ)]
(
e(δ+θh(θ))a¯g−
1
2 θh(θ)a
∗ − 1
)
a¯b
+
[
(δ + θh(θ))a¯g − 12θh(θ)a∗(1 + C)
] (
e(δ+θh(θ))a¯b − 1) .
The derivative is negative if (δ + θh(θ))a¯g − 12θh(θ)a∗ ≥ (δ + θh(θ))a¯b, which
can be verified. From (5.317) and (5.318), this inequality can be rewritten as
0 > (δ + θh(θ)) ln (α) + g
1
2
θh(θ)a∗,
which is true since ln( 1b ) ≥ ga∗ ≥ ln
(
1
α
)
, implying that mismatch decreases
with g when λ = 1.
Employment protection
Bellman equations
When employment protection is introduced, the Bellman equations write as:
rW1(τ, t) = w1(τ, t)+
1
2
θh(θ)[W g(t, t)−W g(τ, t)]−δ[W g(τ, t)−U(t)]− 1
2
θh(θ)F
rW2(τ, t) = w2(τ, t)−δ[W g(τ, t)−U(t)]+θh(θ)
[
W g(t, t) +W b(t, t)
2
−W g(τ, t)
]
−θh(θ)F
rW b(τ, t) = max
{
wb(τ, t)− δ[W b(τ, t)− U(t)]
+θh(θ)
[
W g(t, t) +W b(t, t)
2
−W b(τ, t)
]
− θh(θ)F + E˙(τ, t), U(t)
}
rJg(τ, t) = max{rJ1(τ, t) + J˙(τ, t), rJ2(τ, t) + J˙g(τ, t), V (t)− F}
where
rJ1(τ, t) = p(τ)− w1(τ, t)−
(
δ +
1
2
θh(θ)
)
[J1(τ, t)− V (t)]− δF
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and
rJ2(τ, t) = p(τ)− w2(τ, t)− (δ + θh(θ))[J2(τ, t)− V (t)]− δF
rJb(τ, t) = max
{
αp(τ)− wb(τ, t)− (δ + θh(θ))[Jb(τ, t)− V (t)]− δF + J˙b(τ, t), V (t)− F
}
Comparative statics Comparative statics of a∗ with respect to f .
From (5.322), one can establish that
da∗
df
=
β dS
b(a¯b,θ;0,0)
df − dS
g(a∗,a¯g,a¯b,θ;−a∗,0)
df
dSg(a∗,a¯g,a¯b,θ;−a∗,0)
da∗
da∗
df
= (1− γ) r
g(1 + rf)
+
βp(a∗)(r + δ + θh(θ))
g(1 + rf [1− e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)])
with γ = β
∫ a¯b
0 αe
−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds∫ a¯g−a∗
0 p(−a∗)e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds
. From Lemma 16, the sign of the deriva-
tive is positive.
Comparative statics of a¯b and a¯g with respect to f . From (5.638) and
(5.639), one can establish that
da¯b
df
=
da¯g
df
=
r
g(1 + rf)
Hence,
d (a¯g − a∗)
df
= γ
r
g(1 + rf)
− βp(a
∗)(r + δ + θh(θ))
g(1 + rf [1− e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)])
with γ = β
∫ a¯b
0 αe
−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds∫ a¯g−a∗
0 p(−a∗)e−(r+δ+θh(θ))sds
. From the above equation, one can write:
d (a¯g − a∗)
df
∝ −
{
[1− α(1− e−(r+δ+θh(θ))a¯b)]r + δ + θh(θ)
}
This implies that a∗ increases by more than a¯g when f increases, resulting in
shorter period during which well-matched workers accept bad offers.
Comparative statics of λ with respect to f . Let us consider first the case
where the labor market tightness θ is exogenous. The share of well-matched
workers willing to accept bad offers writes as
λ−1 = 1 +
δ + θh(θ)
δ + 12θh(θ)
X,
where X = e
(δ+12 θh(θ))a
∗−1
1−e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗) . When the tightness is exogenous, λ is only
affected by variations in X. This is why I now only focus on the derivative of
X with respect to f :
dX
df
∝ (δ + 1
2
θh(θ))e(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))a
∗ [
1− e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)
] da∗
df
−(δ + θh(θ))e−(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗)
[
e(δ+
1
2 θh(θ))a
∗ − 1
]
d(a¯g−a∗)
df .
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This can be rewritten as
dX
df
∝ (1−γ)(δ+1
2
θh(θ))
[
e(δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a
∗) − 1
]
−γ(δ+θh(θ))
[
1− e−(δ+ 12 θh(θ))a∗
]
with γ = βαp(a∗) 1−e
−(r+δ+θh(θ))a¯b
1−e−(r+δ+θh(θ))(a¯g−a∗) ∈ (0, 1).
The sign of the derivative is ambiguous. But, the sign of the second derivative
is not, i.e. d
2X
df2 > 0 implying that X is convex in f and λ concave.
5.8.2 Technology updating with no search on the job
Mismatch index η
From Figure 5.9, the law of motion of ng and nb are
n˙g =
1
2
θh(θ)(1− ng − nb)− δng,
n˙b =
1
2
θh(θ)(1− ng − nb)− δnb −Db.
In steady state, the mass of well and mis-matched workers are
ng =
1
2θh(θ)
1
2θh(θ) + δ
(1− nb),
nb =
1
2θh(θ)(1− µb)
1
2θh(θ)(1− µb) + δ
(1− ng).
This implies that
ng =
1
2θh(θ)
1
2θh(θ)(2− µb) + δ
and
nb =
1
2θh(θ)(1− µb)
1
2θh(θ)(2− µb) + δ
,
leading to (5.426).
Wages
When mismatched
From (5.31), (5.427), (5.429), and the free entry condition, the worker and
firm surplus when mismatched are respectively
(r+δ)
[
W b(τ, t)− U(t)] = max{wb(τ, t)− bp(t)− β
1− β θcp(t) + W˙
b(τ, t)− U˙(t), 0
}
(5.847)
and
(r + δ)Jb(τ, t) = max
{
αp(τ)− wb(τ, t) + J˙b(τ, t), 0
}
. (5.848)
Those two equations combined with the rent-sharing rule (5.311) implies
wb(τ, t) = βαp(τ) + (1− β)bp(t) + βθcp(t) (5.849)
When well-matched
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From (5.31), (5.428), (5.430), and the free entry condition, the worker and
firm surplus when well-matched are respectively
(r + δ) [W g(τ, t)− U(t)] =
w1(τ, t)− bp(t)− β1− β θcp(t) + W˙
g(τ, t)− U˙(t)
and
(r + δ) Jg(τ, t) = p(τ)− w1(τ, t) + J˙g(τ, t)
for t ≤ τ + a˜.
Those two equations combined with the rent-sharing rule (5.311) imply
wg(τ, t) = βp(τ) + (1− β)bp(t) + βθcp(t) (5.850)
Lifetime of a bad job
As in Pissarides (2000), the lifetime a¯b of a bad job is determined such that
αp(τ) = wb(τ, τ + a¯b)
for any given τ .
Replacing wb(τ, τ + a¯b) in the above equation by (5.849) leads to a¯b =
ln
(
α
b+ β1−β θc
)
.
Renovation
The first-order condition is
(1− β)
[
p(τ)−
(
b+
β
1− β θc
)
p(τ + a˜)
]
= (r + δ − g)p(τ + a˜) [Jg(0, 0)− i]
(5.851)
By plugging the above equation into (5.430) one gets the solution for a˜.
5.8.3 Technology updating with search on the job
Mismatch index η
From Figure 5.10, the law of motion of ng and nb are
n˙g =
1
2
θh(θ)(1− ng − nb) + 1
2
θh(θ)nb − δng,
n˙b =
1
2
θh(θ)(1− ng − nb)− δnb −Db − 12θh(θ)n
b.
In steady state, the mass of well and mis-matched workers are
ng =
1
2θh(θ)
1
2θh(θ) + δ
,
nb =
1
2θh(θ)(1− µb)
θh(θ) + δ
(1− ng).
This implies that
nb =
1
2θh(θ)
θh(θ) + δ
δ
δ + 12θh(θ)
(1− µb),
leading to (5.536).
205
5.8.4 Figures
206
Figure 5.1: Skill mismatch in Europe, 1994-2001
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Notes: The graph depicts the evolution of the share of workers who answer positively to the question “Have you
had formal training or education that has given you skills needed for your present type of work?”. Source: ECHP
data.
Figure 5.2: Unemployment decrease and occupational mobility in EuropeUnemployment decrease and occupationnal mobility in Europe
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Decrease in unemployment
Gross occupationnal mobility
Net occupationnal mobility
Notes: the unemployment rate is the OECD standardized one and occupational mobility (ECHP data) is defined as
in Kambourov and Manoskii (2005a). The data covers the EU15.
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Figure 5.3: Unemployment decrease and industry mobility in Europe
Unemployment decrease and industry mobility in Europe
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Decrease in unemployment
Gross industry mobility
Net industry mobility
Notes: the unemployment rate is the OECD standardized one and industry mobility (ECHP data) is defined as in
Kambourov and Manoskii (2005a). The data covers the EU15.
Figure 5.4: Skill mismatch and TFP growth in Europe
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Notes: the skill-mismatch measure (ECHP data) is the 1994-2001 average share of workers who answer positively to
the following question: Have you had formal training or education that has given you skills needed for your present
type of work? TFP growth comes from the Groningen Total Economy Accounting Growth Database. The data
covers the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Spain and the UK.
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Figure 5.5: Skill mismatch and employment protection legislation in Europe
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Notes: the skill-mismatch measure (ECHP data) is the 1994-2001 average share of workers who answer positively to
the following question: Have you had formal training or education that has given you skills needed for your present
type of work? TFP growth comes from the Groningen Total Economy Accounting Growth Database. The data
covers the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Spain and the UK.
Figure 5.6: The pure creative-destruction model: flows of workers between labor
market states
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Notes: this Figure describes worker flows between the three labor market states, which are unemployment (denoted
by U), good jobs (Wg) and bad jobs (Wb). The total mass of well-matched workers is ng and nb refers to
mismatched workers. δ corresponds to the rate at which exogenous separations occur. θh(θ) is the rate at which
any worker receives a job offer. This, together with the symmetry assumption for sectors, implies that the rate at
which workers receive good (or bad) offers is 12 θh(θ). Dg and Db respectively refer to destruction of good and bad
jobs.
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Figure 5.7: The pure creative-destruction model: determination of a∗
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Notes: a∗ is the time spent on a good job after which a worker starts accepting bad offers. The Figure displays the
first-order condition characterized in equation (5.323). The worker chooses the value of a∗ by taking into account
two effects. Alternative employment opportunities get more interesting as time goes by, while accepting bad offers
increases the discount rate because workers leave their jobs at a higher pace. The EE and DD curves respectively
refer to these two effects. EE corresponds to the right-hand side of (5.323), while DD to the left-hand side.
Figure 5.8: The pure creative-destruction model: effect of an increase in g on η
under two specifications
0 0.05 0.1
0.46
0.48
0.5
g
η
α=0.6
0 0.05 0.1
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
g
χ
α=0.6
0 0.05 0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
g
λ
α=0.6
0 0.05 0.1
0.6
0.7
0.8
g
η
α=0.9
0 0.05 0.1
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
g
χ
α=0.9
0 0.05 0.1
0.2
0.4
0.6
g
λ
α=0.9
210
Figure 5.9: Technology updating with no search on the job: flows of workers
between labor market states
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Notes: this Figure describes worker flows between the three labor market states, which are unemployment (denoted
by U), good jobs (Wg) and bad jobs (Wb). The total mass of well-matched workers is ng and nb refers to
mismatched workers. δ corresponds to the rate at which exogenous separations occur. θh(θ) is the rate at which
any worker receives a job offer. This, together with the symmetry assumption for sectors, implies that the rate
at which workers receive good (or bad) offers is 12 θh(θ). ϕ is the share of well-matched workers for whom the
technology is updated and Db refers to destruction of bad jobs.
Figure 5.10: Technology updating with on-the-job search: flows of workers be-
tween labor market states
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Notes: this Figure describes worker flows between the three labor market states, which are unemployment (denoted
by U), good jobs (Wg) and bad jobs (Wb). The total mass of well-matched workers is ng and nb refers to
mismatched workers. δ corresponds to the rate at which exogenous separations occur. θh(θ) is the rate at which
any worker receives a job offer. This, together with the symmetry assumption for sectors, implies that the rate
at which workers receive good (or bad) offers is 12 θh(θ). ϕ is the share of well-matched workers for whom the
technology is updated and Db refers to destruction of bad jobs.
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Figure 5.11: Technology updating with on-the-job search: share of well-matched
workers
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Notes: The y-axis of the graph gives the share of well-matched workers, which is equal to 11+η . On this graph, as
we move from the left to the right, we increase the job finding rate by also keeping the unemployment rate constant,
i.e. the variable µb increases as well so as to maintain the share of unemployed constant. The parameter δ is set to
.01 and three cases are considered where the unemployment rate u takes the values .07, .08 and .09. To compute
the values reported on this graph, I have only considered equations (5.536) and (5.537) independently of the rest of
the structure of the model.
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